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ABSTRACT 
Using methods drawn from literary analysis, theology, and political history, Loving Liberty 
explores the relationship between Milton’s thinking about liberty and his practice of 
scriptural interpretation. It argues that Milton advances a model of a free society ultimately 
modeled on the charitable relations between the Father and the Son, who in his view differ 
essentially from one another. This model of liberated unity in difference derives from, and 
responds to, Milton's encounter with the Reformation ideal of each believer reading the 
Bible for him or herself, along with the social chaos that accompanied the resulting 
proliferation of interpretations. Using a complex concept of charity, Milton’s writings 
imagine a society in which all are free to use scripture in highly individualized ways that 
nevertheless conduce to unity rather than chaos. In the end, the very interpretative practice 
through which Milton thinks his way toward this model also stands as its shining example, 
culminating in a rich body of writing that creatively re-imagines scripture and that invites its 
readers to use these new creations or not, as charity demands and in keeping with their own 
freely exercised gifts. In contrast to what he calls “obstinate literality” and “alphabetical 
servility” in The Doctrine and Discipline of Divorce, Milton’s liberated interpretative method 
requires the interpreter to generate his or her own Bible, whether by radically reassembling 
the text (as Milton does in De Doctrina Christiana), by prophetically speaking the scripture 
written on one’s heart (as Michael teaches Adam to do in Paradise Lost). 
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A Note on Texts 
 
Because this study focuses on interpretative practice, it calls for an awareness also of 
the peculiar forms of interpretation performed by editions and translations of texts. I have 
therefore striven to quote from texts in versions that reflect as few degrees of mediation as 
possible (recognizing that no absolutely unmediated versions exist). This has meant quoting 
from early modern editions wherever possible. Unless otherwise noted, these have been 
accessed from Early English Books Online, or, where relevant, from Eighteenth Century Collections 
Online. I cite bibliographical numbers from the 2nd edition of the Short-Title Catalogue (STC) 
for books published before 1640; from Wing’s Short-Title Catalogue (Wing) for books 
published after 1640, with the exception of tracts in the Thomason collection, which I cite 
by British Library shelfmark; and from the English Short Title Catalogue (ESTC) for eighteenth-
century books. I have regularized i/j, u/v, vv/w, and long s when quoting from early 
modern texts (except in titles, though I regularize long s there as well). I have otherwise 
retained old spelling. Typographic features such as italics, ligatures, and small caps are in the 
original unless otherwise noted. I have silently corrected obvious typographical errors, such 
as “u” for “n” and so on. Regarding dates of publication, I treat the year as beginning on 1 
January; thus, The Reason of Church-Government was published in February, 1642, not 1641. I 
use short titles for convenience. 
While I have consulted the Yale edition of Milton’s prose extensively, I do not 
provide cross-references, as it includes page numbers from the seventeenth-century printings 
and thus makes reference easy for anyone who wishes it. In quoting from the 1674 edition of 
Paradise Lost, however, I have given book and line numbers for convenience, taking these 
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from Barbara Lewalski’s 2007 Blackwell edition. I have also drawn on the resources of the 
online Milton Reading Room hosted by Dartmouth College. Though I do not quote from 
modern editions, I am greatly indebted to the valuable work performed by their editors, 
whose scholarship continues to teach me how to face with style and grace the daunting 
challenges posed by the transmission of literary texts over hundreds or even thousands of 
years, as in the case of the Bible. 
Scriptural texts pose particular difficulties, considering the proliferation of early 
modern translations and the great variation even among different editions of the same 
translation. Where the version being used in a particular instance can be ascertained, I have 
quoted from that version. Otherwise, I have quoted from the 1612 edition of the King 
James Version, STC 2219. This was the first edition of the KJV printed in roman type; its 
orthography was more “modern” than the 1611 black letter edition; and it provided the basis 
for most future editions. I have likewise quoted from this edition when referencing scriptural 
passages independent of any particular early modern usage. 
Milton’s De Doctrina Christiana introduces its own set of textual problems. The only 
edition of the Latin text currently available is still the initial one done by Charles Sumner in 
the early 19th century, which is helpfully reprinted in the Columbia Complete Works. Following 
the publication of the Columbia edition in the 1930s, Maurice Kelley devoted decades to the 
careful study of the manuscript, providing extensive textual apparatus in the appendix to his 
book This Great Argument in 1941 and subsequently in 1973 in the appendix to Volume VI of 
the Yale Complete Prose, which he edited. The Yale edition, alas, does not provide a Latin text, 
meaning that anyone interested in knowing what the manuscript actually says must piece this 
together from the Columbia edition text (and its own textual apparatus), along with Kelley’s 
 x 
first thoughts of 1941 and his revised views of 1973, and then hope that something 
approaching accuracy has been the result. 
Fortunately, the forthcoming edition of De Doctrina Christiana for the Oxford Complete 
Works, prepared by John K. Hale and J. Donald Cullington, promises to make detailed 
information about the manuscript—and a Latin text freshly edited from it—readily available 
in a single volume, along with a new translation and extensive annotation. As this edition is 
not yet available, however, I have been obliged to find a workable solution for the purposes 
of this project. Seeking to balance the fact that untranslated blocks of Latin might prove an 
obstacle to readers (including, in other circumstances, myself) with my argument’s reliance 
on Latin diction and manuscript revisions, I have begun by using the various textual notes 
available to cobble together my own representation of the manuscript, with insertions 
signaled by angle brackets and deletions by strikethrough. This I have then translated, in a 
manner aimed more at workmanlike representation of Milton’s Latin than at English 
eloquence, and placed in the body of the text, with the Latin appearing in the notes. Where 
manuscript revisions are particularly at issue, however, I have put both Latin and English in 
the body. I have cited the text by manuscript page number (gleaned from the Yale edition, 
which confusingly departs from other volumes in the edition by using bracketed page 
numbers to mark the beginning, rather than the end, of a page in the original), followed by 
parenthetical reference to both Columbia and Yale. 
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 1 
Introduction 
 
 What does Milton’s thinking about liberty owe to his practice of scriptural 
interpretation? The old Whiggish view that a theory of individual liberty was implicit in the 
Reformation has given way to more recent scholarship that finds Milton’s republicanism to 
have been derived entirely from the secular sources of Roman history and Machiavelli’s 
Discorsi on Livy.1 The Whig view has rightly been discredited, but my dissertation seeks to 
augment the neo-roman account of Milton’s thinking by placing it within a larger framework 
of Christian political thought. Milton, it will argue, departs radically from Reformation 
norms of scriptural interpretation, and in doing so he attempts to solve the social problems 
resulting from those norms, with the consequence that his interpretative practice stands as 
the pre-eminent model of his concept of liberty. This concept and its attendant practice are 
at once grounded in the key Reformation assumption that individuals ought to read the Bible 
for themselves and markedly distinct from the usual ideas about what such reading should 
actually entail. The factor that distinguishes Milton’s mode of liberated interpretation from 
its forebears turns out to be a complex notion of charity, ultimately modeled on the divine 
relationship between the Father and the Son, that he develops quite richly over the course of 
his career: whence my title, Loving Liberty. 
                                                
1 For an influential reaction against the former view, see Herbert Butterfield’s seminal The Whig 
Interpretation of History (London: G. Bell and Sons, 1931). For examples of the latter view, see the 
essays in Milton and Republicanism, ed. David Armitage, Armand Himy, and Quentin Skinner 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995). 
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 After all, the Reformation model of individuals reading the scriptures for themselves 
almost immediately produced adverse social consequences. A Pandora’s box of proliferating 
interpretations and the ensuing social chaos prompted both Luther and Calvin to argue that 
Christian believers owe their rulers relative deference. In the conclusion to the Institutes 
(1536-60), for instance, Calvin writes: 
civil government has its appointed end, so long as we live among men, to cherish 
and protect the outward worship of God, to defend sound doctrine of piety and the 
position of the church, to adjust our life to the society of men, to form our social 
behavior to civil righteousness, to reconcile us with one another, and to promote 
general peace and tranquility.2 
For Milton, however, such deference quickly turns Christian subjects into slaves, particularly 
when it entails authorizing civil government to meddle in affairs of conscience (as it almost 
inevitably does when one of government’s purposes is “to defend sound doctrine of piety”). 
Individuals, according to the social thinking of the magisterial Reformers, are in an 
important sense not really at liberty to read the scriptures for themselves. Loving Liberty 
explores Milton’s attempts to realize this liberty in ways that avoid the twin perils of 
centralized control and social chaos. 
As Quentin Skinner has influentially demonstrated, Milton’s political thinking takes 
opposition to slavery as its starting point.3 Although Skinner’s demonstration rests on 
Milton’s relationship to Roman texts, his observation also holds true for Milton’s language 
                                                
2 John Calvin, The Institutes of the Christian Religion, ed. John T. McNeill, trans. Ford Lewis Battles 
(Louisville: Westminster John Knox Press, 2006 [1960]), 1487 (IV.xx.2). 
3 Quentin Skinner, Liberty before Liberalism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 37-57. 
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regarding scripture, as Chapter One shows. Milton’s attempts to articulate a positive 
alternative to religious slavery build on interconnected scriptural ideas of liberty and charity. 
Speaking in A Treatise of Civil Power in Ecclesiastical Causes (1659) of the relationship between 
“beleef and practise,” Milton writes in a way that doubly emphasizes the interrelation of 
liberty and charity in his thought: “Nay our whole practical dutie in religion is containd in 
charitie, or the love of God and our neighbour, no way to be forc’d, yet the fulfilling of the 
law; that is to say, our whole practise in religion.”4 First, charity is “no way to be forc’d,” 
meaning that for Milton the slightest hint of compulsion fatally undermines charity, which 
can exist only if free. Second, charity is the “fulfilling of the law,” meaning that, according to 
the Pauline teaching that Christ sets believers free from the bondage of the law, charity is the 
very key to this liberty. The importance of charity to Milton’s thinking about liberty suggests 
that in his hands this concept is anything but fuzzy or facile. Indeed, because Milton offers 
the combination of liberty and charity as a positive alternative to the negative of centralized 
religious control, establishing with some precision just what he means by charity at various 
times in his career is a major task of this dissertation.  
Milton’s efforts to articulate this alternative face a significant obstacle in the practical 
need for social order. For instance, the heresiographer Thomas Edwards implies that 
Milton’s writings on divorce pose an antinomian threat, because they hold that “man in 
regard of the freedome and eminency of his creation, is a law to himself in this matter, being 
head of the other sex, which was made for him, neither need he hear any judge therein above 
                                                
4 John Milton, A Treatise of Civil Power (London, 1659), 38-39. Wing M2185. 
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himself.”5 Edwards subsequently drew attention to a case of this threat’s being realized by 
“Mistris Attaway the Lace-woman,” who after reading Milton’s The Doctrine and Discipline of 
Divorce saw fit to leave her “unsanctified husband” and “[run] away with another womans 
husband.”6 This troublesome case aptly illustrates the challenge that Milton faces in trying to 
find an orderly way to bring a carefully nuanced interpretative concept of charity to bear on 
the muddled complexities of erotic love, not to mention on society at large. 
 Milton develops this concept of charity out of some particularly rich thinking 
structured by the idea of proportion, which undergirds his efforts to find a form of social 
order compatible with individual interpretation. The roots of this thinking lie in an 
Augustinian interpretative principle called the “analogy of faith,” which posits a deep 
structure or governing proportion to the meaning of scripture as a whole. The most basic 
Christian doctrines serve to define this proportion, which manifests itself most clearly, 
therefore, in the “plain places” of scripture. These passages can then be used to bring 
difficult or obscure passages into harmony with the holistic structural meaning of scripture.7 
The definitive quality of these plain places gives them a creedal quality; indeed, J. N. D. Kelly 
finds proto-creedal qualities in such New Testament tropes as kurios Iesous [Jesus is Lord] and 
in more complex statements like “God, Who has raised Jesus from the dead.” 
Methodologically speaking, using the analogy of faith typically involves gathering a set of 
                                                
5 Thomas Edwards, Gangræna (London, 1646), 34. Thomason E.323[2]. For an excellent recent study 
of this important work, see Ann Hughes, Gangraena and the Struggle for the English Revolution (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2004). 
6 Thomas Edwards, The Second Part of Gangræna (London, 1646), 10-11. Thomason E.338[12]. 
7 Augustine, De Doctrina Christiana, ed. and trans. R. P. H. Green (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), 
III.ii.2. 
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plain places such as these and then resolving difficulties by working from the assumption 
that they represent the deep structure of scripture. Thus, even though the scriptures do not 
explicitly establish a formal statement of belief, a small set of the most basic doctrines can, 
so the thinking goes, be gathered from the scriptures without much difficulty. This set of 
core doctrines came to be known in the second century, through the writings of Irenaeus 
and Tertullian, as “the rule of faith [regulam fidei]”—the same term later appropriated by 
Augustine to denote a method for interpreting difficult passages of scripture by recourse to a 
gathering of plain ones.8 In this way, Augustine’s method works both to articulate and to 
enforce a particular cultural code, as evidenced by his use of this method immediately 
following its definition to “correct” the Arian punctuation of John 1:1.9 This need for 
enforcement also explains why Augustine includes the authority of the church alongside the 
plain places of scripture as a key determinant of the analogy, in addition to showing that the 
analogy of faith fundamentally functions as an instrument of control—which remained true 
even after Protestant polemicists dispensed with Augustine’s inclusion of the authority of the 
church in the analogy and tried to refer all arguments to scripture alone. 
Mary Thomas Crane’s study of the “notebook method” of sixteenth-century 
humanism reveals some of the social implications of this Augustinian methodology. The 
                                                
8  On the proto-creedal statements and their connection to Apostolic tradition, see J. N. D. Kelly, 
Early Christian Creeds 3rd ed. (New York: Longman, 1972), 1-29. On creeds and baptism, see pp. 30-61 
passim. On Irenaeus, see pp. 76-82; on Tertullian, see pp. 82-88. The roots of the rule of faith in 
Apostolic authority were, of course, important to Irenaeus’s polemic against the Gnostics. Augustine 
uses “regulam fidei” later in De Doctrina Christiana (IV.20.40) to render the phrase analogian pisteos 
(“analogy” or “proportion of faith”) from Romans 12:6. 
9 Augustine, De Doctrina Christiana, III.ii.3. 
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notebook method, like the analogy of faith, works through a tripartite process of searching, 
gathering, and framing. This method, Crane argues, developed in response to the increasing 
centralization of the English state under the Tudors, which created a need for bureaucrats 
schooled in a common cultural code and primed to wield its authority. The cultural code in 
question appeared scattered throughout classical texts, and the measure of whether one had 
assimilated this code lay in one’s ability to gather the relevant fragments and then to “frame” 
(or arrange) them authoritatively. 
To be sure, there are significant differences between the kind of humanist gathering 
studied by Crane and the long-established Augustinian practice of gathering and framing 
scriptural passages. For one, gatherings undertaken according to Augustine’s method 
purport to speak for the Bible as a whole—what William Whitaker in the sixteenth century 
called “the perpetual sense of scripture [perpetua sententia Scripturæ].”10 Even though gathered 
verses of scripture necessarily lose some of their contextual situatedness, they nevertheless 
remain grounded in their source text—the Bible considered as a whole—to a far greater 
extent than the “aphoristic fragments” of classical antiquity gathered by sixteenth-century 
humanists point back to their respective source texts.11 Be this as it may, Protestant regimes 
had an interest, noted above in the quotation from Calvin’s Institutes, in the doctrines that 
their subjects derived from reading the scriptures. In this sense, the analogy of faith could 
also function as a kind of cultural code, according to which a person’s cultural authority 
depends in part on gathering and framing the right passages in the right way. While “correct” 
                                                
10 William Whitaker, Disputatio de Sacra Scriptura (Cambridge, 1588), 353. STC 25366. 
11 Crane, 4. 
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scriptural gathering alone could not suffice to produce cultural authority, incorrect gathering 
might be enough to threaten it, as nearly happened in the case of Whitaker with respect to 
the Lambeth Articles.12 
 Crane’s study provides a useful lens for perceiving Milton’s simultaneous reliance on 
and departures from both the analogy of faith and the notebook method, thus helping to 
situate Milton’s efforts at claiming cultural authority. Her analysis of Thomas Wilson’s 1551 
logic treatise The Rule of Reason offers one helpful contrast with Milton’s practice. According 
to Crane, Wilson’s purpose is “that of convincing a middle-class audience … that Protestant 
beliefs were logical, and that they could be effectively marshaled and controlled through the 
practices of gathering and framing.” In service of this project, Wilson deploys “[m]etaphors 
of dismantling or ‘unknitting’ erroneous beliefs and replacing them with a carefully 
constructed single edifice (or ‘frame’) of Protestant truth,” with the aim of “demonstrat[ing] 
the proper way to frame, fashion, or construct arguments in English that are congruent in 
shape with Protestant doctrine.” The geometric language of “congruent in shape” indicates 
the close kinship between what Wilson is doing and the analogy of faith. Crane repeatedly 
emphasizes Wilson’s desire to control or confine the arguments stemming from Protestant 
doctrine—and this desire, I suggest, is not unrelated to Wilson’s dedication of his treatise to 
Edward VI, nor to his argument for, as Crane puts it, “the need to elevate those who do the 
                                                
12 Elizabeth Gilliam and W. J. Tighe “To ‘Run with the Time’: Archbishop Whitgift, the Lambeth 
Articles, and the Politics of Theological Ambiguity in Late Elizabethan England,” The Sixteenth 
Century Journal 23, no. 2 (1992): 325-40. 
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framing to positions of authority.”13 Wilson hopes that logic and a humanist bureaucracy 
backed by monarchical power might tame the unruliness of a religion rooted in sola scriptura. 
This example shows that the analogy of faith fundamentally functions as an instrument of 
control—even after Protestant polemicists dispensed with Augustine’s inclusion of the 
authority of the church in the analogy and tried to refer all arguments to scripture alone. 
Milton does not believe that orderly Protestantism depends on the same 
centralization of religious authority for which Wilson argues; rather, he envisions a more 
diffuse kind of order—one in which liberty can obtain—by taking Augustine’s interpretive 
principle back to its scriptural origins in the writings of Paul, where the principle of analogy 
or proportion refers not to scripture, but to the church. Writing in Romans 12:3 that “God 
hath dealt to every man according to the measure of faith,” Paul uses proportion in verses 4-
6 to explain how diversely gifted members can cohere within the unified body of Christ: 
For as we have many members in one body, and all members have not the same 
office: So we being many are one body in Christ, and every one members of one 
another. Having then gifts, differing according to the grace that is given unto us, 
whether prophecie, let us prophecie according to the proportion [Greek: analogian] of 
faith. 
Within this model, each member’s exercise of gifts in keeping with his or her proportional 
place within the body serves as the guarantor of that body’s unity and order. Milton connects 
this framework for order with the Augustinian emphasis on interpreting the scriptures. In his 
                                                
13 Mary Thomas Crane, Framing Authority: Sayings, Self, and Society in Sixteenth-Century England 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993), 26-30. Cf. Thomas Wilson, The Rule of Reason (London, 
1551). STC 25809. 
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view, the process of searching and gathering scripture requires the use of spiritual gifts, and 
because each member is differently gifted within the orderly body of Christ, the outcomes 
(or resulting frameworks) of individual interpretative processes can be both diverse and 
harmonious at the same time. 
 For Milton, this harmony in diversity can be attained only through charity; otherwise, 
his mode of thinking about the proportion of faith would seem to exacerbate the negative 
social consequences of proliferating interpretations more than it would alleviate them. In its 
simplest form, charity means that each member ought not interfere with the others’ 
performances of their due functions. To paraphrase Paul in 1 Corinthians 12:14-30, the eye 
ought not concern itself with the business of smelling, except insofar as the prevention of 
“schisme in the body” requires that “the members should have the same care one for 
another” (verse 25). Different members, in other words, will perceive the same text 
differently (as in the adage about every problem resembling a nail when one’s only tool is a 
hammer), and yet Paul affirms that such necessarily partial interpretation serves the greater 
divine end. The members, as Paul writes in 1 Corinthians 13:4, should neither envy the 
others nor vaunt themselves—but they should seek to fulfill their given roles: “Follow after 
charitie, and desire spirituall gifts, but rather that yee may prophesie” (1 Corinthians 14:1). 
“The proportion of faith,” then, refers to the careful balance that must be struck between 
exercising one’s own capacities fully and ensuring that one does not encroach on the free 
exercise of others’. 
 Throughout his career, Milton gives different forms to this notion of a charitably 
balanced Pauline/Augustinian proportional order-in-diversity. Chapter One tracks his initial 
development of these ideas in his prose works of the early 1640s: the antiprelatical tracts 
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(1641-42), the divorce tracts (1643-45), and Areopagitica (1644). In the antiprelatical tracts, he 
insists that the bishops hinder the necessary and proper use of spiritual capacities: “For not 
only the body, & the mind, but also the improvement of Gods Spirit is quickn’d by using. 
Whereas they who will ever adhere to liturgy, bring themselves in the end to such a passe by 
overmuch leaning as to loose even the legs of their devotion.”14 These tracts make adherence 
to set forms—whether liturgical or scriptural—out to be a form of slavery, while Milton 
argues for a form of church-government that will facilitate the free exercise of every 
Christian believer’s spiritual gifts. He urges a similar exercise in the preface to the second 
edition of The Doctrine and Discipline of Divorce:  
Let the statutes of God be turn’d over, be scanned a new, and considered … by men 
of what liberall profession soever, … able to shew us the waies of the Lord … with 
divine insight and benignity measur’d out to the proportion of each mind and spirit, 
each temper and disposition, created so different from each other, and yet by the 
skill of wise conducting, all to become uniform in vertue.15 
Milton’s concluding appeal to uniformity of virtue balances his acknowledgment that 
tempers, dispositions, and even “the proportion[s] of each mind and spirit” differ. 
Parliament—the addressee of Milton’s preface—paradoxically stands in the way of this 
uniformity (even as the Westminster Assembly is attempting to work out a new mode of 
religious uniformity), and Milton urges its members to use their capacities to help rather than 
hinder. 
                                                
14 John Milton, An Apology (London, 1642), 48. Thomason E.147[22]. 
15 John Milton, The Doctrine & Discipline of Divorce, 2nd ed. (London, 1644), fol. A4r. Thomason 
E.31[5]. 
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 Accordingly, Milton displays his own liberty in the way that he uses scripture to 
advance his arguments in these early tracts, where he tends to use the analogy of faith 
obliquely. That is, the “plain places” he gathers often have an at-best tangential relationship 
to the controversial matter at hand. In practice this means, with regard to the antiprelatical 
tracts, that he advances his argument by means of scriptural allusions designed to cast 
prelatical episcopacy as an impediment to the liberated, proportional exercise of spiritual 
gifts rather than through direct engagement with scriptural proof-texts having to do with 
ecclesiology. Milton’s rhetorical circumstances in the divorce tracts necessitate that he deal 
with proof-texts directly, and yet he does so primarily by recourse to “the rule of charity,” an 
analogical principle according to whose terms the proof-texts in question are difficult places 
in need of harmonization by a liberated interpreter. He accomplishes this harmonization by 
arguing that literalistic (or “slavish”) interpretation of these passages uncharitably results in 
subjecting people to the bondage of bad marriages.  
Milton’s liberated methods have led to modern-day descriptions of these early tracts 
as “exercises in how to make Scripture mean what you want it to mean.”16 These 
descriptions, while factually accurate in a sense, radically over-simplify what Milton is doing 
with scripture in his early prose. For one, they overlook an aspect of Milton’s relationship to 
the analogy of faith that continues throughout his career: a recognition that the analogy is in 
some sense extra-scriptural. Even though it is grounded in scripture, the analogy ultimately 
works because it is an abstraction from scripture, which paradoxically distinguishes it from 
                                                
16 See, e.g., Annabel Patterson, Milton’s Words (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 116, from 
which this quote is taken. 
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the text even as it purports to represent that text with particular fidelity. Along with the 
realization that such abstractions depend on who does the abstraction, this paradox creates 
an opportunity that Milton will seize with increasing vigor as his career progresses: a chance 
to reorganize the Bible according to his own liberated sense of it, and to do this not only 
without betraying the Bible, but to do it because the Bible itself requires it (as when Acts 
17:11 commends the Bereans for searching all things). 
 The interrelation of liberty and charity in Milton’s early prose reaches new levels of 
sophistication in his unpublished theological treatise of the late 1650s, De Doctrina Christiana. 
Critics have long recognized Milton’s treatise as a radical reorganization of scripture. The 
treatise does not, however, mention in any particularly prominent way the analogy of faith, 
which, based on the precedents of his early prose, might seem to offer a rationale for this 
reorganization. Whereas one of the major sources on which Milton drew in compiling his 
treatise, Johannes Wolleb’s Compendium Theologiæ, treats the analogy of faith in canon 19 out 
of 22 in its introductory explanation of the methodology governing the treatise as a whole, 
Milton buries it at the end of a list of interpretative criteria in Book I Chapter 30.17 This 
obscure placement contrasts, for instance, with his earlier prominent reference to “the drift 
and scope of Christian profession” in the concluding sentence of the preface to The Reason of 
Church Government.18 In the early prose, Milton’s practice at least bears some resemblance to 
                                                
17 Johannes Wollebius, Compendium Theologiæ Christianæ (London, 1647), 7. Wing W3258. Cf. Milton, 
De Doctrina Christiana, 390 (CE, XVI, 264; CPW, VI:582). 
18 John Milton, The Reason of Church-Government (London, 1642), 3. Invocations of the analogy of faith 
often use phrases like “the general tenor of scripture” or similar references to Christian belief as a 
whole. See, e.g., William Whitaker, A Disputation on Holy Scripture, trans. William Fitzgerald 
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traditional uses of the analogy of faith. With the divorce tracts, the unorthodoxy of his 
practice (which has not yet changed considerably from that of the antiprelatical tracts) 
becomes more apparent. In De Doctrina Christiana, however, Milton’s practice bears so little 
resemblance to Augustine’s principle that calling it by the same name would only foster 
confusion. This shift in emphasis shows that, while the long lists of scriptural quotations in 
De Doctrina Christiana obviously depend on a logic of searching, gathering, and framing, 
Milton has replaced the control-oriented analogy of faith with a new methodology aimed at 
facilitating a community defined by interpretative liberty. 
 As his model for this liberated community, Chapter Two argues that Milton uses the 
relations between Father and Son to model the charitable balance between using one’s own 
capacities and leaving others free to do the same. Milton insists that Father and Son do not 
share a unified essence, which means that if they are united (as Jesus says in John 17 that 
they are), it must be in other ways, and among these Milton lists charity. Milton’s extended 
exposition of how the Son relates to the Father thus illuminates his writings about charity 
elsewhere in the treatise. Milton concludes the introductory epistle to his treatise by asking 
his readers to use it charitably, and given his professed departure from all of the systematic 
theologies he had consulted, this seems like a rhetorically wise move. Milton is also inviting 
his readers, however, to do what he has done by reassembling the Bible into their own 
theological treatises. He assumes that these will diverge from his own, but by making charity 
                                                
(Cambridge [UK], 1849), 472. Cf. Whitaker, Disputatio de Sacra Scriptura (Cambridge, 1588), 353. STC 
25366. 
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one aspect of the harmonious relationship between Father and Son, he asserts that this 
divergence is in keeping with divine ends and can therefore be borne charitably. 
In this way, Milton’s treatise rejects an important aspect of the humanist logic of 
framing studied by Crane. While the treatise exemplifies gathering of an extraordinarily 
meticulous sort, and while it certainly arrays these fragments in a new and idiosyncratic 
framework, it crucially eschews any claims to be providing a definitive new Protestant 
cultural code. That is, Milton does not use framing to construct for himself an authority of 
the same kind aimed at by his sixteenth-century humanist forebears; rather, he claims a sort 
of second-order authority, meaning that he—like any other member of the “universal 
churches of Christ [Universis Christi Ecclesiis]” to which he addresses his treatise—is divinely 
authorized only to participate in (and therefore not to arbitrate or resolve) the diffused 
process of working toward a definitive and unified doctrine.19 This is in contrast to the 
humanist emphasis on popularizing (to a certain extent) access to the centralized authority of 
the bureaucratic, though essentially monarchical, state—a mode of power markedly unlike 
the charitable form of kingship that Milton argues is exercised by the Son. 
 Paradise Lost takes to a logical extreme the notion that Christian liberty requires 
believers to reorganize the Bible for themselves according to the proportion of faith. As 
Chapter Three argues with regard to the poem’s final books, Michael’s presentations to 
Adam of what many readers will recognize as biblical history are, in an important sense, not 
biblical at all—and not only because the Bible does not yet exist within the poem’s temporal 
                                                
19 John Milton, De Doctrina Christiana, 1 (CE, XIV:2; CPW, VI:117). See the Note on Texts for more 
information about how I cite Milton’s treatise. 
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framework. Rather, Michael’s presentations result from his exercising liberty to creatively 
organize information given to him by the Father, and a major part of his purpose is to teach 
Adam an interpretative posture (the proportion of faith) that will enable him to respond 
creatively to the presentations as he learns to exercise a similar liberty. In this light, Michael’s 
presentations show that the eventual compilation of the Bible will be one result of such 
liberated, creative processes. The proportion of faith, then, becomes a creative means 
whereby individuals use their liberty to re-shape divine materials that might be received in a 
variety of forms, of which written scripture is but one. 
 Charity crucially informs the model of liberty at work in these final books of Paradise 
Lost. There, the Father delivers information about the future to Michael with a charge that 
invites Michael to use his own discretion in deciding how he will organize that information 
in presenting it to Adam. Michael then follows the Father’s example by shaping his 
presentations in ways that carefully preserve the contingency of Adam’s future, thereby 
leaving Adam at perfect liberty to interpret and respond to the coming events in whatever 
way he sees fit. Michael’s goal is not for his pupil to assimilate useful facts about the future; 
rather, it is to instill in Adam an interpretative posture that will enable him to use his liberty 
well in meeting future challenges. This emphasis on interpretative posture marks a 
development in Milton’s thinking about the proportion of faith. Perhaps because Adam and 
Eve are the only people then in existence, their place in the abstract body of Christ becomes 
at once more difficult to imagine and, in a way, less relevant to their current situation. The 
result is a radical focus on how individuals ought to manage their particular interpretative 
tasks, and yet, paradoxically, this focus makes Milton’s thinking, hitherto obsessed with the 
particularities of difference, more easily universalizable. 
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 A contrast with Milton’s practice in De Doctrina Christiana will illustrate the universal 
potential of his vision in the conclusion of Paradise Lost. The theological treatise makes broad 
allowance for difference among liberated interpreters searching and gathering from the Bible 
for themselves, but while this approach certainly demands a charitable approach to a broad 
range of individual differences, it nevertheless looks for difference only within the fairly 
narrow stratum of human experience devoted to interpretation and exegesis. That is, anyone 
might do as Milton does by compiling, in effect, a personal Bible, down to choosing the 
individual words in many cases—and Milton is quite prepared to tolerate the inevitable 
differences that arise from other people following his example—but not everyone can do as 
Milton does. Indeed, few people have the resources of education, reference materials, and 
time that Milton could devote to this project. Everyone, however, has a future of 
undetermined, yet finite duration, and the question of how to meet that future remains a 
persistently vital one. To this universal human challenge, Milton offers a broadly applicable 
solution in the conclusion of Paradise Lost. As with De Doctrina Christiana, his readers might 
find that using this solution charitably requires not using it at all, but then Milton, with a 
charity all his own, has already both anticipated and accepted precisely that contingency. 
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Chapter One 
Liberty and Interpretation in Milton’s Early Prose 
 
The language of slavery reverberates throughout Milton’s prose writings of the early 
1640s. His first forays into prose pamphleteering were five tracts arguing for reform of 
English church-government, and in the last of these “antiprelatical” tracts, An Apology 
(1642), Milton writes that “God hath inseparably knit together” religion and “native liberty,” 
and that “they who seek to corrupt our religion are the same that would inthrall our civill 
liberty.”1 Later in the same tract, Milton writes of the bishops that “their doctrine was plainly 
the dissolution of law which only sets up sov’ranty, and the erecting of an arbitrary sway 
according to privat will, to which they would enjoyne a slavish obedience without law; which 
is the known definition of a tyrant, and a tyranniz’d people.”2 Such political instances do not, 
however, exhaust Milton’s uses of slavery as a trope. In the first of his five subsequent tracts 
advocating reform of divorce law, The Doctrine and Discipline of Divorce (1643), Milton says that 
marriage can be a form of slavery: 
What thing more instituted to the solace and delight of man then marriage, and yet 
the mis-interpreting of some Scripture directed mainly against the abusers of the Law 
for divorce giv’n them by Moses, hath chang’d the blessing of matrimony not seldome 
                                                
1 John Milton, An Apology (London, 1642), 38. Thomason E.147[22]. 
2 Ibid., 53. 
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into a familiar and co-inhabiting mischiefe; at least into a drooping and disconsolate 
household captivitie, without refuge or redemption.3 
Here, slavery results from the misinterpretation of scripture at least as much as it does from 
the tyranny of people in authority.  
Indeed, Milton often links slavery and misinterpretation in his early prose, as in this 
passage from Tetrachordon (1645), which, together with the simultaneously published 
Colasterion, concluded his writings on divorce: 
For what can be more opposite and disparaging to the cov’nant of love, of freedom, 
& of our manhood in grace, then to bee made the yoaking pedagogue of new 
severities, the scribe of syllables and rigid letters, not only greevous to the best of 
men, but different and strange from the light of reason in them, save only they are 
fain to stretch & distort their apprehensions, for feare of displeasing the verbal 
straightnesse of a text, which our owne servil feare gives us not the leisure to 
understand aright.4 
The connection between slavery and misinterpretation takes two forms: the use of 
misinterpretation to enslave others, and the idea that misinterpretation itself results from 
slavish, literalistic approaches to scripture. Both of these aspects come together when Milton 
writes in The Doctrine and Discipline of Divorce that practitioners of “obstinate literality” enforce 
                                                
3 John Milton, The Doctrine and Discipline of Divorce (London, 1643), 2. Thomason E.62[17]. Cited 
hereafter as Doctrine (1643) to distinguish from the expanded second edition of 1644. 
4 John Milton, Tetrachordon (London, 1645), 37. Thomason E.271[12]. Because of an error in the 
pagination at the beginning of signature G, this is the tract’s second p. 37. John Milton, Colasterion 
(London, 1645). Thomason E.271[11]. 
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an “alphabetical servility” on people harmed by their interpretations.5 In opposition to these 
forms of slavery Milton presents “the cov’nant of love, of freedom, & of our manhood in 
grace,” as well as “the leisure to understand aright.” These positive values reflect St. Paul’s 
notion that, by entering into the Christian covenant, people who had hitherto been slaves in 
bondage to the law become sons and heirs of God.6 Understanding the scriptures, Milton 
argues, requires the charitable exercise of Christian liberty, which bondage to the letter 
hinders, if not prevents outright. 
 This chapter will argue that Milton’s early prose makes just such a “liberated” 
attitude to scriptural interpretation the key to escaping slavery, whether personal, domestic, 
or civil. This argument challenges two influential veins of recent scholarship. One is Quentin 
Skinner’s argument that Milton’s thinking on liberty derived primarily from his reading of 
Roman history and Machiavelli’s Discorsi, and in due course this chapter will argue that, while 
Milton certainly looks to the Roman past for positive precedents, he systematically treats 
scriptural notions of Christian liberty as even better than the good Roman alternative. In 
other words, Skinner’s argument is persuasive, but it only tells part of the story. Annabel 
Patterson gives voice to the other vein when she writes that “Milton’s divorce pamphlets are 
exercises in how to make Scripture mean what you want it to mean.”7 The nub of Patterson’s 
comment is “what you want it to mean,” which suggests that Milton’s scriptural 
interpretation smacks of ulterior motives—probably beginning with his wife Mary’s 
                                                
5 Milton, Doctrine (1643), 22. This use of “literality” predates the first instance recorded in the OED 
by three years. 
6 See Rom. 8:12-17 and Gal. 3-4. 
7 Annabel Patterson, Milton’s Words (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 116. 
 20 
departure after a mere month of marriage and then building as he apparently contemplated a 
new marriage with a certain Miss Davis.8 These motives are presumably the same as those 
that one assumes led the infamous Mrs. Attaway to abandon her “unsanctified husband” for 
another married man.9 A more honest interpreter, by implication, ought to have let scripture 
dictate his motives instead of the other way round. By accusing Milton of self-interested 
misinterpretation, Patterson hints at the possibility that he is acting tyrannously by seeking to 
use the authority of scripture to foist his own opinions off on others. He might, moreover, 
unwittingly be in bondage to his own interests. Patterson performs a valuable service by 
drawing attention to these potential pitfalls of Milton’s interpretative practice; nevertheless, 
this chapter aims to trace his (possibly unsuccessful) attempts at avoiding them. 
 On one level, Patterson is right: especially in the divorce tracts, Milton is using 
scripture to suit his rhetorical purposes, and those purposes do dictate that certain passages 
cannot be taken at face value and indeed must mean something like the opposite of what 
they superficially seem to say. What this perspective leaves unexamined, however, are 
Milton’s efforts to make this interpretative practice fadge with the very sense of scriptural 
authority that dictates his need to engage with the passages in question, especially as 
scriptural authority serves as a bulwark against antinomianism. The present chapter, then, 
will probe Milton’s attempts to develop a scriptural justification for his interpretative 
practice, in the process engaging his complex thinking about how self-interest and 
                                                
8 For the biographical background to Milton’s divorce tracts, see Barbara K. Lewalski, The Life of John 
Milton (Oxford: Blackwell, 2000), 154-85 and Gordon Campbell and Thomas N. Corns, John Milton: 
Life, Work, and Thought (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 150-77. 
9 Thomas Edwards, The Second Part of Gangræna (London, 1646), 10-11. Thomason E.338[12]. 
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interpretation ought to relate to one another. In these attempts, Milton frequently invokes 
the rhetoric of liberty and slavery as he seeks to establish a rhetorical authority that avoids 
the perils of slavish literalism on the one hand and libertine antinomianism on the other. 
 
Liberty, Slavery, and Scripture 
Milton uses the tropes of liberty and slavery to engage the question of how 
interpreters ought to relate to the scriptural text. What Milton means by liberty appears in 
how he uses a key interpretative principle known as the analogy of faith, or the idea that the 
plain places of scripture collectively afford a general sense of scripture that can be used to 
clarify obscure passages. The roots of this principle lie in scripture; Augustine derived it 
from Romans 12:6, which reads, “Having then gifts, differing according to the grace that is 
given to us, whether prophecie, let us prophecie according to the proportion of faith.”10 As 
Dayton Haskin notes, because of its ostensible basis in scripture, the analogy of faith “served 
as a nearly perfect disguise under which, consciously or unconsciously, tacit presuppositions 
might be imported into one’s interpretative work.”11 Milton similarly recognized that the 
analogy of faith is not quite as scriptural as it purports to be; rather, it is an abstraction from 
scripture, one whose quality depends on who does the abstracting and how it is carried out. 
Milton displays this recognition in the preface to his fourth antiprelatical tract, The Reason of 
                                                
10 For Augustine’s definition of his “rule of faith,” see his De Doctrina Christiana, ed. and trans. R. P. 
H. Green (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), III.ii.2. 
11 Dayton Haskin, Milton’s Burden of Interpretation (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 
1994), 81. 
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Church-Government (1642), where he calls the analogy of faith “the drift and scope of Christian 
profession”: 
Let others therefore dread and shun the Scriptures for their darknesse, I shall wish I 
may deserve to be reckon’d among those who admire and dwell upon them for their 
clearnesse. And this seemes to be the cause why in those places of holy writ, wherein 
is treated of Church-government, the reasons thereof are not formally, and profestly 
set downe, because to him that heeds attentively the drift and scope of Christian 
profession, they easily imply themselves[.]12 
Milton uses the idea of scriptural clarity (and his own adherence to it) to explain why the 
reasons of church-government need not be “formally, and profestly set downe” in scripture. 
His tract, in other words, will advance its argument less from direct scriptural evidence in 
favor of “presbyterial” government than from a confluence of scriptural themes that 
together condemn prelatical episcopacy and promote the idea that all members of the church 
should be free to exercise their God-given gifts.13 When he responds in Colasterion to the 
charge of adding an unscriptural “only” to the rule he had applied in The Doctrine and 
                                                
12 John Milton, The reason of church-government urg’d against prelaty (London, 1642), 3. Thomason 
E.137[9]. 
13 I use the term “presbyterial” (which is Milton’s own: see Reason, 49) instead of “presbyterian” 
because nowhere in the antiprelatical tracts does Milton advocate Presbyterianism on the Scottish 
model. For a useful bibliography of the view that Milton’s tracts hew to the “Presbyterian party line” 
and a thoughtful challenge to it, see Ken Simpson, “‘That Sovran Book’: The Discipline of the Word 
in Milton’s Anti-Episcopal Tracts,” Of Poetry and Politics: New Essays on Milton and His World, ed. P. G. 
Stanwood (Binghamton, NY: Medieval & Renaissance Texts & Studies, 1995), 313-25. Campbell and 
Corns, 148-50, acutely examine the issues that ought to prevent our identifying Milton too closely 
with Presbyterianism at this early stage in his career. 
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Discipline of Divorce, that “Love only is the fulfilling of every Commandment,” Milton candidly 
admits that this process of abstraction permits him to take liberties with the text: “I cited no 
particular Scripture, but spake a general sense, which might bee collected from many 
places.”14 The notion that “the drift and scope of Christian profession” needs to be 
“heed[ed] attentively” suggests that perceiving the analogy of faith will itself require the 
exercise of such spiritual gifts.15 Accordingly, much of Milton’s argument depends on using 
this abstract sense of scripture to show how the bishops tyrannically impede the use of 
spiritual gifts, not least by fogging up scriptural clarity with antiquarian citations and so on. 
 Because Milton’s approach to scripture depends on themes whose relation to the 
matter at hand is admittedly indirect, it carries significant antinomian potential: given this 
arrangement, can’t he make scripture mean whatever he wants it to?16 Milton’s attempt at 
                                                
14 Milton, Colasterion, 21. Cf. Milton, Doctrine (1643), 12. 
15 Milton also uses “Christian profession” to denote the analogy of faith in Doctrine (1643), 6, where 
he treats “God-forbidd’n loneliness” as an indispensibly scriptural doctrine. 
16 The charge of antinomianism was one frequently leveled at opponents of episcopacy by its 
supporters, as in this attack by Bishop Hall against the Independent Henry Burton’s notorious tract 
The Protestation Protested (1641), which argued that the Church of England was popish and therefore 
could not protest popery unhypocritically. Hall characterizes Burton’s position thus: “any thing that 
is by order and authority is burthensome; you idolize onely the calves of your owne making, that is, 
of your crazed imagination. But how shall this humor of yours suit with the unity of a Church? can 
many shreads of cloth make a garment, and doe not you remember that Christs coat was without a 
seame? Nay, for that you care not, you will be very loth to plead right in Christs Testament; My peace I 
leave you; for a needlesse feare to be polluted with the antichristianisme of Ecclesiasticall courts. These 
who are in Civill or Ecclesiasticall power, may from thence learne, what a narrow circle you confine 
them within; nor should they take this ill, when some of you, the Antinomians, doe pretend 
immunity from the morall Law, the Law of God himselfe[.]” Although Hall treats “the Antinomians” 
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articulating a liberated interpretative practice presents him with a constant challenge to assert 
a positive model of order, for doing nothing more than rejecting the false order of slavish 
interpretation could open the doors to social chaos. Milton strives toward such a positive 
model by returning Augustine’s analogy of faith to its original Pauline context, which is a 
discourse of spiritual gifts: “For I say, through the grace given unto me, to every man that is 
among you, not to thinke of himselfe more highly then he ought to thinke, but to thinke 
soberly, according as God hath dealt to every man the measure of faith” (Romans 12:3). St. 
Paul then offers the metaphor of “one body in Christ” composed of many diverse members, 
before urging those gifted with prophesy to exercise their gift “according to the proportion 
of faith” (Romans 12:4, 6). Milton seizes on this notion of proportion governing the use of 
gifts within the body of Christ—and therefore providing that body’s organizing principle—
to counter the antinomian potential of his theory of liberated scriptural interpretation. The 
idea of proportion also provides him with ample occasion to attack the bishops by arguing 
that they, in effect, are the real antinomians, both exercising their own gifts out of order and 
tyrannously preventing most Englishmen from such orderly exercise themselves. Milton’s 
concept of Christian liberty, then, depends on people taking their duly proportioned places 
in the body of Christ, thinking of themselves neither too much nor too little, neither 
impeded in the use of their own gifts nor using them to the impediment of others. 
 With characteristic audacity, Milton offers himself as the chief example of a free 
Englishman resisting tyrannical enslavement by the bishops. He makes his self-interest in the 
                                                
as a subset of the greater antiepiscopal movement, in this passage he accuses the movement at large 
of being on a slippery slope toward antinomianism. Joseph Hall, A Survay of That Foolish, Seditious, 
Scandalous, Prophane Libell, The Protestation Protested (London, 1641), 8. Thomason E.164[8]. 
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matter of church-government quite clear in the autobiographical digression to The Reason of 
Church-Government, where he describes “those intentions which have liv’d within me ever 
since I could conceiv my self any thing worth to my Countrie”: 
that none hath by more studious ways endeavour’d, and with more unwearied spirit 
that none shall, that I dare almost averre of myself, as farre as life and free leasure 
will extend, and that the Land had once had once infranchis’d her self from this 
impertinent yoke of prelaty, under whose inquisitorius and tyrannical duncery no free 
and splendid wit can flourish.17 
Somewhat paradoxically, Milton treats the fact of prelatical tyranny both as an impediment 
to the achievement of his literary goals and as an all-consuming call to deploy his talents, 
even if only those of his left hand. Milton claims that in pursuing his own interest he is 
pursuing the interests of many, writing in An Apology (1642) that in attacking prelacy “I 
conceav’d my selfe to be now not as mine own person, but as a member incorporate into 
that truth whereof I was perswaded[.]”18 This sense of himself as a “member incorporate” 
enables Milton to justify his claims to exceptionalism, because he can present himself as 
exercising unique spiritual gifts in a manner appropriate to his particular place in the body 
(whether Christian or political): by advancing his own ends, he would have his readers 
believe, he is advancing theirs as well. 
 A considerable rhetorical burden falls, therefore, on Milton’s claims to be 
representing interests beyond his own—claims, incidentally, that the bishops also make for 
                                                
17 Milton, Reason, 40. 
18 Milton, An Apology, 3.  
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themselves. One of Milton’s most frequent attacks on the bishops is that they worship the 
gods of their own bellies, that is, that they pursue their own interests at the expense of those 
whom they ought to be serving. The tit-for-tat accusations of self-interest that result from 
these mutually exclusive claims to other-centeredness often involve charges that one’s 
opponent lacks charity, as when Milton attacks Bishop Hall in his third antiprelatical tract, 
Animadversions (1641):  
Your charity is much to your fellow offendors, but nothing to the numberlesse 
soules that have beene lost by their false feeding; use not therefore so sillily the name 
of Charity as most commonly you doe, and the peacefull attribute of God to a 
preposterous end.19 
St. Paul treats charity as the ultimate spiritual gift, indeed as the sine qua non of the rest, with 
the locus classicus of 1 Corinthians 13 immediately following his seminal discussion of gifts in 
chapter 12. Unsurprisingly, then, charity takes pride of place in Milton’s redefined analogy of 
                                                
19 John Milton, Animadversions (London, 1641), 62. Thomason E.166[11]. In response to a petition 
signed by some 15,000 London citizens (possibly including Milton) advocating the abolition of 
episcopacy “with all its dependances, rootes and branches,” Bishop Joseph Hall, author of the official 
defense of episcopacy commissioned by Archbishop Laud, semi-anonymously addressed a Humble 
Remonstrance to parliament. This met with a response from five divines—Stephen Marshall, Edmund 
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Animadversions constitutes a point-by-point response to this Defence. Anon., The First and Large Petition 
of the Citie of London (London, 1640). Thomason E.156[20]. Joseph Hall, Episcopacie by Divine Right 
(London, 1640). Thomason E.203[8]. Joseph Hall’s A Defence of the Humble Remonstrance (London, 
1641). Wing H378. Smectymnuus, An Answer to a Booke Entitvled An Hvmble Remonstrance (London, 
1641). Thomason E.161[4]. 
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faith, which he uses both to establish his own rhetorical authority and to destroy the 
bishops’. In this way, as is too little recognized, the antiprelatical tracts lay a crucial 
foundation for the “rule of charity” that Milton will invoke in the divorce tracts. 
  
Free and Charitable Interpretation 
 A basic logical pattern runs through the arguments in both Milton’s antiprelatical 
tracts and his divorce tracts: ecclesiastical authorities have been working tyrannically to 
impede scriptural interpretation, with the result that many English people suffer under 
bondage; a free and charitable interpretation, meanwhile, would liberate these people, but its 
charity requires defense against charges of antinomianism. This pattern raises questions 
about just how certain interpretative practices conduce either to slavery or to freedom. It 
also challenges the conventional view that Milton’s own interpretative practice underwent a 
radical shift between the two sets of tracts. As it turns out, these two sets of issues bear 
powerfully on one another, for the conventional wisdom assumes that Milton’s interpretative 
practice was not as free as he supposed.  
Arthur Barker influentially characterized the shift between sets of tracts as one from 
unconscious bias to logical rationality. He writes that that the antiprelatical tracts rest “upon 
the fundamental assumption that reformation according to the word of God and true liberty 
are inseparable,” and that Milton furthermore “was so convinced of the truth of [this] 
assumption as to be scarcely aware that definitions [of its terms] were necessary.” Barker 
subtly accuses Milton of doing something un-Miltonic, that is, of leaving his assumptions 
unexamined. He suggests that such examination did occur, however, when Milton turned to 
the subject of divorce in 1643-1645: “If Milton’s thought on divorce possesses a new 
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firmness as a result of his private struggle with passion and depression, it also reveals the 
effects of the necessity, imposed on him by his subject, of thinking less zealously and more 
logically.”20 In effect, Barker suggests that in writing the antiprelatical tracts Milton was an 
unwitting slave of his own zeal, but that in writing the divorce tracts reason took the reins 
over from passion. Stanley Fish extends Barker’s psychological explanation of the shift to 
argue that Milton manipulates scripture unconsciously in the antiprelatical tracts, but quite 
consciously in the divorce tracts: Milton’s anxieties about interpretation drive him toward 
silence in Of Prelatical Episcopacy, whereas in The Doctrine and Discipline of Divorce he claims to 
have produced the definitive interpretation.21 
 Milton’s practice does shift between the two sets of tracts, but less than these critics 
suppose, and not in the way that they suppose: in the divorce tracts Milton must confront 
scriptural texts directly in a way that had not been necessary in the antiprelatical tracts. That 
is, in the earlier tracts Milton attacked the institution of episcopacy for all sorts of reasons, 
but he writes much less voluminously than other contributors to the debate do about the 
direct scriptural bases of church-government (although he does argue at length that it should 
be based in scripture).22 He cannot advocate a new approach to divorce, however, without 
                                                
20 Arthur Barker, Milton and the Puritan Dilemma (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1942), 19-20, 
71-72. 
21 Stanley Fish, “Wanting a Supplement: The Question of Interpretation in Milton’s Early Prose,” in 
Politics, Poetics and Hermeneutics in Milton’s Prose, ed. David Loewenstein and James Grantham Turner 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 41-68. 
22 Contrast Milton’s tracts with the ongoing exchange between Bishop Hall and Smectymnuus, both 
of whom fill a vastly greater number of pages than Milton does in debating the scriptures that 
ostensibly bear directly on church-government. 
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running abruptly into Jesus’ apparent prohibition of divorce in Matthew 19. Nevertheless, in 
both sets of tracts he uses similar tactics to approach the small set of scriptures generally 
presumed directly relevant to the debate at hand.  These tactics involve using the analogy of 
faith to show that the sense of scripture as a whole (as opposed to some subset of relevant 
proof-texts) favors Milton’s view and condemns his opponents’. 
 Just as he will do in the divorce tracts, in the antiprelatical tracts Milton consistently 
prefers using the abstract sense of scripture (which he identifies with liberty) to methods 
based in proof-texts (that is, the slavery of literalism). This preference appears, for instance, 
in his singular use of Psalm 137. The literature of the church-government debates frequently 
references this psalm, because its mention of the Edomites’ chanting “Down with it, down 
with it, even to the ground” at the destruction of Jerusalem by the Babylonians conveniently 
seems to echo the attitude toward episcopacy of its opponents.23 The psalm’s verses could be 
invoked quite literally, as in Stephen Marshall’s much-reprised sermon insisting that God in 
some cases really does require his people to brain babies on rocks, as expressed in the 
psalm’s concluding verse: “Blessed shall hee be that taketh thy children: and throweth them 
against the stones.”24  
                                                
23 I quote the psalm text from The booke of common prayer and administration of the sacraments, and other rites 
and ceremonies of the Church of England (London, 1637). STC 16404.9. The frequency of references to 
this psalm likely also results from its use in the tract that brought the debate, long simmering, to a 
boil: see Hall, Episcopacie by Divine Right, II:5-6. Hall’s tract is paginated by section. 
24 Stephen Marshall, Meroz cursed (London, 1642), 11-12. Thomason E.133[19]. This sermon was 
apparently preached over sixty times, beginning with a delivery before a Parliament so enthusiastic in 
its reception that immediate publication of the text was ordered. Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, 
s.v. “Marshall, Stephen.” Cf. Paul Stevens, “Intolerance and the Virtues of Sacred Vehemence,” in 
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This literalism contrasts markedly with Milton’s use of the psalm to attack Bishop 
Hall, who had frequently suggested that the anti-episcopal consortium Smectymnuus should 
blush at their shoddy scholarship.25 Hall made the mistake of repeating this suggestion 
shortly after a reference to Psalm 137, drawing the following response from Milton: 
This is a more Edomitish conceit than the former, and must be silenc’d with a 
counter quip of the same countrey. So often and so unsavourily has it been repeated, 
that the Reader may well cry, Downe with it, downe with it for shame. A man would 
think you had eaten over liberally of Esaus red porrage, and from thence dreame 
continually of blushing; or, perhaps, to heighthen your fancy in writing, are wont to 
sit in your Doctors scarlet, which through your eyes infecting your pregnant 
imaginative with a red suffusion, begets a continuall thought of blushing.26 
This passage draws on Genesis 25:30, which explains that Esau got the name Edom 
(meaning “red”) from the color of the lentils in Jacob’s pottage—“And Esau said to Jacob, 
Feed mee, I pray thee, with that same red pottage: for I am faint; therefore was his name 
called Edom”—but there is no sense in which that particular verse bears on the debate 
about church-government: its interest is primarily etiological. Milton does not use the verse 
to prove anything or to advance any particular course of action; rather, he reads it through a 
sense of scripture in which Hall’s episcopal office renders him captive to its worldly 
accoutrements (e.g., “Doctors scarlet”), thereby fatally undermining his own capacity to read 
                                                
Milton and Toleration, ed. Elizabeth Sauer and Sharon Achinstein (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2007), 258. 
25 See note 11 above for more on the controversy between Hall and Smectymnuus. 
26 Milton, Animadversions, 60 (CPW, I:725). 
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scripture clearly. Milton is using an incidental detail gathered from scripture in service of a 
point that he considers scriptural more in a structural than in a local, literal sense. 
 In both sets of tracts, Milton’s structural sense of scripture has three core 
components: Christian liberty (contrasted with its corollary forms of slavery), charity, and a 
commitment to preserving the proportion of the body of Christ. These components appear, 
for instance, in this passage from The Reason of Church-Government: 
But there is yet a more ingenuous and noble degree of honest shame, or call it if you 
will an esteem, whereby men bear an inward reverence toward their own persons. 
And if the love of God as a fire sent from Heaven to be ever kept alive upon the 
altar of our hearts, be the first principle of all godly and vertuous actions in men, this 
pious and just honouring of our selves is the second, and may be thought as the 
radical moisture and fountain head, whence every laudable and worthy enterprize 
issues forth.27 
Milton’s use of the word “ingenuous,” which means “freeborn,” establishes “inward 
reverence toward their own persons” as a defining characteristic of free people.28 Charity 
appears in the notion that the love of God is the first principle of virtuous action, which 
encapsulates Christ’s summation of the commandments in Mark 12:29-31—love God and 
neighbor as yourself—with 1 Timothy 1:5, which Milton cites frequently in the divorce 
                                                
27 Milton, Reason, 53. 
28 For the rich history of “ingenuous” in seventeenth-century usage, see Robert Greene, “Whichcote, 
Wilkins, ‘Ingenuity,’ and the Reasonableness of Christianity,” Journal of the History of Ideas 42 no. 2 
(1981): 227-52. Greene’s analysis influenced Haskin, 42-45, which in turn influenced Joanna 
Picciotto, “The Public Person and the Play of Fact,” Representations 105 no. 1 (2009): 96. 
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tracts: “the end of the commandment is charity.”29 In this way, charity and liberty are 
mutually constitutive: only on the basis of due self-esteem can one really love one’s neighbor 
as oneself.  
 Preserving the orderliness of the body of Christ—Milton’s guard against 
antinomianism and the resulting forms of slavery—appears in his complex notion of self-
esteem. Asking how a person might ascend to “the love of God which from this self-pious 
regard cannot be assunder,” Milton answers, 
no better way doubtlesse then to let him duly understand that as he is call’d by the 
high calling of God to be holy and pure, so is he by the same appointment ordain’d, 
and by the Churches call admitted to such offices of discipline in the Church to 
which his owne spirituall gifts by the example of Apostolick institution have 
autoriz’d him.30 
Milton argues that episcopacy, by preventing the members from exercising their spiritual 
gifts, impedes their due self-esteem. Persistently likening the members’ resulting condition to 
bondage or slavery, he writes that the bishops have “condemn[ed] the rest of Gods 
inheritance to an injurious and alienat condition of Laity” and thereby “excluded the 
members of Christ from the property of being members, the bearing of orderly and fit 
offices in the ecclesiastical body[.]”31  
                                                
29 In all these verses, as in 1 Cor. 13, the locus classicus on charity, the relevant Greek word is either the 
noun agape or the verb agapao—meaning that they all deal with the same kind of love. 
30 Milton, Reason, 54. 
31 Ibid., 52. 
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Milton illustrates this exclusion and the resultant disorder in Of Reformation, where he 
composes a fable that characterizes episcopacy as an enormous wen growing next to the 
head of the body politic. The wen addresses the proper members of the body in an attempt 
to justify his prominent position, saying 
That as in place he was second to the head, so by due of merit; that he was to it an 
ornament, and strength, and of speciall neere relation, and that if the head should 
faile, none were fitter then himselfe to step into his place; therefore hee thought it 
for the honour of the Body, that such dignities and rich indowments should be 
decreed him, as did adorne, and set out the noblest Members. 
The fable concludes with a philosopher rising to condemn the wen for displacing “the 
lawfull and free-borne members” and promising to reveal its true excremental nature by 
cutting it off and opening it up.32 Part of the wen’s problem is that he does not have a 
correct estimation of himself: he considers himself worthy of the dignities pertaining to the 
body’s “noblest Members,” when what makes the members noble is their freeborn ingenuity, 
not the pride of a particular place in the body. This faulty estimation leads the wen to disrupt 
the natural order, or proportion, of the body, in which each member freely occupies its due 
place. In this way Milton characterizes the bishops as the real antinomians. 
 The fable of the wen raises questions, though, about just how the body’s natural 
order is to be preserved. If Milton uses the wen’s putrid self-elevation to figure episcopacy as 
an antinomian threat, then what is to prevent recrudescence among the individual members, 
especially ones, like Milton, who consider themselves to be extraordinarily gifted? 
                                                
32 John Milton, Of Reformation (London, 1641), 54-56. Thomason E.208[3]. 
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Opponents of presbyterial government feared that it would lead to a pope in every parish, 
but Milton argues, paradoxically, that only Christian liberty can ensure that each member 
remains in its proper place: 
But when every good Christian thoroughly acquainted with all those glorious 
privileges of sanctification and adoption … shall be restor’d to his right in the 
Church, and not excluded from such place of spirituall government as his Christian 
abilities and approved good life in the eye and testimony of the Church shall preferre 
him to, this and nothing sooner will open his eyes to a wise and true valuation of 
himselfe, which is so requisite and high a point of Christianity, and will stirre him up 
to walk worthy the honourable and grave imployment wherewith God and the 
Church hath dignifi’d him…. Then would the congregation of the Lord soone 
recover the true likenesse and visage of what she is indeed, a holy generation, a royall 
Priesthood, a Saintly communion, the houshold and City of God.33 
God, so the argument goes, has distributed gifts to all, thereby creating the body of the 
church. Allowing the free exercise of these gifts will lead the members to an understanding, 
not attainable by any other means than experience, of what their places are, complete with a 
grasp of the attendant privileges and limitations. This understanding Milton calls “a wise and 
true valuation” of oneself, and it would encourage each member to fill his or her station 
honorably. Meanwhile, the “more ingenuous and noble degree of honest shame” would 
discourage encroachment on other’s places.  
                                                
33 Milton, Reason, 54-55. 
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Still more powerful than honest shame to the preservation of the body’s order is 
charity; as Milton writes in Animadversions, 
The eminence of the Apostles consisted in their powerfull preaching, their unwearied 
labouring in the Word, their unquenchable charity, which above all earthly respects 
like a working flame, had spun up to such a height of pure desire, as might be 
thought next to that love which dwels in God to save soules; which, while they did, 
they were contented to be the off-scouring of the world, and to expose themselves 
willingly to all afflictions, perfecting thereby their hope through patience to a joy 
unspeakable.34 
In Milton’s ecclesiological framework, the Apostleship is an explicitly extraordinary calling 
and might therefore seem to grant some legitimate claim to special pre-eminence, yet charity 
leads its holders not to glorying in their high calling, but to willing contentment with being 
“the off-scouring of the world” and to patient endurance of affliction. Charity is what makes 
their shame honest. 
 Milton anticipates this assessment of apostolic virtue earlier in Animadversions, when 
he claims charity as his reason for entering the church-government debate. He makes this 
claim precisely in order to defend his (occasionally abusive) contribution as being perfectly in 
keeping with his due place in the body: 
And therefore they that love the soules of men, which is the dearest love … cannot 
be blam’d though they bee transported with the zeale of truth to a well heated 
fervencie; especially, seeing they which thus offend against the soules of their 
                                                
34 Milton, Animadversions, 50. 
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brethren, do it with delight to their great gaine, ease, and advancement in this world, 
but they that seeke to discover and oppose their false trade of deceiving, do it not 
without a sad and unwilling anger, not without many hazards, but without all private 
and personall spleene, and without any thought of earthly reward, when as this very 
course they take stopps their hopes of ascending above a lowly and unenviable pitch 
in this life.35 
Milton insists that participating in this debate runs counter to his presumed interest in self-
aggrandizement, because his anti-establishmentarianism endangers any hopes of preferment 
that he might be entertaining. Only love for the souls of his brethren, he claims, could bring 
him to face these dangers: mere spleen would not suffice. The bishops, meanwhile, are 
engaged in a quest for advancement and gain that leads them to offend against these souls, 
so love leads Milton to attack the bishops, albeit “not without a sad and unwilling anger.” In 
other words, Milton is ashamed to write such vituperative prose, but he would have his 
readers believe that this shame is honest and so worthy of praise rather than reproach. 
 The presence of this claim to charity in the apologetic prologue to Animadversions 
shows that Milton is already invoking a “rule of charity” to defend a liberated practice of 
scriptural interpretation that he strongly suspects will appear highly dubious to his 
opponents. His opponents responded as anticipated. One, after quoting ten particularly 
offensive passages from Animadversions, asks the reader: 
Christian, doest thou like these passages? or doth thy heart rise against such 
unseemly beastlinesse? Nay, but take heed: [This is nothing disagreeing from Christian 
                                                
35 Ibid., 3. This passage appears in italics in the original. 
 37 
meeknesse, Pag. 2. Not unauthorised from the Morall precept of Solomon, —— Nor from the 
example of Christ, and all his Followers, in all ages, Ibid.] Horrid blasphemy! You that love 
Christ, and know this miscreant wretch, stone him to death, lest your selves smart 
for his impunity.36 
The writer responds incredulously to Milton’s claims and offers a counter-appeal to “You 
that love Christ.” Insofar as Milton believes himself to be exercising his gifts according to his 
place in the body, however, charity simply means asserting the same privilege for every 
believer, and this requires tearing down the impediment of episcopacy. The structure of the 
claims that so offended Milton’s opponent—“Nothing disagreeing from Christian 
meeknesse” and so on—belongs to the analogy of faith; that is, Milton appeals to an abstract 
sense of scripture rather than to individual proof-texts. He claims, in short, to be acting in 
accordance with the scriptural model of charity even and perhaps especially when he uses 
scripture to attack the bishops. 
 Milton’s defense of his own charity relies on passive verbal constructions, such as 
“Not unautoritied,” that leave ambiguous the agency operating in his potentially offensive 
speech. This ambiguity, however, illuminates the paradoxes of Miltonic self-esteem. The uses 
of the passive in Milton’s defense follow a New Testament pattern identified by the biblical 
philologist Max Zerwick as the “theological passive,” or “the passive used to avoid directly 
naming God as agent.”37 In one of the illustrative passages cited by Zerwick, Jesus tells a 
                                                
36 Anon., A Modest Confutation (London, 1642), fol. A3r-A4r. Thomason E.134[1]. I have reversed 
italic and roman type. Square brackets in original. 
37 Max Zerwick, Biblical Greek: Illustrated by Examples (Rome: Editrice Pontificio Instituto Biblico, 
1963), 76 (no. 236). 
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paralytic, “thy sinnes be forgiven thee [aphientai sou hai hamartiai].” The scribes treat this 
grammatical ambiguity as obscuring Jesus’ human agency, leading them to charge him with 
blasphemy. Jesus responds to these accusations by saying to the paralytic, “Arise, and take 
up thy bed, and goe thy way into thine house,” implying that such healing could not occur if 
Jesus were merely a human being acting on his own. And yet the matter of agency remains 
ambiguous: the only first-person active verb that Jesus uses in the passage is “I say [lego].” 
Jesus distances himself from the divine agency at work, but his participation (e.g., by saying 
“Arise”) nevertheless seems essential to the outcome.38 
In Milton’s case, grammatical ambiguity enables him to insist, even indirectly, on the 
necessity of his participation in the church-government debates while also using the divine 
quality of that necessity to distance himself from complete responsibility for his participation 
(perhaps especially in its uglier forms). For instance, he refers obliquely to himself in the 
third person in conjunction with the theological passive: “And therefore they that love the 
soules of men … cannot be blam’d though they bee transported with the zeale of truth to a 
well-heated fervencie.” He also uses the passive outright: “And although in the serious 
uncasing of a grand imposture … there be mixt here and there such a grim laughter….” A 
true valuation of himself requires the vigorous exercise of his putative gifts, accompanied by 
a recognition that these gifts can properly be exercised only in service of the body as a whole 
and not to his own self-aggrandizing ends. In contrast to the passives used in his own 
defense, Milton uses active verbs to characterize his opponents’ depredations, describing 
                                                
38 Ibid. Mark 2:1-12 (quoting verses 5 and 11). The King James translators slightly misconstrue the 
verb in verse 5 by rendering the indicative as a kind of jussive subjunctive (“be forgiven”), though 
Greek does not use the subjunctive in this way.  
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Hall and the other bishops as “those that resisted sound Doctrine, and by subtile 
dissimulations corrupted the minds of men,” and saying that Hall “creeps up … to his 
relinquish’d fortresse of divine authority againe.”39 Milton’s grammar implies that the 
bishops, wen-like, are over-active in their own cause. His own participation, meanwhile, 
appears in infinitives paired with theological passives: “it will be nothing disagreeing from 
Christian meekness to handle such a one in a rougher accent…. Nor to do thus are we 
unautoritied … to answer him thereafter that prides him in his folly.”40 The infinitives represent 
Milton’s positive use of his spiritual gifts, while the theological passives work to represent 
these activities as subsidiary to the overall function of the body of Christ, even as they create 
space for free participation in that body by Milton and others.  
 
Liberty, Domestic and Interpretative 
 The argumentative pattern of the antiprelatical tracts appears in the divorce tracts 
with little change, albeit translated from the ecclesiastical to the domestic sphere. The same 
emphases persistently appear: Christian liberty, slavery, charity, and the need to preserve due 
proportion—with all of the above linked to an allusive approach to scripture rooted in the 
analogy of faith. Indeed, the first three of these elements all appear on the title page of 
Milton’s first divorce tract, The Doctrine and Discipline of Divorce: Restor’d to the Good of Both Sexes, 
From the bondage of Canon Law, and other mistakes, to Christian freedom, guided by the Rule of Charity. 
Wherein also many places of Scripture, have recover’d their long-lost meaning. Seasonable now to be thought 
                                                
39 Milton, Animadversions, 2-4 passim; emphasis added. 
40 Ibid., 2; emphasis added. 
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on in the Reformation intended (1643). “The bondage of Canon Law” denotes a kind of double 
slavery here, for Milton treats bad marriages themselves as a kind of bondage that the law 
unduly and illiberally enforces: people must first be freed from the law to be freed from 
enslaving marriages. Unsurprisingly, given this disparaging reference to law, Milton 
recognizes the potential for antinomianism, in the form of license, arising from his argument 
for divorce, and once again he counters this potential by appealing to an interpretative 
practice that he presents as being at once free, charitable, and keyed to preserving proportion 
within the marital relationship. 
 Milton’s concept of Christian liberty in the divorce tracts has several components. 
The first and most fundamental is this divine observation: “It is not good that the man 
should be alone: I will make him an helpe meet for him.”41 Whereas the antiprelatical tracts 
figured liberty in terms of individuals taking their places in the body of Christ (in which 
other people are to some extent mere abstractions), the divorce tracts explicitly make the 
presence and involvement of another person a prerequisite for liberty. Liberty depends, 
moreover, on this person’s being a “help meet,” which condition Milton defines negatively 
early on in the first edition of The Doctrine and Discipline of Divorce, positing 
That indisposition, unfitnes, or contrariety of mind arising from a cause in nature 
unchangable, hindring and ever likely to hinder the main benefits of conjugall 
society, which are solace and peace, is a greater reason of divorce then naturall 
frigidity, especially if there be no children, and that there be mutuall consent.42 
                                                
41 Gen. 2:18; cf. Milton, Doctrine (1643), 6. 
42 Milton, Doctrine (1643), 5. This passage appears in italics in the original. 
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Within this vision of (in)compatibility, the sense of proportion that Milton had used to 
define the body of Christ now applies to the relationship between husband and wife, giving 
priority to its spiritual/intellectual (rather than physical) aspects: “And with all generous 
persons maried thus it is, that where the minde and person pleases aptly, there some 
unaccomplishment of the bodies delight may be better born with, then when the minde 
hangs off in an unclosing disproportion[.]”43 If disproportion of mind provides just cause for 
divorce, then proportion is the hallmark of what Shakespeare’s sonnet 116 calls “the 
marriage of true minds.” 
 Such disproportion results in a “needlesse thraldome,” but this bondage persists only 
because what Milton feels is a servile approach to scriptural interpretation prevents captive 
spouses from regaining their freedom.44 This slavish method insists on reading Matthew 
19:8-9 at face value, where Jesus says: 
Moses because of the hardnesse of your hearts, suffered you to put away your wives: 
but from the beginning it was not so. … Whosoever shal put away his wife, except it 
be for fornication, and shall marry another, committeth adultery: and whoso 
marrieth her which is put away doth commit adultery. 
As in the antiprelatical tracts, Milton does not employ literalistic methods of interpretation 
rooted in proof-texts, but rather uses the analogy of faith indirectly and allusively to 
undermine literalistic readings: 
                                                
43 Ibid., 6. 
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[T]here is scarce any one saying in the Gospel, but must be read with limitations and 
distinctions, to be rightly understood; for Christ gives no full comments or continu’d 
discourses, but scatters the heavenly grain of his doctrin like pearl heer and there, 
which requires a skilfull and laborious gatherer; who must compare the words he 
finds, with other precepts, with the end of every ordinance, and with the general 
analogy of Evangelick doctrine: otherwise many particular sayings would be but 
strange repugnant riddles[.]45 
Literalism, in Milton’s view, too often produces “strange repugnant riddles” instead of 
Gospel clarity, which requires gathering passages both more and less obviously related to the 
saying at issue—just as he had in the antiprelatical tracts.  
A controversial instance of such gathering occurs when Milton uses Deuteronomy 
22:9-10—“Thou shalt not sowe thy vineyard with divers seeds, lest the fruit of thy seed 
which thou hast sowen, and the fruit of thy vineyard be defiled. Thou shalt not plow with an 
oxe and an asse together”—to argue from the principles of nature that disproportionate 
persons cannot be lawfully married.46 This reasoning drew an incredulous response: “Ho 
brave stuffe! … but how will you make this last to fit your shooe?”—a claim that, because 
shoes are made to fit lasts and not the other way around, amounts to an accusation that 
Milton is making scripture mean whatever he wants it to mean.47 Milton, however, claims to 
“follow the pattern of St. Pauls reasoning; Doth God care for Asses and Oxen, how ill they yoke 
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47 Anon, An Answer to a Book, intituled, The Doctrine and Discipline of Divorce (London, 1644), 39. 
Thomason E.17[12]. 
 43 
together, or is it not said altogether for our sakes? For our sakes no doubt this is writt’n.”48 Milton’s 
opponent objects that these latter verses, paraphrased from 1 Corinthians 9:9-10, have to do 
with God’s means of providing for the temporal needs of his ministers, not with the “yoke” 
of marriage.49 Defending himself in Colasterion, Milton acknowledges that yes, 1 Corinthians 9 
is about preachers, not spouses; this, he says, “is not doubted.” His reading, rather, does not 
depend on the literal sense of either the passage in Deuteronomy or the one in 1 
Corinthians: he is working from “that allegorical precept of Moses” and “the pattern of St. 
Pauls reasoning.”50 These passages are not relevant because of what they superficially say—
on those terms, in fact, they would be supremely irrelevant—but because of how they key 
into a greater symbolic structure that Milton, acting in his asserted capacity as “a skilfull and 
laborious gatherer,” can discern. This structure is the “analogy of Evangelick doctrine,” which 
Milton consistently favors as an interpretative tool over the alleged transparency of proof-
texts. 
Even in Tetrachordon, where Milton engages in scriptural exegesis on a level of detail 
unmatched elsewhere in his early prose, his method overwhelmingly relies on argument by 
analogy (which is to say, proportion). Instances abound. Milton treats God’s institution of 
marriage by creating a help meet for Adam as an analogical rule in many places, as when he 
says that William Ames’ definition of “one flesh” “perverts the order of God, who in the 
institution places meet help and society of life before communion of body.”51 In another 
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place he uses the notion of the Eucharist as a “spiritual mystery” (i.e., not a “physical” 
mystery like transubstantiation) to argue that “one flesh” doesn’t just refer to the body.52 He 
says elsewhere that the idea that Jesus speaks about divorce more strictly in Matthew 19:9 
than Moses had in Deuteronomy “sound[s] disproportion to the whole Gospel, … 
outstretching the most rigorous nervs of law and rigor it selfe.”53 He argues, additionally, that 
Jesus’ ultimate intention in this verse is “that his Disciples and all good men might learne to 
expound him … as in all other his precepts, not by the written letter, but by that unerring 
paraphrase of Christian love and Charity, which is the summe of all commands, and the 
perfection.”54 Indeed, Milton turns to the first institution and “that unerring paraphrase of 
Christian love and Charity” so persistently that occasionally he shows signs of exasperation 
at having to repeat them yet one more time: “How often shall I answer both from the 
institution of mariage, and from other general rules in Scripture, that this law of divorce hath 
many wise and charitable ends besides the being suffer’d for hardnes of heart[?]”55 If the idea 
that Milton makes scripture mean whatever he wants it to mean derives its appeal from the 
counterintuitive quality of the meaning he extracts from the verses in Matthew 19, in the end 
it rests on an understanding that scriptural meaning resides (or should reside) in the plain 
sense of individual passages. Milton, however, insists—and has insisted throughout his early 
prose—that scriptural meaning is to be found only by considering the deep structures of the 
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Bible as a whole, and that the meanings of individual verses can be worked out only by 
ascertaining in a finely tuned way just how they accord with these structures. 
 Milton treats the work of developing and using a structural sense of scripture as the 
mark of a free interpreter, one not caught up in “alphabetical servility.” In the preface to the 
second edition of The Doctrine and Discipline of Divorce (1644), he writes that Custom and Error 
with the numerous and vulgar train of their followers make it their chiefe designe to 
envie and cry down the industry of free reasoning, under the terms of humor, and 
innovation; as if the womb of teeming Truth were to be clos’d up, if shee presume to 
bring forth ought, that sorts not with their unchew’d notions and suppositions. 
Milton feels led by this “notorious injury and abuse of mans free soule to testifie and oppose 
[with] the utmost that study and true labour can attaine.”56 “Free reasoning,” he argues, will 
result in the bringing forth of new truth, in contrast to custom and error, which thrive on 
remaining unchanged, whether by chewing or by subsequent processes of digestion. The 
digestive metaphor suggests, with regard to the scriptures, that free reasoning will not permit 
the text to remain whole in one’s mouth: trying and testing something—the only way of 
finding new truth—necessitates mashing it up with one’s teeth and reconstituting it into 
something else. 
 If Milton’s method for drawing new truth out of the scriptures seems destructive to 
the very sacred text he claims to revere (and the assertion that he makes scripture mean 
whatever he wants it to mean implies precisely this), he argues that his approach is grounded 
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in charity, in two senses. First and foremost, Milton asserts that literalistic readings lead to 
the enslavement of freeborn Englishmen, whether under episcopal tyranny or the oppressive 
circumstances of unfortunate marriages, whereas his analogical appeal to the “rule of 
charity” conduces to their freedom. More subtly, though, the sort of charitable reading that 
would free these slaves liberates them precisely to engage in more charitable reading of their 
own through the use of spiritual gifts, for such reading is the very stuff of liberty. According 
to Milton, only in a free society is charity truly possible, and only through charity can people 
genuinely be free. 
 
The Spurre of Self-Concernment 
 The charge that Milton makes scripture mean whatever he wants it to implies that 
self-interest drives his interpretation: with regard to the divorce tracts, for instance, this self-
interest putatively has to do with Milton’s abandonment by his wife and his subsequent 
attraction to Miss Davis, both of which events put him in thrall to his passions. And yet, as 
we have seen, Milton’s interpretative methods were in place well before either of these 
events took place. What, then, to make of the usual scholarly assumption that “the spurre of 
self-concernment” has contributed to Milton’s decision to write on the subject of divorce? 
Stephen M. Fallon uses this phrase as the title of a chapter on Milton’s self-representations 
in the divorce tracts, saying that they “are not merely inspired by personal experience, they 
are about Milton.”57 Here, though, is what Milton writes:  
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Indeed mans disposition though prone to search after vain curiosities, yet when 
points of difficulty are to be discusst, appertaining to the removall of unreasonable 
wrong and burden from the perplext life of our brother, it is incredible how cold, 
how dull, and farre from all fellow feeling we are, without the spurre of self-
concernment.58  
In this passage, “the spurre of self-concernment” is notably impersonal and bereft of 
specifics. Granted, this impersonal quality might, in keeping with Fallon’s generally 
persuasive argument, be a function of Milton’s rhetoric bearing out a profound reluctance 
(and even refusal) to admit personal failings, but the point of the passage is to observe that 
many more people than Milton alone are concerned in the matter of divorce, while 
lamenting the fact that only the people so concerned tend to be aware of this broadly shared 
plight. If Milton is admitting to his own self-concernment here (and the biography makes 
such an admission hard not to see), he does so in order to purchase an authority that allows 
him to speak on behalf of this congregation of domestic sufferers.59 
 Milton implies, however, by way of admonishment to any reader not currently 
enslaved in a bad marriage, that there are other ways than through a vigorous pricking from 
personal circumstance to assume one’s due place in the body of Christ. Real charity, he 
suggests, requires recognizing suffering in others when that suffering differs from one’s own. 
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Thus, Milton’s admonition about “the spurre of self-concernment” contains an invitation for 
all of his readers to take a concern for the conditions in other parts of the body than their 
own: are the people in these places free, or not? If the proper function of the body depends 
upon every person’s ability to exercise his or her spiritual gifts freely, then Milton is saying 
that we ought to be concerned with their liberty whether we share their conditions or not—
as indeed we usually will not.  
Milton had written in a similar vein in Animadversions while defending liberty of 
speaking in a “Kingdom of free spirits”: 
Some Princes, and great Statists, have thought it a prime piece of necessary policy to 
thrust themselves under disguise into a popular throng, to stand the night long under 
eaves of houses, and low windows, that they might hear every where the free 
utterances of privat brests, and amongst them find out the precious gemme of Truth, 
as amongst the numberlesse pibbles of the Shoar; whereby they might be the abler to 
discover, and avoid that deceitfull, and close coucht evill of flattery that ever attends 
them, and misleads them, and might skilfully know how to apply the several 
redresses to each malady of State, without trusting the disloyall information of 
Parasites, and Sycophants.60 
In this example, self-concernment (i.e., that princely interest in securing one’s reign) only 
goads toward charity those princes who recognize that the interests of society at large are 
and ought to be their own concern as well. The information provided by parasites and 
sycophants is “disloyall” precisely because it is geared too closely to the prince’s presumed 
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self-interest in a purely personal sense (and therefore also to the narrow interests of these 
courtly hangers-on themselves). The prince must rather act independently to seek 
understanding of interests different from his own. Thus, in a way Milton’s ideal prince 
functions much as any other citizen ought to within the Pauline “body of Christ” that serves 
as Milton’s ecclesiological-political framework: his particular gifts afford him a unique place 
in the body and carry an obligation to be used in a way conducive to the good of the whole, 
that is, “according to the proportion of faith.” 
 The proportion of faith therefore comes to signify the free use of spiritual gifts, 
which entails a manner of use consistent with a similar free exercise by others. Broadly 
speaking, in the antiprelatical tracts Milton identifies this liberty with the lay exercise of 
ecclesiastical office, while in the divorce tracts he associates it with a marriage characterized 
by intellectual, spiritual, and physical proportion between spouses. In both cases, however, 
he envisions a kind of social unity that can emerge only from the exercised liberty of people 
endowed with diverse gifts. For instance, Milton writes in Tetrachordon that, although 
“proportion” places a woman “beneath” her husband in priority, “man is not to hold [his 
wife] as a servant,” just as “it cannot stand … that man the portraiture of God, joyning to 
himself for his intended good and solace an inferiour sexe, should so becom her thrall[.]” 
Similarly, “the wife also, as her subjection is terminated in the Lord, being her self the 
redeem’d of Christ, is not still bound to be the vassall of him, who is the bondslave of 
Satan…, but hath recours to the wing of charity[.]” Men and women have different roles to 
play within the domestic body, Milton argues, but any hint that either party has become 
enslaved to the other offers just and charitable grounds for divorce. Milton offers divine 
relationships as a model for human ones:  
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Moreover, if man be the image of God, which consists in holines, and woman ought 
in the same respect to be the image and companion of man, in such wise to be lov’d, 
as the Church is belov’d of Christ, and if, as God is the head of Christ, and Christ 
the head of man, so man is the head of woman; I cannot see by this golden 
dependance of headship and subjection, but that Piety and Religion is the main tye of 
Christian Matrimony[.]61 
The phrase “golden dependance,” coming so soon after Milton uses “proportion” to 
describe the relationship between husband and wife, seems to suggest a kind of social 
corollary to the golden mean, an ideal ratio that governs relations even between Father and 
Son and that should therefore also apply to husband and wife.62 Given that Milton has in the 
antiprelatical tracts so thoroughly identified “Piety and Religion” with the free use of 
spiritual gifts (which discourse, after all, provides the context for St. Paul’s most extended 
discourses on ecclesiology), the success of “Christian Matrimony” would seem to depend on 
each spouse’s allowing the differently-gifted other to function freely in his or her divinely 
ordained place. 
 Milton had applied the free and proportional exercise of spiritual gifts to society 
more broadly in his pamphlet of the previous year, Areopagitica (1644). Offering a metaphor 
of Truth as the dismembered body of Osiris, to be gathered by the Isis-like faithful, Milton 
castigates those who would stand in the way of such efforts:  
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They are the troublers, they are the dividers of unity, who neglect and permit not 
others to unite those dissever’d peeces which are yet wanting to the body of Truth. 
To be still searching what we know not, by what we know, still closing up truth to 
truth as we find it (for all her body is homogeneal, and proportionall) this is the golden 
rule in Theology as well as in Arithmetick, and makes up the best harmony in a 
Church; not the forc’t and outward union of cold, and neutrall, and inwardly divided 
minds.63 
Notably, in the work of reconstructing the “proportionall” body of Truth, the same “golden 
rule” applies to the efforts of the workers as to spouses: do not hinder someone else from 
exercising his or her particular gifts, especially if they’re different than yours. If the body is 
proportional, and the workers search “what [they] know not, by what [they] know,” then 
inevitably a diversity of gifts and knowledge must be distributed proportionally among the 
workers.  
Indeed, Milton expresses precisely this need for a diversity of gifts when he defends 
the sects’ participation in the process of rebuilding the Temple: 
Yet these are the men cry’d out against for schismaticks and sectaries; as if, while the 
Temple of the Lord was building, some cutting, some squaring the marble, others 
hewing the cedars, there should be a sort of irrationall men who could not consider 
there must be many schisms and many different dissections made in the quarry and 
in the timber, ere the house of God can be built. And when every stone is laid 
artfully together, it cannot be united into a continuity, it can but be contiguous in this 
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world; neither can every peece of the building be of one form; nay rather the 
perfection consists in this, that out of many moderat varieties and brotherly 
dissimilitudes that are not vastly disproportionall arises the goodly and the graceful 
symmetry that commends the whole pile and structure. Let us therefore be more 
considerat builders, more wise in spirituall architecture, when great reformation is 
expected.64 
The “perfection” and “symmetry” both of the Temple and among its builders depend on 
“brotherly dissimilitudes that are not vastly disproportionall,” meaning that the progress of 
the building requires that different people use different gifts in different places, even as 
Milton readily acknowledges that these efforts at the free and proportional exercise of 
spiritual gifts will inevitably be imperfect. Those who would impede such exercise, 
meanwhile, are “irrationall,” which is to say not proportional, out of keeping with the golden 
mean. They, like the wen of Milton’s fable in Of Reformation, assert their own pre-eminence in 
a bid for power and control, and in the process they disrupt the proper order of the body, 
thereby reducing what Milton has just called “the mansion house of liberty” to slavery.65 
 Often in his prose of the mid-1640s, Milton uses coldness to figure such slavery, as 
in the first passage from Areopagitica quoted above, where he speaks of “the forc’t and 
outward union of cold, and neutrall, and inwardly divided minds.” Milton uses the idea of 
freezing a few pages earlier to create an image of uniformity in contrast to the divine model 
of proportional unity arising out of diversity: “How goodly, and how to be wisht were such 
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an obedient unanimity as this, what a fine conformity would it starch us all into? doubtles a 
stanch and solid peece of frame-work, as any January could freeze together.”66 Later in the 
tract Milton writes of freedom as a breaking of imprisoning ice: 
There have bin not a few since the beginning of this Parlament, both of the 
Presbytery and others who by their unlicen’t books to the contempt of an Imprimatur 
first broke that triple ice clung about our hearts, and taught the people to see day: I 
hope that none of those were the perswaders to renew upon us this bondage which 
they themselves have wrought so much good by contemning.67 
In Tetrachordon Milton applies this trope of frozen slavery to scriptural interpretation: “For 
what can this bee but weake and shallow apprehension, to forsake the standard principles of 
institution, faith, & charity; then to be blanke & various at every occurrence in Scripture, and 
in a cold Spasm of scruple, to reare peculiar doctrines upon the place[.]”68 An interpretative 
practice that considers “every occurrence in Scripture” individually, and without recourse to 
the unity of the whole, Milton calls “literal rigidity,” as though the interpretative muscle had 
frozen into a state of permanent contraction.69 Milton even uses this idea of freezing to 
abuse an opponent: ridiculing the anonymous Answerer’s lengthy discourse on St. Paul’s 
statement that it is better to marry than to burn, Milton says, “and yet all this burning is not 
able to expell the frigidity of his brain.”70 
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 Milton also employs the freezing trope in the second edition of The Doctrine and 
Discipline of Divorce: “it is incredible how cold, how dull, and farre from all fellow feeling we 
are, without the spurre of self-concernment.”71 In this way, self-concernment is not an 
impediment to objective discussion of the issues, but rather a prod to the free exercise of 
spiritual gifts in keeping with Milton’s concept of a due self-esteem balanced between “self-
pious regard” and proper recognition of one’s limitations. With regard to scriptural 
interpretation, self-pious regard should prompt people to be ever “sitting by their studious 
lamps, musing, searching, revolving new notions and idea’s wherewith to present, as with 
their homage and their fealty the approaching Reformation,”72 while also humbly 
remembering what Milton says even of a passage absolutely fundamental to his whole 
method of interpreting the biblical writings about marriage:  
Not a rule yet that we have met with, so universall in this whole institution, but hath 
admitted limitations and conditions according to human necessity. The very 
foundation of Matrimony, though God laid it so deliberatly, that it is not good for man to 
bee alone holds not always, if the Apostle can secure us.73 
The liberty of searching and the acknowledgment of limitations cannot be separated from 
one another: only by diligently considering the scriptures as a whole can one come to 
recognize the contingent quality of individual passages. In this light, Augustine’s powerful 
analogy between the body of Christ in the church and the body of Christ in the Bible just 
might provoke a dawning realization that even one’s own interpretations are imperfect 
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contributions to a divine framework that “can but be contiguous in the world.” To be “not 
vastly disproportionall” may really be the best that one can hope. 
 
Liberty and Law 
By tracing how Milton’s early prose connects a manner of thinking about liberty to 
the practice of scriptural interpretation, this chapter’s argument challenges Quentin Skinner’s 
potent account of Milton’s political thought. Skinner places Milton among a group of writers 
concerned with what he calls the “neo-roman theory of free states,” arguing that this theory 
derived from “Roman legal and moral argument, and had subsequently been revived and 
adapted by the defenders of republican libertà in the Italian Renaissance, above all by 
Machiavelli in his Discorsi on Livy’s history of Rome.” Slavery, or the state of being “within 
the power of someone else,” figures powerfully in neo-roman theory: it is the negative 
against which neo-roman writers strive to articulate their positive visions of liberty. Whether 
this “someone else” uses his power benignly or not is beside the point: the very potential for 
oppression enslaves a people. Accordingly, free society requires self-government (whether 
under a republic or a prince), in which the governing entity possesses no discretionary or 
prerogative powers, and which allows “each individual citizen to exercise an equality of 
participation in the making of laws.”74 Skinner persuasively shows Milton’s debt to neo-
roman thinking—and to Machiavelli in particular—and yet his analysis leaves unresolved the 
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question of how Milton’s scriptural discourses of slavery in the early prose relate to his 
Roman ones.  
This lack of resolution is problematic because Milton’s most frequent arguments for 
sola scriptura in the antiprelatical tracts work in “neo-roman” terms, casting reliance on 
scripture as the key to liberty and dependence on anything else as slavery. For example, he 
writes in Animadversions that his purpose is “to free ingenuous minds from that over-awfull 
esteeme of those more ancient then trusty fathers,” with the expression “over-awfull” 
signaling an oppressive excess of fear generated by his opponents’ appeals to antiquity. By 
contrast, the Bible is “a rule, and instrument of necessary knowledge” that is “so in 
proportion as may bee weilded and manag’d by the life of man without penning him up 
from the duties of humane society,” meaning that scripture does not effectively require 
captivity of its users in the way that the vast patristic library would, while positing that liberty 
depends on some notion of “proportion.”75  
This is not to say that Roman law played no part in shaping Milton's conception of 
liberty; indeed, he does make occasional—and sometimes sustained—reference to Roman 
law in the early prose, for instance in this passage from Animadversions: 
The Romans had a time once every year, when their Slaves might freely speake their 
minds, twere hard if the free borne people of England, with whom the voyce of Truth 
for these many yeares, even against the proverb, hath not bin heard but in corners, 
after all your Monkish prohibitions, [etc.].76 
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Milton here reiterates themes familiar from Of Reformation, which presents England as both 
the exceptional birthplace and the latter-day laggard of Reformation. Accordingly, his 
reference to Roman law has a double edge: to remind “the free borne people of England” 
that by right their privileges exceed those accorded to the Romans, and to admonish 
England’s leaders for not permitting to free Christians even that which the Romans once 
enjoyed. 
 Milton reprises this pattern frequently in Tetrachordon, repeatedly emphasizing the 
superiority of divine liberty while nevertheless using Roman liberty as a high example by way 
of admonition. He sets this pattern in the tract’s opening pages, where he quotes Cicero 
thus: “All law … we ought referr to the common good, and interpret by that, not by the 
scrowl of letters. No man observes law for laws sake, but for the good of them for whom it 
was made.” Milton then offers two scriptural examples, of David eating the temple 
shewbread ordinarily reserved for priests and of Hezekiah delaying the celebration of 
Passover beyond the scripturally appointed time, before he moots the question of such 
dispensations by saying that “our Saviour … redeem’d us to a state above prescriptions by 
dissolving the whole law into charity. And have we not the soul to understand this, and must 
we against this glory of Gods transcendent love towards us be still the servants of a literall 
indightment?”77 Here, the examples of Cicero, David, and Hezekiah all offer examples that, 
if heeded, would bring greater liberty to England, and yet these justifiable departures from 
the law remain inferior to Christ’s liberating dissolution of the law into charity. 
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 This pattern of the divine “rule of charity” transcending even the best of legal 
reasoning continues when Milton brings several discussions of Roman law regarding slavery 
to bear on the question of divorce. Milton prefaces this discussion by once again treating the 
law as a baseline standard: “The Law is to tender the liberty and the human dignity of them 
that live under the Law, whether it bee the mans right above the woman, or the womans just 
appeal against wrong, and servitude.” He then goes on, citing a particular tenet of Roman 
civil law, to show the transcendence of God’s law: 
The civil law, though it favour’d the setting free of a slave, yet if hee prov’d 
ungratefull to his Patron, reduc’t him to a servil condition. If that Law did well to 
reduce from liberty to bondage for an ingratitude not the greatest, much more 
became it the Law of God to enact the restorement of a free born man from an 
unpurpos’d, and unworthy bondage to a rightfull liberty for the most unnatural fraud 
and ingratitude that can be committed against him [i.e., by his compelled presence in 
a bad marriage]. 
Driving home the point that God’s law exceeds (“much more”) even the good of Roman 
law, Milton follows this immediately with two more examples, in which Moses’ equity out-
does Justinian’s and God’s laws regarding “injur’d Servants” improves upon “the rescript of 
Antoninus in the Civil Law.”78 Milton gives numerous other examples in the remaining course 
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of the tract, but these suffice to show the pattern: Roman law affords a good and admirable 
standard of liberty, but God’s law of charity offers a better one.79 
 If God’s law is to exceed Roman law in bringing freedom to the people of England, 
however, the scriptures must be interpreted in accordance with that divine law, i.e., 
charitably. In Tetrachordon Milton answers “a loud exception against this Law of God, … that 
it opens a dore to all licence and confusion.”80 The tension between divine and civil law 
(whether English or Roman) appears in this accusation that adherence to the former will 
result in antinomianism with regard to the latter. In The Doctrine and Discipline of Divorce, 
Milton had argued that antinomian excesses paradoxically resulted from undue constraints 
on freedom: 
[S]eeing that sort of men who follow Anabaptism, Famelism, Antinomianism, and other 
fanatick dreams, be such most commonly as are by nature addicted to a zeal of 
Religion, of life also not debausht, and that their opinions having full swinge, do end 
in satisfaction of the flesh, it may come with reason into the thoughts of a wise man, 
whether all this proceed not partly, if not cheefly, from the restraint of some lawfull 
liberty, which ought to be giv’n men, and is deny’d them.81 
Milton suggests that the cure for these alleged societal ills is more freedom, not less. In 
Tetrachordon, however, he shifts emphasis somewhat, arguing that God is more interested in 
preserving liberty than in curbing license: 
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For God regards more to releev by this Law the just complaints of good men, then 
to curb the licence of wicked men, to the crushing withall, and the overwhelming of 
his afflicted servants. He loves more that his Law should look with pitty upon the 
difficulties of his own, then with rigor upon the boundlesse riots of them who serv 
another Maister, and hinder’d heer by strictnes, will break another way to wors 
enormities. 
For Milton, license cannot be curbed legally without also crushing liberty. He seems to think, 
moreover, that the restraint of license might not even really be attainable by force of law: 
even as the licentious slavishly “serv another Maister,” their “riots” are “boundlesse,” that is, 
unconstrained, free. Their use of this freedom to abuse the law redounds not to the law or 
its divine giver, but to themselves: “If this Law therfore have many good reasons for which 
God gave it, and no intention of giving scope to leudnes, but as abuse by accident comes in 
with every good Law, and every good thing, it cannot be wisdom in us … to except against 
this Law, as if it foster’d licence.”82 
 Milton’s legal attitude toward license—that some people will inevitably abuse the 
law, no matter how harsh—further illuminates the interdependence of liberty, charity, and 
scriptural interpretation in his early prose. The proportionate response to license, in his view, 
is charity, not fear. If fear of retribution cannot motivate lewd persons to obey the law, he is 
saying, then neither should fear of said persons drive legal authorities to place undue and 
unnecessary burdens on good people. Nor should the scriptural reasoning used to justify the 
law be driven by “feare of displeasing the verbal straightnesse of a text, which our own servil 
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feare gives us not the leisure to understand aright.”83 Fear, Milton suggests, makes people 
slaves, whether to the letter of scripture or to people they view as malcontents. In place of 
this fearful perspective, Milton urges a charitable one colored by the hope that both 
individual passages of scripture and perceived societal malcontents might, if given the liberty 
to assume their due place in the body of Christ, not turn out to be antinomian after all. 
 
Reconsidering the Case of Mrs. Attaway and William Jenney 
 Perhaps the best known contemporary response to Milton’s divorce tracts came 
from Mrs. Attaway, the lace-maker and Baptist preacher who, according to Thomas 
Edwards’s informants, thought The Doctrine and Discipline of Divorce “a point to be considered 
of; and that for her part [she] would look more into it, for she had an unsanctified husband, 
that did not walk in the way of Sion, nor speak the language of Canaan[.]” After describing 
Mrs. Attaway’s interest in this doctrine, Edwards acerbically notes that “accordingly she hath 
practised it in runing away with another womans husband[.]”84 This was one William Jenney, 
of whom Edwards later writes: 
This Jenney held from the Scripture in Genes. where God saith I will make him an help 
meet for him, that when a mans wife was not a meet help, he might put her away and 
take another; and when the woman was an unbeleever (that is not a Sectarie of their 
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Church) she was not a meet help, and therefore Jenney left his wife, and went away 
with Mistris Attaway.85 
From Edwards’s point of view, the antinomian potential of Milton’s interpretative practice 
seems to have been realized in this notorious pair.  
What is interesting, though, is how the kinds of interpretative questions at issue in 
Milton’s early prose also appear in this story. That is, Edwards has a stake in the ideas that 
Attaway and Jenney have interpreted Milton’s pamphlet accurately, and that the pamphlet 
can therefore accurately be said to endorse actions like theirs. This literalistic approach gives 
Edwards three heretics to condemn rather than just two. Conversely, Milton, as we have 
seen, displays a persistent concern for social order: while he certainly wants people to be able 
to escape bad marriages, he is far from advocating a free-for-all of people abandoning their 
spouses on whatever pretexts prove apt for the occasion. Thus, he would seem to have a 
stake in believing that Attaway and Jenney mistook by reading his tract too literally. In a 
sonnet of 1646, Milton complains of people who abuse the doctrines of liberty in his 
writings, calling them “Hoggs,”   
That bawle for freedom in their senceless mood 
    And still revolt when truth would set them free 
    Licence they mean when they cry libertie; 
For who loves that, must first be wise and good; 
    But from that mark how far they roave we see 
    For all this wast of wealth, and loss of blood.86 
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Those who find pretext for licentiousness in liberty are the swine before whom Milton has 
cast his pearls. The issue is not only that the licentious have read his tracts too literally—
though it is that—but that without “first be[ing] wise and good” they cannot love liberty in 
the way that proper interpretation demands. Milton the Divorcer still finds sin to be a useful 
category: “from that mark how far they roave” expresses the same concept as the Greek 
word used for “sin” in the New Testament, hamartia, which means “missing the mark.” 
 The confluence of love and liberty in the story of Mrs. Attaway and William 
Jenney—and in Milton’s response to his own, hardly unrelated, notoriety—bespeaks the 
complexity of the interpretative framework operating in Milton’s early prose. As we have 
seen, beginning no later than with Animadversions in 1641, Milton consistently argued that 
scriptural interpretation needs to be charitable; that is to say, colored by a love for other 
people that prompts a refusal to impede their freedom. This emphasis on a loving 
interpretation becomes highly charged when the topic shifts to matters of marriage and 
divorce, where love becomes something more personal than an abstract principle of social 
order. And yet Milton’s rhetorical stance—which mounts a general appeal for charitable 
treatment of people harmed by bad marriages—calls for a drawing of the attention away 
from one’s own erotic circumstances and first toward one’s spouse and then to society at 
large. Charity, in Milton’s usage, is less about one’s own liberty that it is about using that 
liberty in a way that makes and keeps others free, especially in cases of manifest difference. 
 Edwards reveals a detail about the case of Attaway and Jenney that shows it 
somewhat at odds with this Miltonic concept of charity, though in an illuminating way: they 
                                                
86 John Milton, “Sonnet XII,” in Poems (London, 1673), 56-57. Wing M2161. Lines 8-14. 
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seem to have shared the assumption that being “unsanctified” (in the case of Mr. Attaway) 
or an “unbeleever” (in the case of Mrs. Jenney) rendered a spouse “not a meet help.” 
Interestingly, then, Attaway and Jenney seem to have connected the concept of proportion 
behind St. Paul’s ecclesiological discussion of spiritual gifts with that used by Milton to 
describe marital relations. There is an important difference, however, between the way that 
they connect these principles and the way that Milton does. Edwards usefully glosses 
“unbeleever” as “not a Sectarie of their Church,” which probably means that the spouses in 
question had not undergone “believer’s baptism,” that is, elective baptism based on adult 
belief, as opposed to universal paedobaptism. While the meetings of Thomas Lambe’s 
General Baptist congregation in Bell Alley, Coleman Street were familiar (not least to 
Edwards’s informants, who witnessed Attaway’s preaching there) as freewheeling affairs that 
anyone might attend, membership in the church itself operated along congregationalist 
lines.87 This means that members recognized no church beyond the gathered congregation of 
visible saints.88 Milton’s sympathy for the sects notwithstanding, he did not share this 
ecclesiology: as in the passage from Areopagitica quoted above, the sects were and should be 
legitimate participants in building the temple, a church more all-encompassing than any one 
gathered congregation, but whose outlines could be realized only imperfectly in this world. 
Milton’s concept of charity, that is to say, depends upon a notion of the invisible church that 
                                                
87 For more about Lambe’s church, see Murray Tolmie, The Triumph of the Saints: The Separate Churches 
of London 1616-1649 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), 75-78. Tolmie discusses the 
case of Mrs. Attaway on p. 81. 
88 The classic work on congregationalism is Geoffrey Nuttall, Visible Saints: The Congregational Way, 
1640-1660 (Oxford: Blackwell, 1957). 
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the likes of Attaway and Jenney explicitly rejected. Ironically, then, Milton’s argument for 
including the sects in his vision of the church advances at the cost of the very principle that 
made them sects in the first place. In other words, Milton unabashedly defines charity on his 
own terms, but he then uses this concept to justify a policy of accommodating even 
Christians whose religious beliefs differ from his on fundamental points. 
 Thus, even though Milton argues in Tetrachordon that people should be able to 
divorce unbelievers, lest an unbelieving spouse seduce the believer to irreligion, the bare fact 
of this argument alone is not of itself sufficient grounds for divorce.89 Edwards treats 
Milton’s tract as the source of a legalistic justification on the part of Attaway and Jenney for 
an action ultimately prompted by lower motives: he describes Jenney as a man “with whom 
[Attaway] had been to[o] familiar along time.”90 Erotic love, though, is not the same as the 
charity that serves in some instances to justify divorce—even if such charity should, in 
Milton’s view, operate within erotic relationships such that neither partner enslaves the 
other. According to Edwards, Mrs. Attaway’s departure left her children of six and seven 
“exposed to the world” (their father was away, fighting with the Parliamentary army), while 
Jenney “left his own wife great with child, besides other children.”91 Neither of these actions, 
if Edwards’s reports are credible, seems to have been undertaken with particular concern for 
the liberty of anyone besides the eloping pair. The primacy of charity over other forms of 
love in Milton’s thought shows that charity, far from being an interpretative tactic 
                                                
89 See Milton, Tetrachordon, 71-81 for a discussion of marriage to (and divorce from) unbelievers. 
90 Edwards, Gangræna, 121 (appendix). Following the tract’s p. 184, the appendix’s pagination begins 
with p. 117. 
91 Ibid. 
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necessitated by the departure of Mary Milton and Milton’s own attraction to Miss Davis, lies 
near the heart of an interpretative project that neither began nor ended with the divorce 
tracts. Indeed, the next chapter will show Milton developing the concept of charity in rich 
and unexpected ways that do not bear in any obvious sense on his own presumed erotic self-
interests. 
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Chapter Two 
De Doctr ina Chris t iana  and Milton’s Theology of Liberation  
 
LEXICO´GRAPHER. n. s. [λεξικὸν and γράφω; lexicographe, French.] A writer of 
dictionaries; a harmless drudge, that busies himself in tracing the original, and 
detailing the signification of words. 
 Commentators and lexicographers acquainted with the Syriac language, have 
given these hints in their writings on scripture.         Watts’s Improvement of the Mind. 
        —Samuel Johnson1 
 
Nowhere in Milton’s oeuvre does the liberated interpreter discussed in Chapter One 
more resemble the “harmless drudge” of Johnson’s famous definition than in De Doctrina 
Christiana, the theological treatise that Milton compiled in the late 1650s. The historical gap 
between the 1650s and Robert Lemon’s eventual discovery of the treatise in the Public 
Records Office in 1823 tends, however, to obscure the nature of what Milton accomplished 
through the apparent drudgery of compiling it. Whereas Johnson’s self-deprecating 
definition functions as a kind of humility topos, brushing aside with characteristic wit any 
suggestion that the long and tedious labor behind what was to become a landmark work of 
English letters just might possibly be heroic, Milton had rather the opposite problem: by 
1823, Paradise Lost had long since secured him a heroic place in the literary pantheon, which 
                                                
1 Samuel Johnson, A Dictionary of the English Language, vol. 2 (London, 1755). ESTC T117231. 
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made his treatise more or less canonical by default.2 If not for the undeniable achievement of 
Milton’s great epic, the discovery of 745 manuscript pages using an outmoded logic to 
contribute to 150-year-old theological debates would not likely have prompted royal support 
for their almost immediate translation and publication. Under the circumstances, it is hardly 
surprising that the treatise’s primary interest has predominantly lain in what it can tell readers 
about what Milton thought on various theological subjects, particularly ones, like the 
relationship between the Father and the Son, that figure prominently in Paradise Lost: for 
instance, was he a Socinian, an Arian, or, seemingly against all odds, some kind of orthodox 
                                                
2 At least one nineteenth-century reader, Thomas Burgess, Bishop of Salisbury, questioned the tract’s 
Miltonic provenance, but to no avail. Citing Burgess as precedent, William B. Hunter launched a 
renewed challenge to the idea that Milton wrote De Doctrina Christiana, with a paper, “The 
Provenance of the Christian Doctrine,” delivered at the Fourth International Milton Symposium in 
1991 and later published in Studies in English Literature, 1500-1900 32, no. 1 (1992):129-42. The 
responses of symposium panelists Barbara Lewalski and John Shawcross, along with Hunter’s reply, 
appear on pp. 143-66 of the same volume. Hunter added some details about Burgess in SEL 33, no. 
1 (1993):191-207. The debate continued in SEL 34, no. 1 (1994), with contributions from Maurice 
Kelley (pp. 153-63) and Christopher Hill (pp. 165-93), along with a rejoinder from Hunter (pp. 195-
203). Hunter subsequently advanced his thesis in a book, Visitation Unimplor’d: Milton and the 
Authorship of De Doctrina Christiana (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1998). In light of this 
controversy, a research group, comprised of Gordon Campbell, Thomas N. Corns, John K. Hale, 
David I. Holmes, and Fiona J. Tweedie, convened to examine the question. They published their first 
findings as “The Provenance of De Doctrina Christiana,” Milton Quarterly 31, no. 3 (1997): 67-117. 
Subsequently, the group (albeit without Holmes) published Milton and the Manuscript of De Doctrina 
Christiana (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), which settled the matter decisively in favor of 
Milton’s authorship.  
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Trinitarian?3  As evidence of this interest, even William B. Hunter writes that his own 
challenging of its attribution to Milton ought “to raise serious doubts about interpretations 
of his canonical works that are based primarily on it as representing his beliefs.”4 
This chapter will argue that to focus on the treatise as a repository of what Milton 
thought or believed is to miss something crucial: that from Milton’s perspective, the process 
that yielded the treatise speaks more powerfully to these matters than do the eventual 
product or its doctrinal conclusions. Process and product are deeply intertwined, of course, 
and cannot always be neatly distinguished. Nevertheless, in the epistle prefacing the treatise, 
Milton makes clear his emphasis on process: “may I therefore speak to how I have moved 
matters forward, if it afterward invites others with the same hope of strongly moving 
forward to enter in the same way[?]”5 John Carey’s translation memorably has Milton speak 
of the treatise as his “dearest and best possession”: “God is my witness that it is with 
feelings of universal brotherhood and good will that I make this account public. By so doing 
                                                
3 For an insightful review of Milton’s relationship to Socinianism and Arianism, and an argument that 
in spite of significant commonalities he was neither, see Michael Lieb, Theological Milton: Deity, 
Discourse, and Heresy in the Miltonic Canon (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 2006), chapters 7 
and 8. For a series of arguments that find Milton’s theology of the Son to be more or less orthodox, 
see William B. Hunter, C. A. Patrides, and J. H. Adamson, Bright Essence: Studies in Milton’s Theology 
(Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 1971), as well as Hunter’s subsequent essay “Divine 
Filiation” in Visitation Unimplor’d. 
4 William B. Hunter, “De Doctrina Christiana: Nunc Quo Vadis?” Milton Quarterly 34, no. 3 (2000):97-
101. See also note 2 above. 
5 “dicam enim quibus rebus profecerim, si quem forte posthac proficiendi spes eadem ad eandem 
viam ingrediendam invitaverit” John Milton, De Doctrina Christiana (hereafter DDC), 2 (CE, XIV:4; 
CPW, VI:118-19). See the Note on Texts for more information about how I cite Milton’s treatise. 
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I am sharing, and that most willingly, my dearest and best possession with as many people as 
possible.” While this phrasing does elegantly capture the gist of Milton’s Latin, it also 
transforms a parenthesis into the object of the verb; Milton had written,  
Hæc si omnibus palam facio, si fraterno quod Deum testor atque amico erga omnes 
mortales animo, hæc, quibus melius aut pretiosius nihil habeo, quam possum 
latissime libentissimeque impertio.  
If I do all these things publicly, if, as God bears witness, [I do them] with a fraternal 
and friendly spirit toward all mortals, I impart these things, than which I hold 
nothing more valuable or precious, as widely and as willingly as possible.6 
The sentence’s overwhelming emphasis is on the dissemination of “these things,” so when 
Milton says “I hold [habeo],” the word does not denote possession, but rather his esteem for 
the gift he is giving. As this chapter will argue, the relationship between this esteem and the 
“fraternal and friendly spirit” with which Milton imparts his treatise develops out of his 
thinking about the relationship between the Father and the Son, which serves as the model 
for the charitable social framework that enables liberated interpretative practice of the sort 
on evidence in De Doctrina Christiana.  
At first blush, Milton’s interpretative practice in De Doctrina Christiana, with its 
veritable flood of scriptural quotations, seems strikingly unlike that in the early prose, which 
eschewed proof-texts in favor of an allusive practice ultimately grounded in the “rule of 
charity.” The interpreter imagined in the early prose can remain free only by striking a 
perilous path between slavery to the text (“alphabetical servility”) on the one hand and 
                                                
6; Milton, DDC, 3 (CE, XIV:8; CPW, VI:121). 
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antinomianism (“making Scripture mean whatever you want it to mean”) on the other, with 
the charitable principle of “first, do no harm” serving as a useful guiderail.7 Even with its 
8,000 or so scriptural quotations, Milton’s treatise is far from having succumbed to 
“alphabetical servility,” however, and this is where Johnson’s “harmless drudge” becomes a 
useful model for what Milton does with scripture in De Doctrina Christiana. 
Johnson defines a drudge as “One employed in mean labour; a slave; one doomed to 
servile occupation.” To be a drudge, in these terms, is hardly the sort of thing one would 
choose to be—if indeed one could choose at all: “one doomed to servile occupation” rings 
of a thoroughgoing fatalism, in which one is not only a slave, but in which one’s “doom” has 
placed liberty altogether out of reach. “Harmless,” however, mollifies the harshness of 
“drudge” somewhat. In Johnson’s terms, “harmless” can mean both “not hurtful” and 
“unhurt; undamaged.” As a synonym for “harmless” Johnson offers “innoxious,” an 
antonym of “obnoxious,” whose Latin root obnoxius means “subject, liable to punishment.”8 
As Quentin Skinner helpfully points out, in Roman moral and historical thought, being 
obnoxius is typically a characteristic of a slave.9 In this way “innoxious” (and by extension 
“harmless”) connotes a kind of liberty: the harmless person can do what he will not only 
because he need not fear hurting anybody else, but also because he need not fear coming to 
harm himself. Thus, Johnson’s lexicographer is at once a slave of sorts (a “drudge”) and not 
a slave (“harmless”). 
                                                
7 John Milton, The Doctrine and Discipline of Divorce (London, 1643), 22. Thomason E.62[17]. Annabel 
Patterson, Milton’s Words (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 116. 
8 Lewis & Short, A Latin Dictionary, s.v. “obnoxius.” Accessed at perseus.uchicago.edu 
9 Quentin Skinner, Liberty before Liberalism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 42. 
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 Milton’s model of interpretative liberty in De Doctrina Christiana straddles the same 
paradox as that faced by Johnson’s lexicographer. The labor that went into the treatise’s 
production is absolutely staggering to contemplate: by assembling the mass of quotations, 
Milton has bound himself in a very real sense to the scriptural text. Such labor necessitates 
prolonged confinement; it even requires a kind of voluntary slavery to the task; it involves, to 
be blunt, drudgery. And yet this labor is the price of becoming “harmless,” that is, free to 
range widely and without fear of doing or receiving harm. More to the point, Milton’s liberty 
appears precisely in his lexicographical practice. Although he may not technically be writing a 
dictionary, he is most certainly “tracing the original, and detailing the signification of words” 
as he makes careful choices about how to render the scriptural texts he quotes. I believe that 
this aspect of his treatise’s work is generally underappreciated, and this chapter aims both to 
bring some of Milton’s labor in this regard to light and to explore the implications of that 
labor for his thinking about liberty. It is fitting to observe that the quotation supplied by 
Johnson to illustrate his definition involves the utility of lexicographers to the study of 
scriptural texts, because Milton draws deeply on the scholarship of his time that works with 
scripture in its various ancient languages. Unlike a lexicographer, however, Milton is not 
bound to the “original” word of the scriptural text (whatever that may be): as this chapter 
will show, sometimes Milton takes the liberty of choosing a word that is more scriptural than 
what the scriptures actually happen to say. In De Doctrina Christiana, a word can mean the 
difference between liberty and slavery: even an apparently innocuous logical term can trail an 
unexpectedly obnoxious shadow, whereas a slight shift from one seeming synonym to 
another free up new paths for exploration. 
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 This chapter argues that some of Milton’s apparently mundane choices about words 
in the treatise work together to produce a theology of a liberated society modeled on the 
relationship between the Father and the Son. In articulating this theology, Milton draws on 
his own history of relating Trinity and society. Near the end of his first prose tract, Of 
Reformation (1641), Milton addresses a prayer to the “Tri-personall GODHEAD,” in which he 
calls the Son “Omnipotent King, Redeemer of that lost remnant whose nature thou didst 
assume, ineffable and everlasting Love[.]”10 The Son’s kingship stands in contrast to “the 
afflicted state of this our shaken Monarchy,” which, as Milton has been arguing throughout 
the tract’s second book, is threatened chiefly by episcopal claims to lordly dominion. Milton 
aims here to counter this threat by offering divine redemptive condescension and love as a 
model of proper dominion, one that is not self-aggrandizing and that does not infringe upon 
but rather enables the liberty of those subject to it. 
An even more pointed reference to the Trinity occurs in Milton’s next tract, Of 
Prelatical Episcopacy (1641). Milton is working to discredit the patristic sources cited by his 
opponents in favor of the notion that bishops in the primitive church were superior to 
presbyters, and in this context he attacks Tertullian, the earliest of the Latin Church Fathers 
and the first exponent of an explicitly Trinitarian theology: 
But suppose Tertullian had made an imparity where none was originally, should hee 
move us, that goes about to prove an imparity betweene God the Father, and God the 
Sonne, as these words import in his Booke against Praxeas. The Father is the whole 
                                                
10 John Milton, Of reformation touching church-discipline in England (London, 1641), 86-87. Thomason 
E.208[3]. 
 74 
substance, but the Son a derivation, and portion of the whole, as himselfe professes 
because the Father is greater then me. Beleeve him now for a faithfull relater of 
tradition, whom you see such an unfaithfull expounder of the Scripture.11 
Here Milton treats the parity among the Divine Persons (which he contrasts with Tertullian’s 
rudimentary subordinationism) as analogous to the parity that he argues should exist 
between bishops and presbyters. The argument is directed negatively at Tertullian, rather 
than positively toward advancing a Trinitarian model of society, but still we find Milton 
seizing upon the comparison between Trinity and society to make his polemical point.12 
 A rather obvious objection arises at this juncture: in De Doctrina Milton no longer 
holds the orthodox Trinitarian view of the Godhead that his earlier tracts had evinced.13 A 
brief comparison with Leonardo Boff’s twentieth-century theology linking Trinity and 
society will illustrate the problem that Milton’s theological shift causes. Boff, one of the most 
influential early liberation theologians, writes: “The community of Father, Son, and Holy 
Spirit becomes the prototype of the human community dreamed of by those who wish to 
                                                
11 John Milton, Of prelatical episcopacy (London, 1641), 17. Thomason E.164[19]. 
12 Still a third instance appears when Milton writes in Tetrachordon about the relations between 
husband and wife in a way that links Trinity and society: 
Moreover, if man be the image of God, which consists in holines, and woman ought in the 
same respect to be the image and companion of man, in such wise to be lov’d, as the Church 
is belov’d of Christ, and if, as God is the head of Christ, and Christ the head of man, so man 
is the head of woman; I cannot see by this golden dependance of headship and subjection, 
but that Piety and Religion is the main tye of Christian Matrimony[.] 
John Milton, Tetrachordon (London, 1645), 4-5. Thomason E.271[12]. 
13 Even the most notable attempt to claim Milton’s theology of the Godhead in De Doctrina Christiana 
for orthodoxy (Hunter et al., Bright Essence) frankly admits his subordinationism. 
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improve society and build it in such a way as to make it into the image and likeness of the 
Trinity.” Drawing on the fourth-century Cappadocian Fathers (Basil the Great, Gregory of 
Nyssa, and Gregory of Nazianzus, influential Trinitarians all), Boff argues that the 
Trinitarian quality of perichoresis—“each Person contains the other two, each one penetrates 
the others and is penetrated by them, one lives in the other and vice-versa”—affords a 
model for human society in which all participants are interrelated and mutually involved in 
one another, rather than being wholly autonomous individuals.14 Milton can hardly use a 
model of this kind, because he insists that the persons of the Godhead differ both in number 
and in essence, leaving him no basis for a perichoretic model of society: “if diverse causes 
prove diverse essences, [then the Son] is distinguished in essence. Next, because a numerical 
difference proceeds from an essential [difference], those things that are two in number, are 
necessarily also two in essence.”15 Rather than appealing to a mystical sense of interpersonal 
interconnection, Milton looks for his model of society to the unity achieved by a divine 
collective comprised of persons who are different and distinct. Milton writes in Book I 
Chapter 5 (“OF GOD’S SON”) that the attainment of this unity depends in part on charity, but 
the surprising influence of Milton’s anti-trinitarian thinking on his discussion of charity in 
Book II Chapter 11 (“OF THE DUTIES OF MAN TOWARDS HIS NEIGHBOR, AND THE VIRTUES 
THAT PERTAIN TO THIS”) shows that this love informs Milton’s sense of how the persons 
interrelate even more deeply than the mere presence of “charity” in a list of divine attributes 
                                                
14 Leonardo Boff, Trinity and Society, trans. Paul Burns (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis, 1988), 7, 5. 
15 “siquidem diversitas causandi diversitatem essentiæ arguit, [Filius] essentia distinguitur. Numerica 
porro differentia cum ab essentia fluat, qui duo sunt numero, duo sint etiam essentia necesse est.” 
Milton, DDC, 56 (CE, XIV:202; CPW, VI:216).  
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might initially suggest.16 The connection between these two chapters reflects back, in turn, 
on the crucial role that charity plays in the vision for a liberated society at work in Milton’s 
prefatory epistle. There he writes that use of force in religion results in people being 
“enslaved under an inhuman tyranny,”17 insisting that God “requires this of him who would 
be saved, that he believe everything for himself, … not depend[ing] on the faith or judgment 
of another.”18 He concludes the epistle by inviting his readers to “cultivate the truth with 
charity.”19 Milton’s careful work with words is his way of fulfilling the latter requirement 
while avoiding the former fate; doing this, as we will see, requires that Milton strike several 
balances of surprising delicacy, and these attempts stretch his remarkable lexicographical skill 
to the limit. 
 
Divine Unity 
The relationship among the persons of the Trinity occupies both Johannes Wolleb 
and William Ames, upon whose systematic theologies Milton drew heavily in compiling his 
treatise. One of the issues at stake is what logical framework to use in describing how the 
persons (alternatively, hypostaseis or “subsistences”) relate to the Trinity as a whole. Both 
Ames and Wolleb consider the possibility of framing the persons as “modes” of a unified 
essence. For instance, Ames writes: “The subsistences are distinguished from the essence, as 
                                                
16 “DE FILIO DEI”; ibid., 49 (CE, XIV:178; CPW, VI:204). “DE OFFICIIS HOMINIS ERGA PROXIMUM: 
ET QUÆ VIRTUTES EO PERTINEANT”; ibid., 631 (CE, XVII:254; CPW, VI:741). 
17 “inhumanæ tyrannidi servienda”; ibid., 5 (CE, XIV:12; CPW, VI:123). 
18 “postuletque hoc a nobis, ut qui salvus esse vult, pro se quisque credat, … non aliorum niti vel fide 
vel iudicio”; ibid., 1 (CE, XIV:4; CPW, VI:118). 
19 “veritatem colite cum charitate”; ibid., 5 (CE, XIV:14; CPW, VI:124). 
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the modes of subsisting growing together with the same [are distinguished] from it 
absolutely considered.”20 Wolleb expresses the same idea as Ames, using the Greek tropos 
instead of the Latin modus: “The divine person is neither the species of God nor of the Deity, 
nor part of itself, nor a thing other than the Deity, nor a bare relation, nor a mode [tropos] 
alone of subsisting, but the essence of God, with a certain mode of subsisting.”21 Key to 
these formulations is the distinction between the Latin words species and modus. Alexander 
Ross, Wolleb’s seventeenth-century translator, explains why Wolleb rejects species: “Though 
this name Person be common to all the three, yet it is not predicated as genus or species because 
the Persons of the Trinity differ not numerically, much lesse essentially, as they must of 
which genus and species are predicated.”22 Wolleb and Ames, then, reject species as a way of 
understanding the relationship among the persons of the Trinity, and Wolleb accepts modus 
(that is, tropos) only insofar as it functions in tandem with a unified divine essence. 
Milton’s insistence that the persons differ in number and therefore also in essence 
might seem to leave species available to him as a way of describing their relationship. Yet he 
                                                
20 “Subsistentiæ distinguuntur ab essentia, ut modi subsistendi cum eadem concreti, ab eadem 
absolutè considerata.” William Ames, Medulla S.S. Theologiæ, 3rd ed. (London, 1629), 18. STC 556.5. I 
have consulted a translation, The Marrow of Sacred Divinity Drawne out of the Holy Scriptures (London, 
1642). Wing A3000. 
21 “Persona divina nec Dei seu Deitatis species est, nec pars eius, nec res à Deitate alia, nec nuda 
relatio, nec τρόπος tantùm [τῆς] ὑπάρξεως: sed Essentia Dei, cum certo [τῆς] ὑπάρξεως τρόπῳ.” 
Johannes Wolleb, Compendium Theologiæ Christianæ (London 1647), 13. Wing W3258. I have consulted 
the translation by Alexander Ross, The Abridgement of Christian Divinity (London, 1660). Wing W3256. 
This passage appears in italics in the original. 
22 Wolleb, Abridgement, 22n. 
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follows Wolleb in thinking of species as a possibility only when the persons are presumed to 
share a single essence: 
If one divine essence is shared by two things, it will hold <itself> with respect to 
that essence or Deity either as a whole to the parts, or as a genus to the species, or 
finally as a common subject to its accidents. If you concede none of these, you will 
not by any means have gotten loose from the rather absurd things that follow, such 
as that a different mode might be one third of two or more.23 
Milton joins Wolleb in rejecting species, albeit for a very different reason: he rejects the very 
premise upon which the genus/species distinction depends, or the idea that the three 
persons are a part of some essential whole. 
 Milton uses forms of modus to express how the persons relate to each other (even 
when discussing absurdities, as in the passage just quoted), but he differs from Wolleb by 
using modus to understand how persons who differ from each other in essence can 
nevertheless be unified. Milton does this in the context of explaining “in what manner” 
(quemadmodum—a word used frequently in Book I Chapter 5) the unity described in John 
17:21 might obtain: “That they may all be one, just as you, Father, [are] in me and I in you; that they 
                                                
23 “Si una essentia divina communis est duorum, habebit <se> illa essentia sive Deitas aut ut totum 
ad partes, aut ut genus ad species, aut denique ut subiectum commune ad accidentia sua. nihil horum 
concesseris, quæ absurdissima sequantur quo alio modo una tertia possit duorum pluriumve esse, 
nunquam expediverint.” Milton, DDC, 53 (CE XIV, 194; CPW, VI, 212-13). The angle brackets 
signal an insertion, presumably by Daniel Skinner (because he made a fair copy of this section of the 
treatise). For a detailed account of Skinner’s involvement with the manuscript, see Gordon Campbell 
et al., Milton and the Manuscript of De Doctrina Christiana (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 5-
31, 33-38. 
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might also be one in us, etc.”24 In this verse, “just as [sicut]” implies that the unity in question will 
be figurative, rather than literal (as it is, for example, in Boff’s perichoretic model). Milton 
lists some of the figurative modes of attaining this unity: 
[The Son] declares that he and the Father are one according to that mode [quomodo] 
in which we are one with him: and that is not in essence, but in esteem, in 
communion, in consensus, in charity, in spirit, and finally in glory. … Because the 
Son clearly teaches that the Father and he are one according to so many modes [cum 
tot modis], shall I consider all these modes [omnos modos] of less account?25 
Here Milton finds modus to be a more appropriate means than species or genus for expressing 
how the Father, the Son, and ordinary people can all be one. 
Milton’s list of the relevant modes charts a process of attaining progressively greater 
degrees of unity. This sense of progress appears in the list’s inclusion of two related terms: 
                                                
24 “ut omnes unum sint, sicut tu Pater in me et ego in te; ut et ipsi in nobis unum sint &c.” Milton, DDC, 59 
(CE, XIV:212; CPW, VI:220). The Columbia edition prints Milton’s scriptural quotations in italics, 
thereby allowing Milton’s interpolations to be distinguished by their appearance in roman type. I 
follow the practice of the Oxford edition by translating scripture directly from Milton’s Latin, which 
in this case differs only in punctuation (and in replacing “&” with “et”) from the Vulgate text printed 
in the Biblia Sacra Polyglotta, ed. Brian Walton (London, 1657).  Wing B2797. J. Donald Cullington, the 
translator of Milton’s scriptural citations for the Oxford edition, has performed a valuable service by 
checking the Latin of these citations against previously available translations, as well as against 
Milton’s other citations of a verse in the treatise. See John K. Hale, “The Problems and 
Opportunities of Editing De Doctrina Christiana,” Milton Quarterly 44, no. 1 (2010): 42. 
25 “[Filius] declarat se et Patrem esse unum quomodo nos cum eo unum sumus: id utique non est 
essentia, sed dilectione, communione, consensu, charitate, animo, gloria denique.… Cum tot modis 
Filius Patrem et se esse unum clare doceat, ego eos omnes modos posthabeam?” Milton, DDC, 59 
(CE, XIV:212; CPW, VI:220). 
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love [dilectione] and charity [charitate]. Milton’s understanding of how these terms relate to 
each other can be discerned from his discussion of Christian liberty in Book I Chapter 27. 
Arguing that “the whole Mosaic law is abolished through the Gospel,” Milton says however 
that the law’s “true substance [re vera]” and “sum [summa] is not abrogated, “but obtains its 
end in the love [dilectione] of God and neighbor.”26 Shortly thereafter Milton connects this 
summa to interpretation, saying that literal interpretation is not warranted “if by not retaining 
the letter we might more rightly consult the love [dilectioni] of God and neighbor.”27 Milton 
then elevates this practice of consultation into a principle, which he calls the “reason of 
charity [ratio charitatis].”28 Love [dilectio] is the action that fulfills the law, and charity [charitas] 
is the name for the framework, encompassing both love and law, within which this 
fulfillment can be understood. 
Communion and consensus function as steps in the progression from love (action) 
to charity (principle). In Milton’s usage, “consensus” refers to a unity in the action of 
professing belief or testifying, not a unity of testimonial substance. In the paragraph 
following the one where Milton lists the modes of divine unity, he attacks the infamous 
Johannine comma, 1 John 5:7, which reads, “There are three who testify in heaven, the Father, the 
                                                
26 “totam legem Mosaicam per Evangelium aboleri. … sed finem suum assequitur in dilectione illa 
Dei et proximi”; ibid., 329 (CE, XVI:140; CPW, VI:532). 
27 “si litteram non retinendo rectius dilectioni Dei et proximi consulemus.” Ibid. 
28 Ibid., 330 (CE, XVI:140; CPW, VI:532). Unsurprisingly, Milton uses divorce as an example of this 
principle in action. 
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Word, and the holy spirit, and these three are one.”29 This verse offers the strongest scriptural 
evidence for the orthodox understanding of the Trinity, but it does not appear in any of the 
earliest manuscripts and seems to be a late interpolation. Milton writes that this verse, even if 
it must be accepted, attests only to “unity of consensus and testimony,” or in other words, 
“one testimony of three testators, one testifying.”30 The divine persons, therefore, are united 
through the activity of testifying, and people can be united with them through the same 
activity, by “professing.” 
The public act of profession—“consensus”—grows out of communion. Writing in 
Book I Chapter 24 “OF UNION AND COMMUNION WITH CHRIST AND HIS MEMBERS,” Milton 
quotes John 14:23 as his first reference developing the idea of “this union and communion”: 
“If a man love me, he will serve my word, and my father will love him, and we will come to him, and we will 
dwell with him.”31 The starting-point is love, evidenced by two appearances of diligo. Later in 
this sequence of scriptures, Milton quotes 1 John 1:3, 6, and 7, which treats explicitly of 
communion in the same practical terms that mark his definition of “consensus”: “And our 
                                                
29 “Tres sunt qui testificantur in cælo, Pater, Sermo, et spiritus sanctus, et hi tres unum sunt”; Milton, DDC, 60 
(CE, XIV:214; CPW, VI:221). Milton’s rendering is identical to Beza’s, as it appears in his Latin New 
Testament published together with the Junius-Tremellius Old Testament (London, 1581). STC 2057. 
30 “unitate consensus et testmonii”; “una atrium testium testificatio, unum testimonium.” Milton, 
DDC., 59-60 (CE, XIV:214; CPW, VI:221-22). 
31 “Unio ista et communio”; “si quis diligit me, sermonem meum servabit, et pater meus diliget eum, et ad eum 
veniemus, et apud eum habitabimus.” Ibid., 288 (CE, XVI:56; CPW, VI:498). Milton’s rendering is identical 
to Beza’s until the last word, which Beza gives as “manebimus.” Walton’s translation of the Ethiopic 
gives “habitabimus.” Other versions included by Walton—the Greek, the Vulgate, the Syriac, and the 
Arabic—all refer to a house (“mansionem” or “domicilium”) that the Father will make (“faciem”), so 
Milton’s choice, while a minority view, nevertheless inclines farther toward the majority than Beza’s. 
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communion is with the father and with his son Jesus Christ: if we say that we have communion with him, and 
walking in darkness deceive ourselves, we do not act sincerely. But if we walk in light, just as he is in light, 
we will have mutual communion with him.”32 The focus here is on sincerity of action, manifest in a 
collective walk with Christ, not orthodoxy of belief. Again, “just as [sicut]” denotes that 
human walking in light merely figures divine being in light: communion is not literal or 
essential union. Milton’s next quotation, 1 John 4:13, 15, and 16, links communion and 
consensus through the activity of professing: “By this we know that we dwell in him and he in us, 
because he has given of his spirit to us. Whoever shall profess that Jesus is the son of God, God will dwell in 
him, and he in God. And we have known and believed the charity that God has towards us: God is charity; 
and who remains in charity remains in God, and God in him.”33 Milton departs from all precedent in 
Beza and the versions collected in Walton’s polyglot Bible when he uses “profess [professus]” 
instead of “confess [confessus].” Whereas “confess” can denote mere acknowledgment of the 
kind that may well occur in private, “profess” is more affirmative and has an inescapably 
                                                
32 “et communio nostra sit cum patre et cum filio eius Iesu Christo: si dixerimus nos communionem habere cum eo, et 
in tenebris ambulamus mentimur, nec sincere agimus. Quod si in luce ambulamus, sicut ipse est in luce, communionem 
habemus cum eo mutuam.” Ibid., 288-89 (CE, XVI:58; CPW, VI:498). Milton’s rendering differs from 
Beza’s in two particulars: he uses “communionem” in v. 6 where Beza has “societatem”; and he gives 
“ambulamus” where Beza uses “incedimus” in both instances. The Vulgate uses “societatem” 
throughout, but does use “ambulamus.” Walton’s translation of the Greek always uses both 
“communionem” and “ambulamus,” but differs from Milton’s rendering in other ways. 
33 “per hoc cognoscimus nos in eo habitare et ipsum in nobis, quod de spiritu suo dedit nobis. quisquis professus fuerit 
Iesum esse filium Dei, Deus in eo habitat, et ipse in Deo. et nos cognovimus et credidimus charitatem quam habet 
Deus erga nos: Deus charitas est; et qui manet in charitate, in Deo manet, et Deus in eo.” Ibid., 289 (CE, XVI:58; 
CPW, VI:498-99). 
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public quality.34 Communion, or dwelling with God, leads naturally to consensus, or walking 
with God. In this context, “consensus” refers simply to this unity of action and need not 
extend to the content of the testimonies produced thereby. Indeed, this very possibility—
that essential difference can nevertheless conduce to unity—lies at the heart of Milton’s 
thinking about the Godhead, and we’ve seen Milton insisting that people can be united “just 
as” the divine persons are. For Milton, the key to bringing difference into harmonious unity, 
and thereby attaining the unity “in spirit and glory [anima gloria denique]” that crowns his 
list of modes, is charity. 
 
The Modes of Charity 
Milton’s preference for modus over species in Book I Chapter 5 offers a clue to some 
otherwise puzzling changes found in the manuscript of Book II Chapter 11, “OF THE DUTIES 
OF MAN TOWARDS HIS NEIGHBOR, AND THE VIRTUES THAT PERTAIN TO THIS.”35 The general 
trend is that Milton and his amanuenses initially follow Wolleb in using the word species to 
describe the subdivisions of charity. At some point, however, Milton bethought himself and 
began casting about for alternatives. Wolleb, for instance, had written: “Charity is considered 
either absolutely, or reciprocally. Its three species considered absolutely are humanity, 
benevolence, and compassion.”36 Milton’s version shows him looking for an alternative to 
                                                
34 OED, “confess” and “profess”; Lewis & Short, “confiteor” and “profiteor.” 
35 “DE OFFICIIS HOMINIS ERGA PROXIMUM: ET QUÆ VIRTUTES EO PERTINEANT”; ibid., 631 (CE, 
XVII:254; CPW, VI:741). 
36 “Charitas absolutè consideratur, aut reciprocé. Absolutè consideratæ tres species sunt, Humanitas, 
Benevolentia, & misericordia.” Wolleb, Compendium, 223. Wing W3258.  
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Wolleb’s species, first trying the rather strange famulæ before rejecting both it and species in 
favor of modi: 
Charitas erga proximum est absoluta vel mutua. Absolutæ charitatis species <modi> 
quædam <quidam> sive famulæ sunt humanitas, benevolentia et misericordia.  
[Charity towards one’s neighbor is either absolute or mutual. The species <modes> 
or maidservants of absolute charity are humanity, benevolence, and compassion.]37 
Milton’s first effort—famulæ— treats the subdivisions of charity metaphorically as 
personified expressions of a unifying quality, much as Clotho, Lachesis, and Atropos 
personify different aspects of Fate, or as Spenser personifies the household of Charissa in 
The Faerie Queene.38 His temporary consideration of a personal metaphor to explain the 
relationship between these three aspects of charity before deciding ultimately to follow the 
same pattern used in Book I Chapter 5 suggests that Milton’s treatment of charity as one of 
the “modes” of divine unity has carried over to his discussion of the subject in the later 
chapter. This raises questions about how exactly Milton’s thinking about charity and the 
Father/Son relationship have influenced each other, and about what this interrelation means 
for the socially oriented invocations of charity in the prefatory epistle. 
                                                
37 Milton, DDC, 635 (CE, XVII:260; CPW, VI:744). These changes all appear in the hand of Jeremie 
Picard, Milton’s primary amanuensis. (Milton was blind at the time of his work on the treatise and so 
relied entirely on others to write for him.) I rely on Maurice Kelley’s identification of amanuenses, 
which can be found in Appendix B to his This Great Argument: A Study of Milton’s De Doctrina 
Christiana as a Gloss upon Paradise Lost (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1941; rpt. Gloucester, 
MA: Peter Smith, 1962) and subsequently in his masterful textual notes to CPW, vol. VI. Campbell et 
al. corroborate Kelley’s findings; see Milton and the Manuscript, p. 51 and ch. 3 passim. 
38 I owe the suggestion of Charissa to John Hale. 
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The pattern of changes to the manuscript continues throughout the rest of Book II 
Chapter 11. There, Milton’s amanuenses also replace species with forms of modus in two 
additional passages where Milton’s primary amanuensis, Jeremie Picard, had written species 
independent of anything in Wolleb. In the first, amanuensis N rather straightforwardly 
makes the change:  
Altera charitatis species <modus> est BENEVOLENTIA.  
[The second species <mode> of charity is BENEVOLENCE.]39 
In the second of these passages, Milton allows both species and modus to coexist for a time, as 
Picard inserts sive modus before deleting both species and sive to leave just modus: 
Tertia <Tertius> charitatis absolutæ species <sive modus> est MISERICORDIA.  
[The third species <or mode> of absolute charity is COMPASSION.]40 
A final passage, this one with a corollary in Wolleb,41 displays an interesting chronology of 
revision:  
<Modi sive> Species <sive modi> charitatis mutuæ sunt charitas fraterna et amicitia.  
[<The modes or> species <or modes> of mutual charity are fraternal charity and 
friendship.]42 
                                                
39 Milton, DDC, 629b (CE, XVII:266; CPW, VI:746). Skinner mis-numbered several pages in this 
chapter; I follow Kelley in identifying these with a “b.” 
40 Ibid., 632b (CE, XVII:268; CPW, VI:747). Picard made these changes. 
41 “The species of charity considered absolutely are finished. The species considered reciprocally are 
fraternal charity and friendship. [Charitas absolutè consideratæ species fuerunt. Reciprocè 
consideratæ species sunt Charitas fraterna & Amicitia.]” Wolleb, Compendium, 225. 
42 Milton, DDC, 633b (CE, XVII:270; CPW, VI:748). 
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Amanuensis M inserted sive modi after Picard’s Species, but N later cancelled sive modi and 
inserted Modi sive before Species.43 These particular revisions pointedly illustrate the broader 
trend of modi assuming an ever-greater importance in Milton’s framework for understanding 
the relationship among the various subdivisions of charity: if Wolleb’s species remains in 
Milton’s text at all, it now appears as an alternative to modi rather than the other way round. 
The manuscript thus reveals a process of systematic revision in which forms of modus 
take precedence over, and often replace, species. Given that both words roughly mean “kinds” 
or “sorts,” it might seem puzzling why Milton made these changes, and yet these shifts in 
terminology work to establish a very specific sense of difference, with modi implying a 
different relation than species of the parts (humanitas, benevolentia, misericordia) to the whole 
(charitas). Species seems more frankly Ramist, insisting that absolute love can be divided into 
three distinct categories of action.44 If we understand modus in the sense of “manner,” 
however, then humanity, kindness, and compassion are simply different ways of expressing 
the same thing, that is, charity. Instead of treating the three parts of charity as distinct kinds 
of action unto themselves, they are now three different manners of putting charity into action. 
Milton has subtly shifted the focus from what differentiates each of these three traits from 
the others to what unifies them, even as he points out the distinctions among them. 
                                                
43 In This Great Argument, Kelley assigned all of these changes to Picard, but he assigns them to M and 
N in the Yale edition. 
44 “Ramist” refers to the method of logical argumentation developed by the French humanist Petrus 
Ramus (1515-72) and employed in Milton’s own Artis Logicæ (London, 1672). Wing M2093. This 
logic works through a recursive pattern of breaking categories down into constituent subcategories. 
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Thus, when Milton has his amanuenses alter species to forms of modus in Book II 
Chapter 11, he emphasizes the way that charity binds even its own manners of expression 
together in unity. Milton, perhaps caught up for the moment in Wolleb’s methodical Ramist 
splintering—to which he does not, after all, object in principle—later reconsiders when it 
comes to subdividing charity too ruthlessly. To be sure, Milton does not altogether reject the 
genus/species distinction. Even amidst the other changes from species to modus, he can use 
the idea of genus where Wolleb does not: “Opposed to this [i.e., benevolence] is, first, envy 
or jealousy, of which there are various genera [the plural of genus].”45 Moreover, as we have 
seen, Milton’s treatment of mutual charity—as opposed to absolute charity—retains species 
even as a sequence of revisions introduces modi as an alternative and then appears to give it 
priority over species.46  
In any event, Milton’s shift in terms is subtle, and significant. He does not revise 
away the subdivision of charity into absolute and mutual charity, or their further subdivisions 
into humanity, benevolence, and compassion on the one hand and brotherly love and 
friendship on the other. His decision to change Wolleb’s “reciprocal charity” to “mutual 
charity” seems to allow for imparity among those exercising this kind of charity, bringing 
this division as well into line with his thinking on the Godhead. Milton lets these 
subdivisions stand, while revising in a way that allows for the various aspects of charity to be 
                                                
45 “Opponitur huic [i.e., benevolentiæ] primum invidentia sive invidia: Cuius varia genera sunt”; 
Milton, DDC, 630b (CE, XVII:266; CPW, VI:746). Wolleb, Compendium, 224, had written, “There are 
four degrees of envy. [Invidiæ quatuor gradus sunt.]” The translation is identical to Ross’s, 
Abridgement, 376. 
46 See Milton, DDC., 633b (CE, XVII:270; CPW, VI:748), the third example of revisions quoted 
above. 
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united in manner or mode even as they differ in number. Milton’s revisions thus clarify 
exactly how charity can serve to bring about the mode of unity described in John 17:21: 
believers, who are generally assented to differ from each other in essence, can show charity 
for each other just as the Father and Son show charity for them and for each other. 
 
The Liberated Interpreter 
 The model of charitable difference for which Milton is arguing appears in the very 
method of De Doctrina Christiana, as it were on the atomic level. In simple terms, this method 
is to arrange biblical quotations under headings that function themselves as parts of chapters 
on particular theological topics. Comparing himself to other writers of systematic theology, 
whose method “thrusts out into the margin narrow references to the numbers of chapters 
and verses only,” Milton’s explanation of his own method gives pride of place to the biblical 
quotations: “I have considered it better in every respect even to overflow the space of my 
pages with heaps gathered from divine authorities[.]”47 Thus, Milton identifies his greatest 
departure from Wolleb and Ames not in terms of theological conclusions, although he 
diverged considerably from some of their points of doctrine, but rather in his method of 
making biblical quotations the center of everything. In this method, not only the quoting, 
but especially the gathering, is significant, because the agency of the interpreter appears in 
the abstract structure of scriptural meaning that such gathering serves to sketch—and yet, as 
Michael Lieb observes, such a method permits only a shadowy view of the gatherer: 
                                                
47 “numeris duntaxat capitum versiculorumque strictim adnotatis in marginem extrudere, satius duxi 
mearum quidem paginarum spatia confertis undique auctoritatibus divinis etiam eadem ingerentibus 
redundare”; ibid., 4 (CE, XIV:10; CPW, VI:122). 
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As for Milton, he is there and not there. Cramming his pages with proof-texts, he is, 
in the words of [Regina] Schwartz, “squeezed out of his text”: he is obliterated, no 
longer there. At the same time, Milton is there to the extent that he appropriates the 
text as a foregrounded series of proof-texts, each with its own contexts and its own 
assumptions that may or may not agree in full with the other proof-texts that have 
been invoked to support a particular doctrinal assertion.48 
This simultaneous presence and absence of Milton in the biblical quotations is a feature, as 
this section will argue, of the model of charitable Christian liberty that undergirds and 
justifies his methodology. 
Milton’s method of gathering and assembling scriptural quotations has its roots in 
the humanist practice of keeping a commonplace book. Mary Thomas Crane concludes her 
study of this practice by highlighting Milton’s departures from its sixteenth-century norms: 
he “kept a commonplace book but did not fill it with aphorisms”; he “assimilated classical 
works as wholes”; and he “replaced gathering with something more like imitation as we 
know it.” Moreover, Milton’s fondness for the Orpheus myth “would seem to conceive of 
literary invention in terms very different from those implied by gathering and framing.”49 
Crane writes with reference primarily to Milton’s commonplace book and his poetic self-
                                                
48 Michael Lieb, Theological Milton: Deity, Discourse, and Heresy in the Miltonic Canon (Pittsburgh: 
Duquesne University Press, 2006), 42-43, citing Regina M. Schwartz, “Citation, Authority, and De 
Doctrina Christiana,” in Politics, Poetics, and Hermeneutics in Milton’s Prose, ed. David Loewenstein and 
James Grantham Turner, 227-40 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 232. 
49 Mary Thomas Crane, Framing Authority: Sayings, Self, and Society in Sixteenth-Century England 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993), 198-99. 
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conception, but her observations are supremely relevant to his theological treatise as well.50 
Milton’s scriptural citations do not really work as aphorisms in the way discussed by Crane, 
who describes such “sayings” as being “at the same time both ‘common’—based on the 
commonly accepted beliefs and standards of the prevailing cultural codes—and 
‘uncommon’—stylistically unusual in such a way as to make their common content seem 
striking, memorable, persuasive, and true.”51 Rather, Milton uses quotations in ways that 
conform to neither of these categories: he subordinates style entirely to content, and he puts 
quotations in conversation with others in a manner whose cumulative effect is to show that 
no scriptural place adequately or accurately expresses the code of biblical belief in toto. In 
other words, Milton fragments the Bible not to excerpt its most memorable or relevant 
passages, but because he can conceive of no other method for accurately assimilating the 
scriptural text as a whole. 
Accordingly, Milton’s practice of what Crane calls “gathering” and “framing” results 
in a radically different model of authority than that sought by his sixteenth-century humanist 
forebears. Whereas earlier practice aspired to establish personal authority through mastery of 
a hegemonic cultural code, Milton poises himself between assertion and self-effacement. De 
Doctrina Christiana is, to be sure, a massive exercise in framing, and Milton doubtless hoped 
that it would persuade readers to share his conclusions. He does not claim, however, that his 
                                                
50 In addition to the extant commonplace book, Milton also compiled a Theological Index. Regarding 
this document, Maurice Kelley (CPW, VI:16-17) makes two relevant points, upon which fruitful 
expansion seems unlikely. 1) Although we know what several of the headings were, the document is 
not extant, so its relevance or lack thereof to De Doctrina Christiana simply cannot be assessed. 2) 
Because the headings we know about focus on temporal aspects of the church (e.g., “Church 
Goods,” “Councils,” “Pope,” and “Religion not to be Forced”) it seems that the index collected 
secular, as opposed to scriptural, texts. There it must rest unless and until the document surfaces. 
51 Crane, 8. 
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treatise expresses any hegemonic code, except perhaps in that it directs its readers to the 
Bible, which, as Milton recognizes, provides such a code more in aspiration than in practice. 
The authoritative aspect of Milton’s framing, therefore, has less to do with what he says than 
with the very method of gathering and framing he both practices and advocates. He claims 
enough authority only to defend the authority of every Christian to search the scriptures, 
gather the truths that lie scattered in them, and then create a purely personal framework 
from these fragments. His method is therefore deeply bound up in his thinking about 
Christian liberty. 
 Indeed, Milton’s discussion of Christian liberty in Book I Chapter 27 raises questions 
about how such liberty relates to the process of gathering biblical quotations. The 
connection between liberty and scripture appears when Milton quotes Zanchius: “not the 
least part of theology consists in the explication of this question: nor is it even possible to 
understand the scriptures rightly, especially the doctrine of justification and good works … 
unless this article about the abrogation of the law is understood.”52 Milton—drawing on 
Paul—discusses the abrogation of the law in the same terms of liberty and slavery that have 
figured in his thinking about scriptural interpretation since his earliest prose writings, 
suggesting that “liberated” interpretation might in some sense involve abrogating the slavish 
legalism of literalistic reading. As was argued earlier with reference to this particular chapter, 
the key to both kinds of abrogation is charity.  
                                                
52 “in huius quæstionis explicatione, non minimam partem Theologiæ consistere: nec probe intelligi 
posse ne scripturas quidem, præsertim doctrinam de iustificatione et bonis operibus … nisi articulus 
iste de legis abrogatione intelligatur”; Milton, DDC, 330 (CE, XVI:146; CPW, VI:533). Columbia 
prints this passage in italics. 
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 In Milton’s view, Christian liberty turns on a distinction (finer than it may appear at 
first) between enforced servitude and willing service. Milton contrasts these terms in his 
definition: 
CHRISTIAN LIBERTY is that whereby WE ARE LIBERATED AS THOUGH BY 
MANUMISSION FROM SLAVERY TO SIN, AS WELL AS FROM THE PRESCRIPT OF HUMAN 
LAWS, THAT SONS MIGHT BE MADE FROM SERVANTS, <ADULTS FROM CHILDREN,> 
THAT WE BEING LED BY THE SPIRIT OF TRUTH MIGHT SERVE GOD IN CHARITY.53 
On this model, people are servants (or slaves) to sin and to human laws; the Christian 
covenant makes them sons instead of servants—or rather, it enables them to serve God 
instead of sin and human law. Putting aside the presumption that God has to be good, 
meaning that serving him is therefore also good, the main difference between the kinds of 
service posited by the definition is charity. Without charity, the distinctions son/slave and 
adult/child are mere shifts in nomenclature—or, to use a phrase with its own roots in the 
Trinitarian theology rejected by Milton, they are distinctions without a difference. 
 As per his method, Milton uses biblical quotations under the heading “THAT WE 
MIGHT SERVE GOD” to illuminate the role of charity in making the distinction between 
servitude and service meaningful.54 The first quotation is from Matthew 11:29-30: “lift up my 
                                                
53 “LIBERTAS CHRISTIANA est qua LIBERATORE CHRISTO, A SERVITUTE PECCATI, ADEOQUE LEGIS 
HOMINUMQUE PRÆSCRIPTO VELUT MANUMISSI LIBERAMUR, UT FILII EX SERVIS FACTI, <EX PUERIS 
ADULTI, > DEO PER SPIRITUM VERITATIS DUCEM IN CHARITATE SERVIAMUS.” Ibid., 332 (CE, 
XVI:152, 154; CPW, VI:537). The insertion is by amanuensis M. 
54 “UT DEO SERVIAMUS”; ibid., 333 (CE, XVI:154; CPW, VI:537). 
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yoke upon you—: for my yoke is good or easy, and my burden is light.”55 In the Bible, the image of a 
yoke almost always signifies slavery when used in relation to people rather than animals. This 
is the case in Deuteronomy 28:48, which promises to curse Israel in the event of 
disobedience: “the LORD … shall put a yoke of yron upon thy necke[.]” In 1 Kings 12 and 2 
Chronicles 10, the people call the taxes imposed by Solomon a “yoke,” to which Solomon’s 
heir Rehoboam unwisely responds: “My father made your yoke heavie, and I will adde to 
your yoke” (1 Kings 12:14). The yoke figures slavery persistently in Isaiah (9:4, 10:27, 14:25, 
47:6, twice in ch. 58), some fifteen times in the writings of Jeremiah, and three times in the 
New Testament: Acts 15:10, Galatians 5:1, and 1 Timothy 6:1.56 The only exceptions to this 
pattern are Paul’s advice in 2 Cor. 6:14 that married couples should not be “unequally 
yoked” and these verses from Matthew. By quoting this passage as the first explication of 
what it might mean to “serve God,” Milton suggests, paradoxically, that Christian liberty 
involves a yoke, but not enslavement. 
 The next three quotations attempt to reinforce the difference between slaves and 
servants of God (even though both “slave” and “servant” render the same Latin word, 
servus). The first of these, 1 John 5:3-5, explains that charity is what makes divine burdens 
                                                
55 “attollite iugum meum in vos—: nam iugum meum bonum sive facile est, et onus meum leve est”; ibid. In the 
Vulgate the yoke is “suave,” while Beza makes it “facile.” “Bonum” appears in the Latin 
interpretation of the Ethiopic in the Polyglotta. I have not found any version that uses “attollite” 
instead of “tollite” (or something else in several of Walton’s interpretations); the same applies to “in 
vos” instead of “super vos.” 
56 Milton quotes Acts 15:10 twice in this chapter, on pp. 318 and 325 (CE, XVI:124, 136; CPW, 
VI:526, 530). 
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light: “this, namely, is the charity of God, that we observe his precepts; and his precepts are not heavy[.]”57 
In rendering this verse, Milton prefers “precepts [præcepta]” to the usual “commandments 
[mandata]”; “precept” suggests something given in anticipation of a genuine need, as opposed 
to something merely “handed down.”58 Milton then quotes two verses from Romans 6 (18 
and 22) that equate divine service with freedom: “having been freed from sin, you were made servants 
of righteousness,” and “now that you have been freed from sin, and been made servants of God, you have 
your fruits toward holiness.”59 Here Milton chooses the Vulgate’s “freed [liberati]” over Beza’s 
“mancipated [mancipati].” This second preference for an alternative to a word involving 
“hand [manus]” explains why Milton’s definition uses the term “manumission” figuratively: 
“WE ARE LIBERATED AS THOUGH BY MANUMISSION [VELUT MANUMISSI LIBERAMUR].” 
Liberation is like manumission in that the slave goes free, but it is not from the divine 
liberator’s own hand that he sends the slave forth from bondage. 
 The next four quotations expound on the proper manner of divine service, thereby 
presenting it as an alternative to the former bondage. The first of these, Romans 7:6, 
emphasizes that God has freed Christians from the law: “now, moreover, we have been freed from 
                                                
57 “hæc est enim charitas Dei, ut præcepta eius observemus; et præcepta eius gravia non sunt”; ibid. “Præcepta” 
appears in Erasmus’ Latin New Testament and in Walton’s interpretation of the Syriac; the Vulgate 
and Beza use “mandata.” William Tyndale and Desiderius Erasmus, The Newe Testament in Englishe and 
in Latin (London, 1548). STC 2819. 
58 “Mando” may be a contraction of “manusdo,” “manus” meaning “hand” and “do” meaning 
“give.” See Lewis & Short, s.v. “mando; see also “præcipio.” 
59 “liberati a peccato, servi facti estis iustitiæ” and “nunc liberati a peccato, servi autem facti Deo, habetis fructum 
vestrum in sanctimoniam”; Milton, DDC, 333 (CE, XVI:154; CPW, VI:537). In both verses Milton 
prefers the Vulgate’s “liberati” (which also appears in Erasmus) to Beza’s “mancipati,” and in the 
latter he chooses Beza’s “sanctimoniam” over “sanctificationem” in the Vulgate and Erasmus.  
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the law, that being dead in which we were detained, so that we might serve in newness of spirit, and not in the 
oldness of the letter.”60 This bondage of the law, which derives from human inability to obey, 
does not make God the slaveholder. Referring earlier to Galatians 3, Milton writes: “Christ 
has redeemed us from the curse of this law, v. 13; which it is clear we were not able to 
fulfill[.]”61 The next quotation, from Romans 12:1-2, urges Christians to undergo a 
transformative process whereby a new, free kind of service becomes possible: “reasonable 
worship. And do not be conformed to this world, but be transformed by the renewing of your minds in order to 
search out what is that good and acceptable and perfect will of God.”62 “Reasonable worship [rationalem 
cultum]” appears as “reasonable service” in the King James Version, but by choosing 
Erasmus’s and Beza’s cultum over the Vulgate obsequium, which denotes yielding or even 
subjugation, Milton instead frames this service as a positive one of labor and care, and 
specifically of “search[ing] out.”63 The next quotation, James 1:25, continues this trend of 
establishing a positive, free alternative to the abrogated, servile law, while also explaining the 
benefits of pursuing the Christian path: “but he who looks into that perfect law of liberty, and remains 
                                                
60 “nunc autem liberati sumus a lege, mortuo eo in quo detinebamur, ut serviamus in novitate spiritus, ac non in 
vetustate litteræ.” Ibid. Milton’s rendering is identical to Beza’s. 
61 “Christusque nos ab illius legis execratione redemit, v. 13; quam videlicet implere not potuimus”; 
ibid., 323 (CE, XVI:132; CPW, VI:529). 
62 “rationalem cultum. et ne conformemini huic sæculo, sed transformemini renovatione mentis vestræ ad explorandum 
quænam sit voluntas Dei illa bona et accepta et perfecta.” Ibid., 333 (CE, XVI:154-56; CPW, VI:537). 
“Conformemini” applies Beza’s grammar (“ne configuremini”) to the Vulgate’s word (“nolite 
conformari”). “Explorandum” seems to be unique to Milton. Amanuensis M added this quotation in 
the margin. 
63 Lewis & Short, s.v. “obsequium,” “cultus.” 
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in it, who is not a forgetful hearer, but a doer of the work, he will be more blessed in his work.”64 Once 
again, the path involves “look[ing] into” the law. The final quotation in this sequence, 1 
Peter 2:16, brings to culmination the gradual transformation in the concept of “servant” that 
began with Jesus’ using the word “yoke” against the scriptural grain: “as free, and not accounting 
liberty as a cover for malice, but as servants of God.”65 Milton’s concept of free service to God 
requires acting in accordance with God’s will—but liberty granted can always be abused. 
 According with God’s will requires charity, as Milton shows through his quotations 
from 1 John 5 and Romans 6. Beyond this, however, Milton means his very method of 
selecting and arranging biblical quotations to be free and charitable, an instance of his 
“reasonable worship.” He had also quoted Romans 7:6, about serving in newness of spirit 
and not the oldness of the letter, earlier in the chapter, in the context of arguing that the 
whole law of Moses is abolished through faith in Christ.66 For Milton, charity involves giving 
new life to the dead letter of scripture, by finding its “true reality [re vera],” namely “that love 
of God and neighbor, which is born of faith through the spirit.”67 This reality can be found, 
as two of Milton’s quotations given above suggest, only by diligent searching—and then, by 
                                                
64 “at is qui introspexerit in perfectam illam legem libertatis, et permanserit in ea, quia non fuerit auditor obliviosus, 
sed effector operis, in beatior erit in opere suo.” Milton, DDC, 333 (CE, XVI:156; CPW, VI:537). Milton 
follows Beza, except in giving “beatior” instead of “beatus” (a reading for which I can find no 
precedent). 
65 “ut liberi, ac non veluti malitiæ velamen habentes libertatem; sed ut servi Dei.” Ibid. Milton’s rendering 
accords with Beza’s. 
66 “per fidem in Christum … tota lex Mosaica aboletur.” Ibid., 317 (CE, XVI:124; CPW, VI:525-26). 
67 “dilectione illa Dei et proximi, quæ ex fide per spiritum nascitur.” Ibid., 327 (CE, XVI:140; CPW, 
VI:531). 
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implication, bringing one’s findings together and sharing them with others. If liberty appears 
in the searching and charity in the sharing, then it begins to become clear why Milton’s 
presence in the assembled quotations remains ambiguous, as noted by Lieb and Schwartz: 
Milton’s charitable presentation of his findings cannot, and indeed must not, prevent his 
readers from conducting their own searches, for such prevention would be anathema to 
liberty. Ideally, Milton could present his gathered materials in a way that would aid and 
encourage his readers to exercise their liberty of searching and trying all things for 
themselves. 
 Milton presents his quotations in a way that not only invites, but on closer scrutiny 
even requires, his readers to undertake considerable scriptural legwork of their own. Milton 
often assembles his quotations from myriad sources, and sometimes he forsakes all 
precedent to offer a new reading of his own, as when he gives “more blessed [beatior]” in the 
rendering of James 1:25 quoted above. Thus, he is not only gathering individual verses, he is 
also gathering the words that comprise them. Michael Lieb fittingly describes the effect on 
the reader of Milton’s overabundant gathering as “a bit like King Canute encountering the 
sea,” saying further that, “In an encounter with De Doctrina Christiana, one faces the danger 
of being overwhelmed by the powers of the sacred text let loose upon those willing to 
address the multiple meanings implicit in the biblical citations”—and Lieb is only talking 
about the gathering of citations on a macro level, not the vast ocean of labor before the 
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reader who is intent first on reverse-engineering Milton’s quotations and then on re-
engineering them for him or herself.68 
 The contemplation of swimming through this deluge of scriptural minutiæ calls to 
mind Johnson’s “harmless drudge, that busies himself in tracing the original, and detailing 
the signification of words,” making Milton’s liberated interpreter seem, perhaps, like a slave 
to an assemblage of Bibles in various tongues, along with the requisite dictionaries and 
grammars, willingly puzzling through the Bible a word at a time and deciding which of the 
available alternatives to use. And yet in Milton’s formulation the laborer is not a slave: 
“Moses imposed the literal or external law even on the unwilling; through his spirit Christ 
writes the internal law of God on the hearts of the faithful, and he leads them as willing 
followers[.]”69 The very volume of sifted biblical quotations in De Doctrina Christiana suggests 
that for Milton, this picture of Christian service as willingly following the scripture written 
on one’s heart bears only a passing resemblance to the Quaker theology of inner light, 
because the external scripture figures in each stage of Christian development. In practical 
terms, even though internal scripture is the “greatest and supreme” authority, believers 
                                                
68 Lieb, 42.It is worthy of note that in preparing the Oxford edition J. Donald Cullington has 
apparently undertaken at least the reverse-engineering part of this labor; see note 15 above. 
69 Moses litteram sive externam legem imponat vel invitis; Christus internam Dei legem per spiritum 
suum fidelium cordibus inscribit, volentesque ducit”; Milton, DDC, 331 (CE, XVI:150; CPW, 
VI:535). 
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“usually” encounter the external scripture “at an earlier time.”70 Belief in the scriptures arises, 
then, 
first on account of the authority either of the visible church or the codices of 
manuscripts; afterward, the truth of the church itself and of these codices, with 
respect to their individual parts, [is believed] on account of the authority of the 
whole scripture collated with itself; finally, the whole of scripture [is believed] on 
account of that spirit which inwardly persuades believers[.]71 
At each step along this path, then, the written scripture is present, and Milton presents the 
careful collation of written scripture in its entirety as necessary to the process of inward, 
spiritual writing. This spiritual Bible, it seems, must be worked out one word at a time, just 
as with the external Bible. 
 Thus, even though Milton seems in places to take liberties with the very text of 
scripture itself, the prolonged rigor of the process serves as a bulwark against a kind of 
whimsical antinomianism that would ultimately conform the text to whatever agenda or 
bugbear Milton happens to be pursuing at the moment. This remains the case even though 
Milton’s process is all but guaranteed to produce an idiosyncratic outcome: Christian service 
requires just such an extended, and—importantly—willing, engagement with the written 
                                                
70 “Itaque auctoritas fidei externa est in scripturis quidem hodie maxima, et fere prior tempore; 
interna vero cuique, adeoque summa atque suprema, est ipse spiritus.” Ibid., 395 (CE, XVI:274; CPW, 
VI:587). From Book I Chapter 30, “OF SACRED SCRIPTURE [DE SCRIPTURA SACRA].” 
71 “creditur, primo propter auctoritatem sive ecclesiæ visibilis sive codicum manuscriptorum; postea 
vero ecclesiæ ipsisque codicibus eorumque singulis partibus propter auctoritatem totius scripturæ 
secum collatæ; toti denique scripturæ propter ipsum spiritum unicuique fidelium intus 
persuadentem”; ibid., 398 (CE, XVI:278; CPW, VI:590). 
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text. The presence of the written text as a sort of marker laying down the boundaries of this 
engagement helps, again, to explain the ambiguous presence of the interpreter in the 
reassembled sequences of quotations, because the requirement only to use found materials 
from a particular source both enables and limits self-expression. The paradox of a self 
willingly constrained by a commitment only to use materials received from another source 
does not, however, apply only to Christians working out their own beliefs through 
engagement with scripture: it also applies to the Son of God in his relationship with the 
Father. This concept of willing service, modeled on the Godhead, becomes the basis for 
Milton’s vision of a liberated society. 
 
Charity and Liberated Society 
  Milton’s notion of a liberated interpreter performing a willing service that is at once 
self-assertive and self-effacing finds its model in none other than the Son’s complex 
relationship to the Father, as articulated in Book I Chapter 5. In this chapter, Milton 
relentlessly presses his case for the Son’s subordination to the Father. In support of his case, 
he devotes nearly forty manuscript pages to arguing three propositions, the sum of which is 
that any divine attributes pertaining to the Son belong properly to the Father, meaning that 
the Father is greater than the Son in every respect.72 As a corollary to these arguments, 
Milton must frequently address the question of how two beings, which are not only distinct 
in essence, but also distinctly unequal in every way, can be one. To answer this question, 
Milton most often turns to what scripture shows Jesus himself saying on the subject. For 
                                                
72 See ibid., 61 (CE, XIV:216-18; CPW, VI:223). 
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one, “the Son himself answers that not only the name of God and Jehovah, but truly also 
whatever other things he has, have been received from the Father[.]”73 The fact and manner 
of the Son’s receipt of all things from the Father bears powerfully on Milton’s thinking about 
how a society comprised of Christians, each performing his or her idiosyncratic service 
through scriptural engagement, might be unified, even though such service will produce 
diverse outcomes. Because Milton’s thinking on this subject involves reflection on the 
relationship between self-determination and external authority, it undergirds his discussions 
of liberty in the epistle, while also emphasizing yet again how crucial a part charity plays in 
his conception of liberty. 
 The relevance of the Father-Son relationship to Milton’s vision of society depends 
on this relationship’s being analogous to that between Christ and the church. The text offers 
considerable support for such an analogy: Milton argues at some length that when Christ 
bears the name “Jehovah,” he does so merely as a messenger from the Father, who alone is 
Jehovah.74 Milton offers concrete arguments for this analogy in Book I Chapter 15, “ON THE 
MEDIATORIAL OFFICE, AND ITS TRIPLE FUNCTION”: “THE MEDIATORIAL OFFICE [of Christ] 
is that by which, AFTER BEING DESIGNATED TO IT BY GOD THE FATHER, HE FREELY 
PERFORMED, AND EVEN NOW PERFORMS, ALL THOSE THINGS BY WHICH PEACE WITH GOD 
AND ETERNAL LIFE MIGHT BE ACQUIRED FOR HUMAN BEINGS.”75 Notably, Christ received 
                                                
73 “Ipsum filium, non nomen Dei et Iehovæ solum, verum etiam quicquid præterea habet, patri 
acceptum referre”; ibid., 84 (CE, XIV:302; CPW, VI:259). 
74 Ibid., 77-84 (CE, XIV:276-300; CPW, VI:250-59) 
75 “DE OFFICIO MEDIATORIO, EIUSQUE TRIPLICI MUNERE”; “OFFICIUM eius MEDIATORIUM est quo, 
A DEO PATRE AD ID DESIGNATUS, EA OMNIA LIBENS PRÆSTITIT ETIAMNUMQUE PRÆSTAT, QUIBUS 
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this office from God, and he performs its duties freely.76 That is, God’s superiority does not 
inhibit the liberty of his inferiors—a quality also exhibited in Christ’s exercise of the kingly 
function that is an aspect of his mediatorial office:  
because he reigns not only over bodies, like a civil magistrate, but much more over 
minds and consciences: and that not by force and fleshly weapons but by those 
things which the world judges most weak. On account of which, external force 
should be altogether absent from Christ’s kingdom, which is the church.77 
 Christ, in short, rules over the church using the same means by which the Father rules over 
him. 
                                                
HUMANO GENERI PAX APUD DEUM ET SEMPITERNA SALUS ACQUIRATUR.” Ibid., 197 (CE, XV:284; 
CPW, VI:430). 
76 Milton is saying, in a rejection of orthodox Christology, that Jesus divine nature wholly derives 
from the Father and is therefore, in an important sense, not “natural” to Jesus at all. Like the 
mediatorial office, the divine nature is a gift: “Therefore, when the Son is said to be the firstborn of all 
created things, and Rev. 3:14, the first of God’s creations, what else can be more plainly understood, than 
that God of his own will created or generated or produced the Son, first of all things, endowed with 
the divine nature, just as in the fulness of time he miraculously procreated [the Son] in his human 
nature from the virgin Mary [Cum enim Filius dicitur primogenitus omnis rei creatæ, et Apoc. iii. 14. 
principium creationis Dei, quid aliud planius intelligi potest, quam quod Deus Filium rerum omnium 
primum divina natura præditum sua voluntate creavit sive generavit aut produxit, sicut in plenitudine 
temporis humanam naturam ex Maria virgine mirifice procreavit.]” Ibid., 53-54 (CE, XIV:192; CPW, 
VI:211). 
77 “quandoquidem non corpora solum, ut magistratus civilis, sed animum maxime et conscientiam 
regit: idque non vi et armis corporeis sed iis rebus quæ mundi iudicio infirmissimæ sunt. quapropter 
et vis omnis externa ab regno Christi, quæ est ecclesia, abesse debet.” Ibid., 203 (CE, XV:298-300; 
CPW, VI:436). 
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 This means of ruling is charity. In Book I Chapter 5, Milton emphasizes the Son’s 
total dependence on the Father, but he also explains that charity motivates the Father’s gifts 
to his Son: “But the Son himself expressly says, the Father loves the Son and gave all things to him 
in his hand, John 3:35.”78 Charity, furthermore, motivates the Father’s gift of his Son to the 
world: “God’s charity [quoting Romans 5:8], therefore, is the Father’s charity, by which he so 
loved the world, that he had acquired it with his own blood Acts 20:28. And laid down and gave 
for it his life, that is, [the life] of his only begotten son, as can be explained from John 3:16 
and by the analogy of many other passages.”79 For present purposes, the Father’s charitable 
giving has two relevant qualities: he responds to another’s difference by giving of himself, 
and he offers guidance, but not enforcement, regarding how recipients are to use their gifts. 
The Son, for instance, maintains unity with the Father by freely obeying his commands; 
Milton quotes John 8:29—“for he who sent me is with me: the Father has not left me alone; because I 
always do those things that please him”—and goes on to explain why the Father remained with 
the Son: “not because they are one essence, but because I always do those things that please him. 
                                                
78 “Atqui ipse filius diserte, pater, inquit, diligit filium et omnia dedit ei in manum, Ioan. iii. 35.” Ibid., 84 
(CE, XIV: 302-04; CPW, VI:260). Milton’s “ei in manum” differs from Beza, as well as the Vulgate 
and Walton’s interpretations of the Greek, Syriac, and Ethiopic, all of which read “in manus eius.” 
Erasmus, however, gives “dedit illi i manum.” 
79 “Charitas igitur Dei charitas patris est, qua is mundum ita dilexit, ut per proprium sanguinem acquisiverit 
Act. xx. 28. et hic animam suam, id est, unigeniti filii, posuerit ac dederit, ut ex Ioan. iii. 16. et 
plurimorum locorum analogia interpretandum est.” Ibid., 76 (CE, XIV:270; CPW, VI:247). Milton 
follows Walton’s rendering of the Greek, except in making “acquisiverit” a pluperfect instead of the 
perfect “acquisivit,” which appears in the Vulgate, Erasmus, and Beza as well. Again, love (the verb 
diligo) is an action, while charity (the noun charitas) is the principle or characteristic manifest in that 
action. 
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Namely as an inferior [does] those things that please a superior.” The model is one of 
service, not servitude: Milton largely breaks from precedent by using an active, rather than 
passive, verb for the action of pleasing.80 
 Discerning this charitable relationship between Father and Son casts new light on 
Milton’s discussions of liberty and scripture in the epistle. The model of gift-without-
compulsion applies to the divine revelation to each believer:  
Truly, God has revealed the way of eternal salvation only to each person’s own faith, 
and he demands this of us, that one who wishes to be saved should believe 
everything for oneself, so in divine matters I decided not to rest on the faith or 
judgment of others, … and, after reading and thinking with all diligence through the 
scriptures of God themselves, [I decided] to have one [treatise] for me myself, sought 
out and learned by my own works.81 
God gives the gift, that is, but the outcome depends entirely on how the recipient uses it. 
The subsequent treatments of liberty in the epistle work accordingly, with the aim of 
preserving the freedom that attended the giving of this gift. The principle of divine 
                                                
80 “nam qui misit me mecum est: pater me solum non reliquit; quia ego quæ placent ipsi facio semper. … cur 
denique non reliquit solum? non quia essentia unus, sed quia quæ placent ipsi facio semper. minor scilicet 
quæ placent maiori.” Ibid., 96 (CE, XIV: 344-46; CPW, VI:276). Milton uses “placent” instead of 
“placita sunt ei” in Erasmus, Beza, and the Vulgate; of Walton’s versions, only the Arabic uses an 
active form. 
81 “Verum cum æternæ salutis Viam non nisi propriæ cuiusque fidei Deus aperuerit, postuletque hoc 
a nobis, ut qui salvus esse vult, pro se quisque credat, statui divinis in rebus, non aliorum niti vel fide 
vel iudicio, … ex ipsa Dei scriptura quam diligentissime perlecta atque perpensa, unumquodque 
habere mihimet ipsi, meaque ipsius opera exploratum atque cognitum.” Ibid., 1-2 (CE, XIV:4; CPW, 
VI:118). 
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revelation “only to each person’s own faith” denies that merely belonging to a group in 
possession of the things essential for salvation automatically grants a person access to them. 
This is not to say that groups of believers cannot exist—only that group identity derives 
from traits its individual members have in common rather than from anything inherent to 
the group itself or mystically shared among its members. 
 The diversity of individuals resulting from the application of Milton’s method raises 
questions, however, about just what kind of coherent group identity might emerge. Uniquely 
among writers of systematic theology, Milton addresses his work “To All the Churches of 
Christ, and to all of the people everywhere professing the Christian Faith.”82 Significantly, he 
does not put doctrinal qualifications on this address; merely professing the Christian faith is 
enough. Milton seems to assume that much, if not most, of his intended audience will not 
agree with his theology, just as he himself is unlikely to agree fully with the fruits of their 
labors. They might not even agree about the words of the biblical text (even though 
agreement on the principle of sola scriptura is a prerequisite of group membership).83 
                                                
82 “Universis Christi Ecclesiis, nec non omnibus Fidem Christianam ubicunque Gentium 
profitentibus”; ibid., 1 (CE, XIV:2; CPW, VI:117); cf. note 2 in the Yale edition. 
83 Compare Milton’s later statement in Of True Religion (London, 1673), 4: “With good and Religious 
Reason therefore all Protestant Churches with one consent … maintain these two points, as the main 
principles of true Religion: that the Rule of true Religion is the Word of God only: and that their 
faith ought not to be an implicit faith, that is, to believe, though as the Church believes, against or 
without express authority of Scripture.” On the basis of these points, Milton argues that the Roman 
Church is antichristian and heretical, thereby excluding it by implication from an address “To All the 
Churches of Christ.” Wing M2135. Here, again, consensus consists in the action of “maintaining.” 
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According to Milton, the unity of this motley group will be achieved in the same way 
that the persons of the Godhead attain their unity. Milton’s decision to share his theological 
treatise publicly involves him in the same economy of giving and receiving gifts that operates 
between Father and Son: “If I do all these things publicly, if, as God bears witness, [I do 
them] with a fraternal and friendly spirit toward all mortals, I impart these things, than which 
I hold nothing more valuable or precious, as widely and as willingly as possible.”84 Milton’s 
stated willingness mirrors the Son’s, and his act of profession similarly echoes the mode of 
consensus operating within the Godhead. Moreover, his claim to be making this profession 
“with a fraternal and friendly spirit” marks the intended publication of De Doctrina Christiana 
as an act of “mutual charity,” one of whose modes is “fraternal charity [charitas fraterna]”:  
FRATERNAL or CHRISTIAN CHARITY is the greatest of all; thereby the faithful esteem 
<and assist> each other as members of Christ, and are of one spirit <and are, as 
much as possible, wholly of one spirit>; they nevertheless bear, as much as possible, 
with the infirm and those who have other opinions.85 
The emendation in this passage is significant, for it entails an acknowledgment that complete 
unity of spirit among believers may be an unattainable ideal; as Milton had written in 
Areopagitica (1644), “many moderat varieties and brotherly dissimilitudes” might at best be 
                                                
84 “Hæc si omnibus palam facio, si fraterno quod Deum testor atque amico erga omnes mortales 
animo, hæc, quibus melius aut pretiosius nihil habeo, quam possum latissime libentissimeque 
impertio”; Milton, DDC, 3 (CE, XIV:8; CPW, VI:121). 
85 “CHARITAS FRATERNA seu CHRISTIANA est omnium maxima; qua fideles ut membra Christi inter 
se diligunt et unanimes sunt <atque adiuvant, et quantum fieri potest, unanimes plane sunt>; 
infirmos tamen et dissentientes, quantum fieri potest, ferunt.” Milton, DDC, 633b (CE, XVII:270; 
CPW, VI:748). The changes are by Picard. 
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“not vastly disproportionall,” just as the Temple of Truth being built by believers “can but 
be contiguous in this world.”86 Even so, unity of spirit is the goal, and the Godhead is the 
model: “[The Son] declares that he and the Father are one according to that mode in which 
we are one with him: and that is not in essence, but in esteem, in communion, in consensus, 
in charity, in spirit, and finally in glory[.]”87 
 Without liberty, however, even the charity that enables this unity of spirit among 
disparate believers is nothing. The idea that fraternal charity requires bearing with “those 
who have other opinions” explains why Milton’s epistle includes a defense of “the liberty of 
discussion and inquiry”:  
I pray and implore all to whom truth is not odious not to shout that the church is 
disturbed by the liberty of discussion and inquiry which is conceded to schools, and 
should certainly be conceded to believers, because we are commanded to explore all 
things, and the church is enlightened and edified by the daily increase of light much 
more than it is disturbed.88 
Again echoing Areopagitica, Milton paradoxically insists that “the church is enlightened and 
edified,” rather than disturbed, by a certain kind of fractiousness among believers: the 
                                                
86 John Milton, Areopagitica (London, 1644), 32. Thomason E.18[9]. 
87 “[Filius] declarat se et Patrem esse unum quomodo nos cum eo unum sumus: id utique non est 
essentia, sed dilectione, communione, consensu, charitate, animo, gloria denique”; Milton, DDC, 59 
(CE, XIV:212; CPW, VI:220). 
88 “Illud oro atque obtestor omnes quibus veritas odio non est, ne libertate hac disserendi ac 
disquirendi quæ scholis conceditur, nullis certe credentibus non concedenda, turbari ecclesiam 
clamitent, cum explorare omnia iubeamur, et veritatis luce indies aucta, illustretur atque ædificetur 
longe magis Ecclesia quam turbetur.” Milton, DDC, 3 (CE, XIV:8; CPW, VI:121). 
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church is built up, not torn down, by free discussion. Indeed, the church cannot even exist 
without such discussion; writing later of “the liberty of shaking and publicly airing out every 
doctrine,” Milton goes on to say: 
Without this liberty, there is neither religion nor Gospel; force alone prospers, upon 
which it is foul and shameful for Christian religion to stand: slavery still remains, 
serving a law, not divine as before, but, what is most wretched, human—or, to speak 
more truly, an inhuman tyranny.89 
Milton’s gift of a theological treatise will be lodged in the world useless unless its recipients 
have the freedom to separate the wheat from the chaff for themselves. In this way, perhaps 
the most charitable statement in the epistle is this imperative in its final sentence: “or even 
do not use [these things].”90 
In the introductory epistle, therefore, Milton insists that his own conclusions, no 
matter how stridently he might express them, participate in a larger process of working out 
the truth as he exercises a Son-like liberty. The complexity of the agency at work in this 
liberty appears in Milton’s use of passive verbs: the church “is enlightened and edified 
[illustretur atque ædificetur].” This usage is in keeping with a feature of New Testament 
grammar called the “theological passive, or “the passive used to avoid directly naming God 
as agent.” Max Zerwick writes, “This usage occurs so often in the sayings of Jesus that J. 
                                                
89 “libertatem … excutiendæ … cuiuscunque doctrinæ, palamque ventilandæ…. sine qua libertate, 
religio nulla, Evangelium nullum est; sola vis viget; qua stare Christianam religionem, turpe et 
probrosum est: servitus adhuc durat; non legi, ut olim, divinæ, sed, quod miserrimum est, humanæ; 
vel, verius ut dicam, inhumanæ tyrannidi servienda.” Ibid., 4 (CE, XIV:12; CPW, VI:122-23). 
90 “vel ne utimini quidem”; ibid., 5 (CE, XIV:14; CPW, VI:124). 
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JEREMIAS puts it among the signs indicating that the ‘ipsissima verba Jesu’ are being 
reported.”91 The theological passive is one of the primary means by which Jesus ascribes the 
agency in his own actions to the Father—and yet, Jesus’ thus emphasizing the Father’s 
agency does not negate, but perhaps even demonstrates his own willingness. The actions that 
Jesus describes using this grammatical construction—such as the healing of the paralytic in 
Mark 2 discussed in Chapter One—have not been determined by the Father’s will, but they 
are in keeping with it, just as they are done with the Father’s power. Similarly, Milton himself 
cannot claim to edify or enlighten the church through his theological treatise: if these things 
occur, it will be because the Father wills it. Nevertheless, Milton participates, as he says, not 
only willingly but “as willingly as possible [libentissime].” The working out of the Father’s will 
in building the church is diffused among many persons willingly undertaking labors similar 
to Milton’s engaging in the activity of Christian profession, an activity “than which [he holds] 
nothing more valuable or precious,” and then sharing its results “as widely as possible 
[latissime].”92 The diffused quality of this larger process liberates Milton—and everybody 
else—from the terrible burden of having to get everything right; in other words, it gives 
everyone the freedom to work out their own beliefs for themselves as well as they can, even 
though along the way they will almost inevitably get some things wrong. It enables drudgery 
to coexist with harmlessness. 
                                                
91 Max Zerwick, Biblical Greek: Illustrated by Examples (Rome: Editrice Pontificio Instituto Biblico, 
1963), 76 (no. 236). Zerwick cites J. Jeremias, “Kennzeichen der ipsissima vox Jesu,” Synoptische 
Studien [Wikenhauser festschrift] (München: Karl Zink, 1953), 93. 
92 “quibus melius aut pretiosius nihil habeo, quam possum latissime libentissimeque impertio”; 
Milton, DDC, 3 (CE, XIV:8; CPW, VI:121). 
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 Milton’s epistle, then, invites his readers to participate in this process of working out 
the truth. The key to successful participation, as Milton puts it in the epistle’s concluding 
sentence, is charity, for this alone can preserve the liberty that makes participation possible: 
For the rest, brethren, cultivate the truth with charity; then judge of these things, just 
as the spirit of God will direct: use these things and me, or even do not use them, 
neither faithfully nor doubtfully, and to be clearly persuaded of the scriptures; finally, 
live and be strong in Christ the Savior and Lord.93 
These concluding words leave Milton’s entire treatise in the same ambiguous position as its 
putative author, suspended between powerful, voluminous assertion and the possibility that 
little or none of this asserted framework—or the detailed labor undergirding it—will in the 
end prove useful to the cosmic elaboration of truth. 
 Looking to Milton’s treatise with too intent a focus on its theological conclusions not 
only risks overlooking the contingency of those conclusions, but more importantly, it risks 
missing Milton’s masterful and rich rhetorical response to that contingency. This chapter has 
argued that his response is built into the very method of the treatise, manifesting itself in the 
scrupulous care with which Milton both arrays the scriptural quotations and assembles their 
very words. In this care appears an audacity on an order with the treatise’s most shocking 
theological pronouncements, and on a much vaster scale, for although Milton claims at the 
outset to be giving the biblical text pride of place, in fact his own spiritual intimations often 
                                                
93 “De cætero, fratres, veritatem colite cum charitate; de his, prout Dei spiritus vobis præiverit, ita 
iudicate: his mecum utimini, vel ne utimini quidem, nisi fide non dubia scripturarumque claritate 
persuasi; in Christo denique Servatore ac Domino nostro vivite ac valete.” Ibid., 5 (CE, XIV:14; 
CPW, VI:124). 
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take precedence, given that he uses them to structure and even revise what he presents as the 
biblical text. In Book I Chapter 30, “ON THE HOLY SCRIPTURES [DE SACRA SCRIPTURA],” 
shortly after saying that “The rule and canon of faith is therefore scripture alone,” Milton 
emends himself: “Nothing except these things [i.e., the scriptures] is the judge of 
controversies; or rather every person for himself [ought to judge] from these things with the 
spirit of God.”94 The shift away from the scriptural text and toward the spirit-aided judgment 
of the individual Christian continues a few pages later, when Milton complains that the text 
of the New Testament has been corrupted in many instances:  
But I do not rationally know why the providence of God would let it happen that the 
writings of the New Testament should have been committed to such uncertain and 
slippery custodians, unless it was for the purpose of arguing this very proposition to 
us, that the spirit is a more certain guide than scripture, whom [i.e., the spirit] we 
therefore ought to follow.95 
That Milton takes this statement as license to emend the text on the basis of nothing more 
than his own spiritual judgment is an interesting phenomenon, one rendered all the more 
interesting by the fact that he does not take his own “inner light” as justification to dispense 
with scripture altogether, as a Quaker might. 
                                                
94 “Regula itaque fidei et canon, scriptural sola est”; “controversiarum etiam iudex nisi ea, nemo; aut 
saltem ex ea sibimet quisque cum spiritu Dei.” Ibid., 393 (CE, XVI:266-68; CPW, VI:585). 
95 “Quod nescio sane cur factum providentia Dei sit, ut novi testamenti scriptura custodibus tam 
incertis tamque lubricis commissa fuerit, nisi ut hoc ipsum argumento esset, certiorem nobis 
propositum ducem spiritum quam scripturam, quem sequi debeamus.” Ibid., 398 (CE, XVI:276-78; 
CPW, VI:589). 
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 Audaciously, Milton presents these occasional interpolations as scripture, thereby 
quietly investing his own spiritual insights with scriptural authority, and only careful 
investigation can distinguish these spiritually based revisions from emendations for which 
there might be some textual or other scholarly basis. Milton’s method of proceeding, while 
likely to raise some entirely justifiable hackles, nevertheless has its advantages. For one, it 
refers readers to scripture, and not Milton or his putative spiritual authority, which crucially 
preserves their liberty to examine and even reconstruct the text for themselves:  
Who, whether in the name of the church or of the Christian magistrate, has therefore 
imposed his sanctions of whatever kind and dogmas on unwilling believers (each one 
of whom is ruled by the spirit of God) imposes a yoke not on people only, but even 
on the holy spirit itself.96 
If Milton were overtly to claim scriptural authority for renderings of scripture that depend in 
fact only on his own spiritual sense of how the text ought to read, he would risk yoking 
other believers who ought instead, as he sees it, to use the freedom of their own regiment by 
the spirit to render the text for themselves. The problem of textual corruption should be 
tackled using every available scholarly tool, but in the end, Milton suggests, these will never 
be sufficient. Perhaps the profoundest irony of Milton’s theological treatise, with its sea of 
quotations in service of occasionally controversial conclusions, is that Milton not only 
expects that readers will disagree with his conclusions, but that he also expects them to 
disagree with the composition of the text upon which he has based those conclusions. 
                                                
96 “Qui igitur fidelibus, quorum unusquisque Dei spiritu regitur, sanctiones quascunque suas et 
dogmata sive ecclesiæ, sive Christiani magistratus nomine invitis imposuerit, is non hominibus 
tantum, verum etiam ipso sancto spiritui iugum imponit.” Ibid., 400 (CE, XVI:280; CPW, VI:590). 
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Milton wants his readers not to believe as he believes, but to do as he has done. In this way, 
the multiplication of Milton’s talents—meaning that other believers accept his invitation to 
“enter into the same way” and produce idiosyncratic treatises of their own—would involve 
not only a proliferation of beliefs, but in some sense even a proliferation of Bibles. In the 
face of such proliferation, with its potential for chaotic disorder, Milton has vested 
considerable hope indeed in the prospect that human beings might embody the charity that 
can bind together even divine differences. 
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Chapter Three 
Prophesying the Bible:  
The Creation of Scripture in Books 11 and 12 of Paradise  Lost  
 
For ye may all prophesie one by one, [that] all may learne, and all may be comforted. 
(1 Corinthians 14:31) 
Kafka’s idiosyncrasy is present in each of these writings [by Zeno, Han Yu, Robert 
Browning, and Søren Kierkegaard], to a greater or a lesser degree, but if Kafka had 
not written, we would not perceive it; that is to say, it would not exist. … The fact is 
that each writer creates his precursors. His work modifies our conception of the past, 
as it will modify the future. 
(Jorge Luis Borges)1 
 
 
Near the end of Paradise Lost, the archangel Michael makes a direct reference to the 
composition of part of the New Testament. Speaking of the Apostles, he says: “Thir 
Ministry perform’d, and race well run, / Thir doctrine and thir story written left, / They 
die.”2 This reference to written scripture, along with a few others like it, has frequently led 
                                                
1 Jorge Luis Borges, “Kafka and His Precursors,” in Selected Non-Fictions, ed. and trans. Eliot 
Weinberger (New York: Viking, 1999), 365. 
2 John Milton, Paradise Lost a poem in twelve books (London, 1674), 12.505-7. Wing M2144. I quote 
from this edition, for convenience citing parenthetically the line numbers of Barbara Lewalski’s 
edition of the poem (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2007). 
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critics to notice a paradox, aptly summarized by David Loewenstein: “[Michael’s] subject 
matter is the drama of biblical history (though its text is yet to be written).”3 Statements such 
as this recognize a necessary (and fairly obvious) component of Milton’s fiction, but critics 
do not as often acknowledge that this temporal detail renders problematic the relationship 
between Michael’s “biblical” presentations and the Bible itself.  This relationship is hardly 
trivial, because teaching Adam how to interpret serves as a major purpose of Michael’s 
presentations. David Ainsworth seeks to clarify matters by granting Michael prior knowledge 
of the Bible: “since almost everything Michael presents to him appears in the Bible, Adam is 
challenged to interpret representations of a text which has yet to be written, but which God 
has already revealed to Michael.”4 Yet if Michael somehow knows the Bible in the form 
familiar to Milton’s readers, what does it mean that Adam is asked to interpret 
“representations of a text,” especially if learning to interpret correctly is the major purpose 
of his encounter with Michael? Furthermore, why does Milton choose to present the sacred 
text in the non-textual formats of vision and oral narration, and what rationale does he offer 
for how Michael’s presentations come to differ from their putative source? 
I wish to argue that in Books 11 and 12 of Paradise Lost, Milton portrays a prophetic 
interpretative process of the kind that would, from the poem’s internal temporal perspective, 
eventually lead to the creation of the Bible. Michael exemplifies this anticipatory prophetic 
                                                
3 David Loewenstein, Milton and the Drama of History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 
101. Cf. John Reichert, Milton’s Wisdom: Nature and Scripture in Paradise Lost (Ann Arbor: University 
of Michigan Press, 1992), 250. Subsequent references to these books appear parenthetically in the 
text. 
4 David Ainsworth, Milton and the Spiritual Reader (New York: Routledge, 2008), 96. 
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process even as he works at teaching it to Adam by, among other things, dramatizing the 
compilation of the Bible. In other words, I am arguing that the Bible, for Milton, creates its 
precursors: reading Paradise Lost after the Bible is supposed to be like reading Kierkegaard 
after Kafka, meaning that readers who seem to glimpse hints of the Bible in Milton’s poem 
see a connection that exists only because they are in a position to make it: the matter, for 
Milton, is one of logical, if not temporal, priority. Thinking of Paradise Lost as a precursor to 
the Bible opens new avenues of inquiry into the relationship between Michael’s presentation 
and its recognizable counterpart in the Bible, enabling us to ask about the sources that 
Michael uses in constructing his visions and narrations, what role he plays in this process, 
and how this role influences his relationship with Adam. 
But why might Milton be interested in using temporality to try to unmoor his readers 
from the most obvious and readily available foundation for interpreting his poem? Such a 
question necessarily engages the matter of Milton’s artistic accomplishment in the final two 
books, because the primary feature that emerges from this temporal unmooring is an 
emphasis on prophetic creativity, both human and angelic. Many readers—at least since 
Addison—have found these books, and especially the narratives in Book 12, somewhat 
lacking in the artistic vigor of the first ten.5 C. S. Lewis gave this view its most famous 
expression, writing that they are “inartistic,” “an untransmuted lump of futurity.”6 Even 
though Stanley Fish has traced the turn in twentieth-century criticism toward a more positive 
                                                
5 Joseph Addison, Notes upon the twelve books of Paradise Lost (London, 1719). ESTC T089182. 
6 C. S. Lewis, A Preface to Paradise Lost (London: Oxford University Press, 1942; rpt. 1960), 129. 
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evaluation of the final books of the poem,7 appreciative critics such as Loewenstein still feel 
the need to engage with the problem of Milton’s artistry: “we need not agree with [Lewis’s] 
unsympathetic characterization … to acknowledge that these remain artistically 
problematical books in which Milton is struggling with his imaginative responses to history 
as a tragic process” (93). I argue that these books portray not Milton alone, but also Michael 
and to a lesser extent Adam engaged in just such an artistic struggle—even as they similarly 
engage the poem’s readers. Michael, as I will show, works assiduously and imaginatively to 
shape his presentations to Adam in a way that attempts to suit his pupil’s needs as 
determined by the Father’s charge to Michael. In other words, Michael is improvising, not 
playing from a written score, and he is teaching Adam how to join in. Milton did not 
therefore accede out of mere necessity to the apparently banal narrative fiction that the Bible 
does not yet exist within the poem’s time frame; rather, he recognized and took advantage of 
its implicit potential for exploring angelic and human creativity.  
The improvisational quality of Michael’s presentations suits his purposes well, for his 
main task is to prepare Adam to meet faithfully the unprecedented challenges of postlapsarian 
existence: Adam has to learn to deal with tragedy not in “history,” but in his own future. 
This requires that Michael make his presentations in a way that will enhance, not impede, 
Adam’s liberty—which is to say, it requires that Michael interpret charitably along the lines 
laid out in the preceding chapters. As Raymond Waddington points out, Michael’s 
presentations contain no specific details about Adam’s own future life, even though Adam 
                                                
7 Stanley Fish, “Transmuting the Lump: Paradise Lost, 1942-1979,” in Doing What Comes Naturally: 
Change, Rhetoric, and the Practice of Theory in Literary and Legal Studies (Durham, NC: Duke University 
Press, 1989), 247-93. 
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will in the event live to witness most of the events contained in the visions of Book 11.8 By 
this means, the presentations preserve a sense of contingency that is key to their educative 
purpose. After all, the future that Michael presents to Adam will not happen if Adam and 
Eve choose not to let it—and Milton carefully structures his poem such that their liberty to 
make this choice remains untrammeled. They have already considered such choices at length. 
Eve has suggested contraception (10.986-91) and sexual abstinence (10.992-1000) as two 
means of limiting the impact of death; she then extended these arguments to include suicide 
(10.999-1006). Even though Adam responded at the time with arguments against suicide 
(10.1016-25) and in favor of childbearing (10.1051), the vision of the lazar-house prompts 
him to reconsider. “Better end heer unborn,” he says (11.502), suggesting that life is 
“obtruded,” or forced, on mankind,  
who if we knew 
What we receive, would either not accept 
Life offer’d, or soon beg to lay it down, 
Glad to be so dismist in peace.  
(11.504-7)  
Nor does the possibility end here that none of the future presented by Michael will even 
happen. Later, witnessing the Flood, Adam speaks of his progeny “by [his] foreknowledge 
gaining Birth / Abortive, to torment me ere their being / With thought that they must be” 
(11.768-70). That “they must be,” however, is not as certain as Adam makes it out to be: 
                                                
8 Raymond Waddington, “The Death of Adam: Vision and Voice in Books XI and XII of Paradise 
Lost,” Modern Philology 70 (1972): 9-21. 
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their existence depends not upon fate or necessity, but on him and Eve jointly doing their 
part to make the future happen. 
Thus, the information that Michael gives to Adam seems designed more to provide a 
framework for interpreting his experience (and indeed to encourage Adam to let that 
experience happen) than to convey advance knowledge of useful historical facts—a notion 
supported by Jameela Lares’s compelling argument that Michael’s presentations take the 
form of a sermon.9 Even though Lares’s model assumes that Michael’s sermon derives from 
a biblical text (specifically the protevangelium of Genesis 3:15), her identification of Michael’s 
activity in these books as preaching invites attention to his role as a charitable creator. Her 
argument becomes more helpful still when paired with the recollection that, in seventeenth-
century England, preaching a sermon was often called “prophesying.”10 Indeed, Adam refers 
to Michael as a “Prophet of glad tidings” (12.375). Modern readers customarily think of a 
prophet as one who foretells the future—something that Michael obviously does for 
Adam—and yet the notion of prophecy also creates some potential common ground 
between Michael’s presentations and the Bible. 
The apostle Paul thought of prophecy as a spiritual gift, advising those who had it to 
“prophesie according to the proportion of faith” (Romans 12:6). Building on the crucial 
                                                
9 Jameela Lares, “Paradise Lost, Books XI and XII, and the Homiletic Tradition,” Milton Studies 34 
(1996): 99-116. This article reappears, slightly revised, in Jameela Lares, Milton and the Preaching Arts 
(Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 2001), 141-68. Subsequent references to the Milton Studies 
version of the essay appear parenthetically in the text. 
10 See, for instance, a preaching manual by the influential Calvinist William Perkins, The Arte of 
Prophesying, trans. Thomas Tuke (London, 1607), 28, 31. STC 19735.4. The tract was first published as 
Prophetica, sive, De sacre et vnica ratione concionandi tractatus (Cambridge, 1592). STC 19735. 
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assumption that the Bible is a record of prophecy, Augustine appropriated this phrase from 
Paul to create a method that enabled readers of the Bible to use the proportion of faith to 
make sense of obscure, difficult, or apparently contradictory passages.11 In the late sixteenth 
century the Cambridge theologian William Whitaker defined this Augustinian sense of 
proportion as what was contained in the “clear passages of scripture, … the articles of faith 
in the Creed, and the contents of the Lord’s Prayer, the Decalogue, and the whole 
Catechism.”12 Noting that two of Whitaker’s examples—the Creed and the Catechism—are 
not strictly scriptural, in his usage “the proportion of faith” becomes the mark of what is 
biblical more than anything in the text itself, because it, and not the text, functions as the 
measuring stick for possible interpretations. Pushing Augustine’s influential hermeneutic 
back to its origins in Paul, however, opens up the possibility of a person with the spiritual 
gift of prophesy creating something biblical that shares nothing in common with the written 
Bible except this abstract proportion of faith. As with Milton’s early prose and his De 
Doctrina Christiana, so too here is a sense of ideological harmony or proportion key, not 
faithful adherence to a text—and this, I will argue, is exactly the possibility that Milton 
exploits in the last two books of Paradise Lost, which show Adam in the process of learning 
how to respond proportionately to events past, present, and future. 
                                                
11 Augustine, De Doctrina Christiana, ed. and trans. R. P. H. Green (Oxford: Clarendon, 1995), 132-33 
(III.2.2). The usual name for Augustine’s hermeneutic is the “analogy of faith [analogia fidei],” 
although his term for it is the “rule of faith [regulam fidei].” Analogia is the Latin form of the word in 
Paul’s Greek rendered “proportion” in the KJV. Because I am more concerned with Paul’s principle 
than Augustine’s, I use the term “proportion of faith” throughout. 
12 William Whitaker, A Disputation on Holy Scripture, trans. William Fitzgerald (Cambridge, 1849), 472; 
published originally as Disputatio de Sacra Scriptura (Cambridge, 1588). STC 25366. 
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Michael’s Experience and His Prophetic Materials 
Milton represents Michael as bringing a prehistory to his encounter with Adam that 
bears some resemblance to Adam’s own. Like Adam, Michael has received a commandment 
from the Father that he proved incapable of fully obeying in practice. Commanded to drive 
Satan’s crew by military force into “the Gulf / Of Tartarus, which ready opens wide / His 
fiery Chaos to receave thir fall” (6.53-55), Michael leads the celestial armies into combat. 
Eventually coming to face Satan, Michael unleashes an apparently devastating blow with his 
vaunted “avenging Sword” (6.278)—a blow from which Satan, in a moment of cosmic 
comedy, recovers almost immediately: “th’ Etherial substance clos’d / Not long divisible” 
(6.330-31). Raphael does not mention any further participation in the battle from Michael. 
 Unlike Adam, however, who was “sufficient to have stood, though free to fall” 
(3.99), Michael was literally incapable of fulfilling the Father’s commandment. After another 
day’s fighting passes without result, because all the angels were created equal and sin has not 
yet had its impact on the fallen ones, the Father observes to the Son: “Whence in perpetual 
fight they needs must last / Endless, and no solution will be found: / Warr wearied hath 
perform’d what Warr can do” (6.692-95). Michael has done all that the Father expected him 
to do—the Son tells the hosts: “Faithful has been your warfare, and of God / Accepted” 
(6.803-04)—and yet he has not fulfilled the commandment to drive Satan and his followers 
from Heaven. If the Father seems capricious in giving Michael a command that he knows 
the archangel cannot obey, at least he is merciful in accepting Michael’s effort rather than 
punishing his failure. Even the Son’s chariot does not ultimately expel Satan and his 
followers, after all; when the soon-to-be devils see its approach, “headlong themselves they 
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thr[o]w / Down from the verge of Heav’n, Eternal wrauth / Burn[ing] after them to the 
bottomless pit” (6.864-66). Michael has been valiant, but ineffectual. 
 When the Father sends Michael to drive Adam and Eve from Paradise, then, his new 
mission offers some instructive parallels with the old. He arrives in military gear, wearing 
“Satans dire dread,” his sword (11.248). Indeed, as he leaves Paradise with the pair, not his 
sword, but the “brandisht sword of God before them blaz[es]” (12.633), and yet Adam and 
Eve depart willingly. The command “all terror hide” suggests that Michael will not need 
military prowess to succeed in his errand, and the Father commands Michael to post 
“Cherubic watch” and a flaming sword at the entrance to Eden as a deterrent not to the 
fallen pair but to “Spirits foule” (11.120, 124, 111). Because Michael himself has once failed 
to overcome Satan—though neither was he defeated himself—the visions and narrations of 
future days that he shares with Adam, who did succumb to satanic influence, might serve to 
strengthen both of them in the hope of ultimate divine victory. The fallen Adam and Eve 
stand as a testament, after all, to an as-yet-unvanquished Satan. Michael’s prophecy works to 
inscribe the covenant in his own heart just as much as in Adam’s, giving both of them a 
framework of faith to use in making sense of their own experience. 
  The Father dispatches Michael on his second mission with a charge to “reveale / To 
Adam what shall come in future dayes, / As I shall thee enlighten” (11.113-15). The Father 
promises, in other words, to give Michael some knowledge about the future that he can use 
to instruct Adam. Michael does not, however, receive this knowledge in the same forms that 
he will use to convey it to Adam. Not only does Michael display a tactile attentiveness to his 
student’s questions, but the Father’s command to “intermix / My Cov’nant in the womans 
seed renewd” (11.115-16) also grants Michael considerable discretion in arranging this core 
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component of his presentation, as though the Father has ordained the strategy and left the 
tactics to Michael. Milton, in other words, has the Father charitably grant to Michael the 
same sort of interpretative liberty that he had claimed for himself in his prose writings. 
The word “enlighten,” moreover, raises questions about the sources of Michael’s 
prophecy, implying that the knowledge granted by the Father will illuminate something 
already present in Michael, instead of revealing secrets hitherto kept from him.13 What the 
Father enlightens in Michael seems to be his memory of the War in Heaven. As in Michael’s 
own experience of combat with Satan, so also in his prophecy do the forces of evil always 
live to fight another day. Michael frequently uses typology to point forward to the eventual 
triumph of good, but these gestures have often struck critics as tentative at best. William 
Walker, for instance, argues that “Milton’s marked attenuation of events such as the Nativity 
and the Crucifixion interrogates these events as typological fulfillments.”14 Regina Schwartz 
goes even further, arguing that the poem repeatedly offers typological fulfillment, and just as 
repeatedly refuses to give it:  
Each [concluding marker] signals a plausible ending, alluding, as it does, to the final 
bliss at the end of time, and each sounds conclusive enough, but there are too many 
signals; the poem ends too many times and it describes the end too many times, so 
                                                
13 For an argument that Milton’s is a hermeneutics of recognition rather than discovery, see James 
Dougal Fleming, Milton’s Secrecy And Philosophical Hermeneutics (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2008), 28 and 
passim.  
14 William Walker, “Typology and Paradise Lost, Books XI and XII,” Milton Studies 25 (1989): 262. 
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that finally— and that is precisely the wrong word here—these repetitions of an 
ending obtrude the very end they invoke.15 
Michael cannot, however, successfully portray an ending that he has not seen, and, lacking 
the omniscience not even granted in the poem to the Son, he is caught in the same pattern 
of repeated deferral as Adam. Nevertheless, his repeated gestures toward the ending, though 
no more effectual than the mighty stroke of his sword, indicate a newly defiant faith. What 
matters about Michael’s types is not the clarity of fulfillment toward which they 
(unsuccessfully) gesture: the gestures themselves are the point. 
Thus, Michael’s faith appears precisely in the creative manner in which he responds 
to the materials given him by the Father. Each element of Michael’s presentation builds on 
and reshapes what has gone before, using details presumably gleaned from the Father’s 
“enlightening” influence to flesh out old themes and cast them into a new light. The 
repeated gestures toward fulfillment, in other words, are not inherent to the materials 
themselves; they appear instead as indicators of Michael’s faithful artifice, asserting divine 
significance where none must necessarily appear. 
Michael describes something like the opposite of his practice of faithful artifice when 
he speaks of the “grievous Wolves, / Who all the sacred mysteries of Heav’n / To thir own 
vile advantages shall turne” (12.508-10). Enlightenment for Milton does not involve being 
granted access to a divinely rendered transparency of the text, but a “turning” rather akin to 
that undertaken by the “grievous wolves,” albeit a turning to different advantage. Turning is 
                                                
15 Regina Schwartz, “From Shadowy Types to Shadowy Types: The Unendings of Paradise Lost,” 
Milton Studies 24 (1988): 130. 
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an action of profound importance in biblical thought: the Hebrew verb shuwb often signifies 
a return to God through repentance, as when Moses tells Israel, “[when thou] shalt returne 
unto the LORD thy God … That then the LORD thy God will turne thy captivity” (Deut. 
30:2-3). An alternative appears in the Psalmist’s description of Israel’s provocation in the 
wilderness: “Yea they turned backe and tempted God” (Ps. 78:1).16 Enlightenment entails a 
turning not only of the individual towards God, but an interpretative turning of things and 
events such that they point to the workings of Providence. Such an act of faith enables 
Michael to undertake his new mission in light of his past failure to vanquish Satan, and such 
an act of faith will enable Adam and Eve not to find, but rather to create the “paradise 
within” as they face the vicissitudes of a fallen world.  
Given this model of faithful creativity, Gordon Teskey’s account of Miltonic allusion 
helpfully illuminates Michael’s method of drawing on the materials given him by the Father 
and turning them to his own advantage: 
The notion of allusion, of a poet deliberately “playing toward” something in an earlier 
poet, as when we speak of Milton alluding to Ovid, is inadequate for two reasons: 
because it implies a conscious, isolated act of reference rather than a relatively 
unconscious process of improvisation, and because it has the direction of movement 
backwards. The poet does not “play toward” something in the past. Things in the 
past are captured, torn free of their contexts in previous works, and brought forward 
                                                
16 All the instances of turning and returning in these verses translate forms of shuwb. 
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in time to be worked into something new. Instead of imitating, by mimesis, the poet 
improvises with what can be captured[.]17  
Michael takes the knowledge gained from the Father’s “enlightenment” and shapes it 
through improvisation into a new prophecy appropriate to Adam’s new fallen context. If 
Michael’s act of framing the prophecy in this way plays a part in the education of Adam, 
then he is teaching Adam to do with the prophecy, and by extension readers to do with the 
Bible, just what he has done with the information from the Father: wrest texts free from 
their original contexts and turn them charitably to present advantage through proportionate 
acts of faith. 
 
Michael’s Prophetic Method 
Michael’s improvisational method appears throughout his prophecy. He begins near 
the chronological beginning of post-Edenic history, with the story of Cain and Abel, 
significantly omitting any direct prophecy of Adam’s life: while Michael does mention that 
the characters in the first vision are Adam’s sons, he does not reveal their names, thereby 
preventing Adam from knowing precisely which of his children are being represented. The 
episode of the lazar-house that follows, however, shows that the prophecy is not organized 
by linear, chronological time, but by an improvisational logic of modulation.18 Like Michael’s 
                                                
17 Gordon Teskey, Delirious Milton: The Fate of the Poet in Modernity (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 2006), 116. Italics in original. 
18 Kenneth J. Knoespel, writing of the final books in terms of their relationship to (implicitly linear) 
seventeenth-century chronologies, while also recognizing “cycles of degeneration and regeneration,” 
also hints at Michael’s logic of modulation when he observes that “from the panorama of warring 
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withholding of the names of Adam’s sons, this logic works not only to preserve the 
contingency of the future, but, more importantly, to prepare Adam to exercise his liberty 
wisely when he comes to face it.  
At first, Michael’s improvisational logic works to develop and expand Adam’s 
concept of death. Recoiling at the graphic vision of his son’s murder, Adam asks, 
But have I now seen Death? Is this the way 
I must return to native dust? O sight 
Of terrour, foul and ugly to behold, 
Horrid to think, how horrible to feel! 
     (11.462-65) 
Michael responds to this exclamation by explaining that there are “many shapes / Of Death, 
and many … wayes that lead / To his grim Cave, all dismal” (11.467-69), and to illustrate his 
point Michael introduces the vision of the lazar-house. This catalogue of ills contains no 
clues to its placement in the temporal scheme of things, but seems to be more a generalized 
illustration of disease than a specific historical event. Against its apparent atemporality lies 
the explicitly drawn connection between the miseries depicted in the house and the horrific 
                                                
cities, [Adam] learns of death’s multiplication.” Kenneth J. Knoespel, “Milton and the Hermeneutics 
of Time: Seventeenth-Century Chronologies and the Science of History,” Studies in the Literary 
Imagination 22 (1989): 23, 28. Thomas Amorose, however, argues that in the final books Milton rejects 
“the Greco-Roman conception of history as a series of cycles” in favor of a linear, dialectical model. 
Thomas Amorose, “Milton the Apocalyptic Historian: Competing Genres in Paradise Lost, Books XI-
XII,” Milton Studies 17 (1983): 142. Where Amorose uses dialectic to accommodate cyclical history to 
linear, I offer the logic of modulation as a similar “middle way” without the teleological implications 
of dialectic. 
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vision of his unidentified son bleeding out on the ground. In this episode, Michael has taken 
an instance—the death of Adam’s son—and reshaped it into a broader category, working at 
cross-purposes with any sense of temporal organization.19 
The introduction of the lazar-house into an otherwise apparently chronological 
prophecy shows that Michael has chosen to “intermix” his prophecy in more ways than 
simply adding the “Cov’nant in the womans seed renewd” specified in the Father’s charge. 
While the Father presumably included such visions of disease in the information he 
conveyed to Michael, Michael has chosen to deploy them out of sequence to make a point. 
Furthermore, Milton’s expansion of the lazar-house episode by three lines for the 1674 
edition draws attention to the status of the vision as a composite with elements drawn from 
many sources—again, presumably by Michael: 
Dæmoniac Phrenzie, moaping Melancholie 
And Moon-struck madness, pining Atrophie,  
Marasmus, and wide-wasting Pestilence[.] 
      (11.485-87) 
While these lines add mental illness as a category to Milton’s catalogue, their purpose seems 
simply to increase the magnitude of horror for Adam. This episode thus shows Michael 
exercising creativity and agency in shaping the vision to fit his didactic purpose: to help 
Adam develop a faithful—which is to say proportionate—response to the Fall. 
                                                
19 Frank Kermode, “Adam Unparadised,” in The Living Milton: Essays by Various Hands, ed. Frank 
Kermode (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1960), 85-123, argues that death is the great theme of 
Paradise Lost: it is “a poem about death, and about pleasure and its impairment” (p. 121). 
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Thus, when Michael turns from the lazar-house to the revelries taking place in the 
“Tents of various hue” (11.557), and especially when he corrects Adam’s mistaken 
interpretation of the vision, the episode serves to expand still further the idea of death begun 
with Abel and developed in the lazar house, even while returning to the chronology that 
would appear in the Bible. After the vision of the lazar-house, Michael offers a softer version 
of death: “So maist thou live, till like ripe Fruit thou drop / Into thy Mothers lap, or be with 
ease / Gatherd, not harshly plucked, for death mature” (11.535-57). To this, Adam responds 
by looking forward to his “appointed day / Of rendring up” (11.550-51) perhaps a little too 
zealously. Michael puts the logic of modulation to work once again by revising Adam’s ideas 
about the value of life into something new: “Nor love thy life nor hate; but what thou liv’st / 
Live well, how long or short permit to Heav’n” (11.553-54). To illustrate his point and 
expand on what he means by “live well,” Michael teaches Adam to recognize the “Tents of 
various hue” and their attendant pleasures as “tents of wickedness” (11.607-08), where 
wickedness is characterized by marriages figured as enslavement (11.585-87) and a failure to 
acknowledge the gifts of God (11.612) in contrast to the “conformitie divine” that Michael 
defines as Adam’s “nobler end” (11.605-06). 
Michael’s composition does more than simply play the same dreadful note again and 
again, albeit in different keys. In counterpoint to his development of the grim theme of ever-
expanding death, which by Noah’s time has taken the shape of a “World perverse” (11.700), 
and which he will eventually modulate into the beatific “a death like sleep, / A gentle wafting 
to immortal Life” (12.434-5), Michael turns Adam’s murdered son, who was unable to stand 
up for his righteousness, into Enoch, who rises to speak of “Judgment from above” (11.664-
68). Noah in turn re-enacts Enoch, but on a grander scale, and instead of being taken from 
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the wicked world like Enoch, the Flood takes the wicked world from Noah.20 The process of 
creative turning appears as much in what Michael leaves out as in what he includes: by saying 
that Enoch rises “at last,” Michael suggests that the appearance of the one just man depends 
on society having reached a certain critical mass. Perhaps this is a matter of visibility; the idea 
of “one just man” implicitly carries a sense of proportion (or perhaps disproportion), of 
societal wickedness on a grand scale to serve as the necessary foil for the righteous 
individual. Thus Enoch becomes visible in a way that the unmentioned, though righteous, 
Seth could not. Similarly, Abdiel in Book 5 cannot be distinguished from the other angels 
who followed Satan to the North until his zeal prompts him to speak. Michael’s prophetic 
turning must be done according to the harmonic “proportion of faith”: the theme of the one 
just man cannot be understood or interpreted without its counter-theme of wickedness and 
death. The challenge for Michael is to show Adam how to exercise a faith like Enoch’s or 
Noah’s without a societal context of sufficient scale to make his righteousness remarkable. 
The difficulty of discerning between good and evil increases still more when Michael 
uses similar methods of turning in ways that are apparently at odds with his earlier practice. 
For instance, Michael’s introduction of Nimrod is a mirror image of his introduction of 
Enoch. In both cases Michael describes a society growing and developing in a particular way 
until someone “rises” to oppose it (11.664-5, 12.24). Structurally, the story of Nimrod would 
seem to be clear enough, but the value judgments implicit in the context—a time of peace 
and righteousness after the destruction of the Flood—complicate the apparent clarity. 
                                                
20 On the murdered son as a precursory version of Enoch, see Barbara K. Lewalski, “Structure and 
the Symbolism of Vision in Michael’s Prophecy, Paradise Lost, Books XI-XII,” Philological Quarterly 42 
(1963): 30-31. 
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Michael resolves the difficulty by incorporating glosses into his narration to guide Adam 
toward the desired understanding. An unexpected turn remains, however, for where Adam’s 
murdered son, Enoch, and Noah could not finally effect societal change, Nimrod succeeds 
in creating a durable institution: the city of Babel. Notably, Michael’s presentations do not 
provide any positive earthly model of which Babel might be a perversion: the church, it 
seems, must be forever militant, never (yet) triumphant.21 Furthermore, when Michael 
reprises this move toward institutionalization with Abraham and the “one peculiar Nation” 
(12.111), the chosen nation seems to have been built on a sandier foundation than Nimrod’s 
tower, for its story is one of much backsliding: Michael summarizes the history of Israelite 
kings after David in one line: “Part good, part bad, of bad the longer scrowle” (12.336). The 
proportion of evil in the world relative to the good suggests that for Milton, not only the 
texts and events to be interpreted, but also the norms of interpretation themselves, are 
intermingled with obscurity and contradiction. Rather than treating faith as a shining light 
that reveals proportion in apparent confusion, Milton offers a model in which interpreters 
freely effect enlightenment by creating the harmony that they envision through faith. This is 
the model with which Michael equips Adam to face an uncertain future. 
 
Interpreting Improvisation 
If Adam’s inadequacies as an interpreter of Michael’s prophecy have been frequently 
noted, Michael’s improvisational method challenges Adam in ways that are vital to the 
                                                
21 George Miller, “Archetype and History: Narrative Technique in Paradise Lost,” Modern Language 
Studies 10 (1980): 18, compares Nimrod’s foundation of Babel to the devils’ construction of 
Pandemonium as “a material imitation of Heaven.” 
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process of instruction in which the archangel has engaged him. Remarkably, Michael’s 
handling of the sole concept explicitly contained in the Father’s charge seems to complicate 
matters more than it clarifies them. The Father had said to Michael: 
Dismiss them not disconsolate; reveale 
To Adam what shall come in future dayes, 
As I shall thee enlighten, intermix 
My Cov’nant in the womans seed renewd; 
So send them forth, though sorrowing, yet in peace[.] 
     (11.113-17) 
The “Cov’nant in the womans seed renewd” refers to the promise given by the Son when he 
cursed the serpent in Book 10: “Between Thee and the Woman I will put / Enmitie, and 
between thine and her Seed; / Her Seed shall bruise thy head, thou bruise his heel” (10.179-
81). The Father has charged Michael to use this promise to console the fallen pair, and 
Michael evidently fulfils this charge, as the final words in the poem of both Adam and Eve 
express confidence in the covenant (12.573, 623). Even so, Michael chooses to present the 
covenant in obscure or attenuated ways that seem at odds with the Father’s charge and that 
moreover raise questions about how exactly Adam and Eve come by their eventual 
confidence. 
As a foretaste of the covenant’s salutary effects, prior to Michael’s arrival Adam has 
already received consolation through the promise, when Eve used it to bring about a 
reconciliation after the couple’s bitter argument by saying, 
Between us two let there be peace, both joining, 
As joyn’d in injuries, one enmitie 
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Against a Foe by doom express assign’d us, 
That cruel Serpent[.] 
     (10.924-27)22 
Perhaps this small success has made Adam overzealous for the greater success it portends: 
he prematurely sees “Nature … fulfilld in all her ends” after the vision of the “Tents of 
various hue” (11.602, 557), and this prematurity is itself proleptic of Adam’s repeated 
jumping to conclusions about the fulfillment of the covenant. 
 While the difficulty of interpreting the covenant correctly does owe something to 
Adam’s exuberance, then, Milton repeatedly has Michael challenge Adam’s overhasty 
applications of this promise. In the first place, Michael does not “intermix” the covenant as 
much as Adam expects him to, thereby inadvertently encouraging his pupil’s 
overzealousness. Several factors contribute to the difficulty when Michael finally does 
introduce the covenant. Having convinced Adam of the power of death and evil and 
therefore also of the need for the covenant, Michael shifts his presentations from visions to 
narrations. Lares argues convincingly that Michael’s sermon works to produce correction 
through the visions of Book 11 and consolation (i.e., the work of the covenant) through the 
narrations of Book 12 (108). Thus, Adam must learn of the covenant while adjusting to a 
different medium. Furthermore, in telling Adam about Abraham and his seed amidst an 
                                                
22 Georgia B. Christopher, “The Verbal Gate to Paradise: Adam’s ‘Literary Experience’ in Book X of 
Paradise Lost,” PMLA 90 (1975): 75, sees Adam’s subsequent invocation of this promise (10.330-32) 
as the climactic postlapsarian moment in which Adam chooses to live.. Christopher’s insight goes a 
long way toward explaining Adam’s overdetermined relationship to this particular promise, but 
subsequent events in the epic suggest that the Adam of Book 10 still has much to learn about the 
import and application of the promise. 
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unprecedented preponderance of specific names for places and people, Michael introduces a 
flurry of additional typological allusions, speaking of Moses specifically as a figure of the 
Messiah and taking advantage of the fact that the Greek Jesus is a transliteration of the 
Hebrew Joshua to foretell the Messiah’s name (12.240-43, 310). Michael offers these allusions 
after explicitly delaying an explanation of the covenant: 
This ponder, that all Nations of the Earth 
Shall in his [i.e., Abraham’s] Seed be blessed; by that Seed 
Is meant thy great deliverer, who shall bruise  
The Serpents head; whereof to thee anon 
Plainlier shall be reveald. 
     (12.147-51) 
Michael thus provides Adam with an abundance of information without offering any clarity 
at all about what bruising the serpent’s head will actually entail, playing into a pattern of 
repeated deferral like the one noted by Schwartz. It is hardly surprising, then, that Adam 
expects the Messiah to be a version of Achilles who will defeat the serpent in single combat, 
especially given Raphael’s mock-Homeric account of the War in Heaven. Michael, of course, 
disabuses him of this notion, saying “Dream not of thir fight, / As of a Duel, or the local 
wounds / Of head or heel” (12.386-88), but Michael also speaks of the actual victory in 
symbolic terms that simply add to Adam’s interpretative burden:  
But to the Cross he nailes thy Enemies, 
The Law that is against thee, and the sins 
Of all mankinde, with him there crucifi’d, 
Never to hurt them more who rightly trust 
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In this his satisfaction[.] 
     (12.415-19) 
Michael, in short, never tells Adam explicitly how the covenant will be fulfilled, or what 
fulfillment might even mean, but rather invites him to trust that the terms will be satisfied. 
 The invitation to trust, given in the face of what amounts to interpretative 
impossibility, brings the problem of interpretation for both Michael and Adam back to faith. 
Michael cannot tell Adam what fulfillment might mean because he does not know himself, 
and his own decision to trust, more than any privileged access to the facts, impels his 
invitation for Adam to undertake a similar trust. Adam finds himself in situation with respect 
to the covenant similar to that expressed in what would become the New Testament locus 
classicus on faith, Hebrews 11:1: “Now faith is the substance of things hoped for, the 
evidence of things not seene.” The word “substance” translates the Greek hypostasis, meaning 
literally “that upon which something stands,” or a foundation. For readers of the poem, the 
verse therefore takes on a retrospectively ironic cast with regard to Adam, for Michael has 
offered him no sure grounds for interpretation, and the evidence of this unseen fulfillment is 
scanty at best. This irony, however, merely points to a paradox inherent in the verse—that 
faith supplies the absent foundation upon which it rests—and this paradox invites Adam to 
do what Michael has been doing throughout his prophecy. Rather than finding the meaning 
inherent in the materials he is given, Adam must choose to wrest them from their context 
and shape them prophetically according to the proportion of faith.  
The trust demonstrated by Michael rests on nothing more than a performative series 
of ritualized repetitions. That Adam never quite manages to produce a fully adequate 
interpretation is less important in the end than his assumption of the correct interpretative 
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posture: he learns not to aspire to knowledge beyond “what this Vessel can containe” 
(12.559). Adam follows this statement with a list of specific actions he will need to 
implement: 
Henceforth I learne, that to obey is best, 
And love with fear the onely God, to walk 
As in his presence, ever to observe 
His providence, and on him sole depend, 
Mercifull over all his works, with good 
Still overcoming evil, and by small 
Accomplishing great things, by things deemd weak 
Subverting worldly strong, and worldly wise 
By simply meek[.] 
     (12.561-69) 
These actions share a persistent focus on the present moment, with an orientation to the 
future. The opening “henceforth” gestures to the future, as do the adverbs “ever” and “still,” 
the latter in the sense of “always,” which was still the dominant sense in the seventeenth 
century. The present-tense “learne” keeps Adam rooted in the present, as do the repeated 
present participles, whose relative tense is determined by “learne,” the sentence’s only finite 
verb. In this present, Adam no longer expects to find concrete evidence of God; rather, he 
will “walk / As in his presence.” The “as” shows Adam using faith prophetically to assert the 
divine presence in the absence of any evidence, assembling a providential history out of 
mundane events. When Adam says that he will “observe / [God’s] providence,” then, he  
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means “observe” in its primary sense, “to act in accordance with, fulfill,”23 and not in the 
senses having to do with vision or discernment.24 His obedience will produce that which he 
obeys. Adam will thus hearken to a voice he cannot hear and follow in the footsteps of a 
guide he may never see, at the awful and never-abating risk of being utterly mistaken or even 
self-deluded. Nevertheless, he has no regard now for the sins of the Garden; rather, he looks 
forward in faith to his “Redeemer ever blest” (12.573), and he will manifest his faith in the 
actions of the present. When Adam has assumed this posture, Michael tells him, “This 
having learnt, thou hast attaind the summe / Of wisdome” (12.575-76). This attainment 
enables Adam to speak in what John Reichert aptly notes is a particularly “biblical idiom”:  
Nowhere in the poem, I believe, can we find a more biblical idiom, a language that 
moves so easily between the Old Testament and New. Adam has been cut loose 
from his reliance on the heavenly beings who spoke the Word to him. … Adam, in 
short, has so caught the Spirit of what Michael has told him that he can express it, in 
effect, as Scripture. (246-48)  
Even though his words, because unwritten, can be scriptural only “in effect,” Adam has 
finally learned to speak “according to the proportion of faith.” 
 
Prophesying the Bible 
 If, as I have been arguing, remembering that the Bible has yet to be written is key to 
understanding Michael’s prophecy, then the references to written scripture in the prophecy 
                                                
23 OED, “observe,” v., I. 
24 Pace Ainsworth, 139. 
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become more than a little curious.25 Why mention written scripture at all if Adam and Eve, 
supposedly representative of universal humanity, do not need it? How does written scripture 
relate to the proportion of faith, given Milton’s inversion of the usual Augustinian way of 
connecting them? Ultimately, even though Michael tends to emphasize scripture written by 
the Spirit on believers’ hearts over more literal kinds of writing, he nevertheless leaves a role 
for written scripture to play in teaching the proportion of faith.  
Michael’s reference to at least some of the New Testament writings is clear enough: 
the Apostles will leave “thir doctrine and thir story written” before they die (12.506). Even 
so, his references to material textual artifacts of the Hebrew Bible pose some difficulties. He 
refers to a “scrowle” (12.336) of good kings and bad (mostly bad), but whether this refers to 
the biblical books of Kings and Chronicles or to the primary sources for those books 
                                                
25 It is also strange to find Michael assuming that Adam knows what writing is. The poem contains 
some three references to reading and writing prior to Michael’s mentions of written scripture in Book 
12, but none of these resolves the question of where Adam learned about language in its written 
form. Collectively, however, these references imply that literacy is a divine phenomenon, though the 
first of them refers to a summons being read at the beginning of the “great consult” (1.798). The 
other two follow the familiar trope of treating the heavens as a book, as when Gabriel tells Satan at 
the end of Book 4: “read thy Lot in yon celestial Sign” (4.1011). The last reference, though, combines 
this trope with another archangelic mention of actual writing, when Raphael in Book 8 tells Adam 
that “Heav’n / Is as the Book of God before thee set, / Wherein to read his wondrous Works,” 
followed some lines on by a mocking description of how later people will “gird the Sphear / With 
Centric and Eccentric scribl’d o’re” (8.67-69, 83). If one is left to wonder how Adam knows about 
writing so soon after the Fall, one must wonder about his prelapsarian literacy as well. 
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remains unclear.26 He says that “God … will himself … Ordain them Lawes” (12.227-30), 
without mentioning any writing (by the finger of God or otherwise), and yet a few lines later 
the Law has clearly been written down: 
By his [i.e., God’s] prescript a Sanctuary is fram’d 
Of Cedar, overlaid with Gold, therein 
An Ark, and in the Ark his Testimony, 
The Records of his Cov’nant[.] 
     (12.249-52) 
Not only does Michael speak of “Records,” which will obviously need to have been recorded 
at some point, but he also speaks of a divine “prescript,” which ordinarily means “a thing 
which is prescribed or laid down as a rule; an ordinance, a law, a command,”27 but which 
ultimately derives from the Latin præscribere, whose primary sense is “to write before.”28 
Michael thus implies that the people constructing the Tabernacle will have access to 
something like the written instructions in Exodus chapters 25-27, which describe its various 
planned components in meticulous detail. Nevertheless, he leaves the literal writing of the 
Law shrouded in mystery. 
In his final narration, Michael promises a spiritual writing of the law on believers’ 
hearts, setting up a contrast with the kinds of literal writing he has hitherto mentioned: 
                                                
26 E.g., “Now the rest of the actes of Rehoboam, and all that he did, are they not written in the booke 
of the Chronicles of the kings of Judah?” (1 Kings 14:29). The Chronicles here referred to are not the 
biblical books of the same name, about whose compilation much remains mysterious. 
27 OED, “prescript,” n., 1. 
28 Lewis and Short, “præscribo,” I. 
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    from Heav’n 
Hee to his own a Comforter will send, 
The promise of the Father, who shall dwell 
His Spirit within them, and the Law of Faith 
Working through love, upon thir hearts shall write[.] 
     (12.485-89) 
This spiritual writing does not eliminate the need for written records, however. A few lines 
later Michael tells of “grievous Wolves,” who shall  
the truth 
With superstitions and traditions taint, 
Left onely in those written Records pure, 
Though not but by the Spirit understood. 
     (12.508, 511-14) 
In addition to placing the composition of a part of the Bible into historical context, Michael 
contrasts the purity of the “written Records” with both extra-scriptural tradition and the 
necessity of understanding these records, no matter how pure, by the Spirit alone. He 
reinforces the necessity of gaining a spiritual understanding when he tells Adam that these 
“wolves” will appropriate to themselves 
The Spirit of God, promisd alike and giv’n 
To all Beleevers; and from that pretense, 
Spiritual Lawes by carnal power shall force  
On every conscience; Laws which none shall finde 
Left them inrould, or what the Spirit within 
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Shall on the heart engrave. 
     (12.519-24) 
Through a pregnant Miltonic “or,” Michael presents the “engraving” of the Spirit on the 
heart as an alternative to the literal writings that have been “inrould.” That the “written 
Records pure” are “not but by the Spirit understood,” however, credits the spiritual writing 
with greater accuracy than the literal, even as the literal writing nevertheless serves as one 
balance in which the wolves’ pretended (and explicitly unwritten) laws are found wanting. 
Even so, “what the Spirit within / Shall on the heart engrave” implies that written records of 
the usual sort, no matter how pure, do not contain everything that God might reveal. 
 Given Michael’s view of literal scripture’s limitations, it is worth noting that his 
explicit references to written scripture (excepting the “scrowle” of good kings and bad) all 
occur after he has paused for a second time, perhaps signaling the intended end of his 
prophecy. Michael’s first pause marks the shift from vision to narration at the beginning of 
Book 12 (12.2); he pauses for a second time, “[a]s at the Worlds great period” (12.467), after 
he has concluded his long explanation of the “Cov’nant in the womans seed renewd” with 
an allusion to a time when “the Earth / Shall be all Paradise, far happier place / Then this of 
Eden, and far happier days” (12.463-65). Adam responds to Michael’s narration with joy—
“O goodness infinite, goodness immense!” (12.469)—but also with a question:  
But say, if our deliverer up to Heav’n 
Must reascend, what will betide the few 
His faithful, left among th’ unfaithful herd, 
The enemies of truth; who then shall guide 
His people, who defend? will they not deale 
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Wors with his followers then with him they dealt? 
     (12.479-84) 
Because Michael’s response to this question ultimately concludes with an eschatological 
reference similar to the one he has already made—“New Heav’ns, new Earth” (12.549)—
and, after another speech from Adam, the promise of “[a] paradise within thee, happier farr” 
(12. 587), his references to written scripture as he narrates the Christian era appear simply to 
be part of yet another improvisation on themes developed in the prophecy as a whole, a 
creative reprise of what he has just said. Taking his earlier treatments of the analogy of faith 
to a logical extreme, Milton now treats written scripture as working to illustrate the 
proportion of faith, rather than merely serving as the basis from which that proportion is 
derived. 
 Everything turns on our recognizing that there was no Bible in Eden, for otherwise 
the events it would eventually describe could not remain contingent, but would rather be 
imbued with a dull necessity that would make Michael’s educational endeavors both 
pointless and boring—and, moreover, uncharitable, because they would leave Adam and 
Eve unfree. This charitable emphasis on the contingency of future events enables Milton to 
use both Michael and Adam as models for his readers, whether they have access to the Bible 
or not. Michael does not have the Bible, but the creative method of improvisational 
interpretation that he applies to the materials given him by the Father, and which he teaches 
to Adam, exemplifies Milton’s counter to the “obstinate literality” and “alphabetical servility” 
among interpreters of scripture that he had complained about in The Doctrine and Discipline of 
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Divorce.29 In dramatizing this method, Milton articulates a vision of faith and Christian liberty 
that does not depend on written scriptures, but that nevertheless informs how he thinks 
written scriptures ought to be used. Michael teaches Adam how to exercise this liberty by 
persistently undercutting his facile and premature overgeneralizations, urging in their place a 
patient and continued searching with an eye not to present certainty but toward an uncertain 
future: 
Som natural tears they drop’d, but wip’d them soon; 
The World was all before them, where to choose 
Thir place of rest, and Providence thir guide: 
They hand in hand with wandring steps and slow, 
Through Eden took thir solitarie way. 
     (12.645-49) 
The poem concludes by opening up to a world of all-encompassing possibility, in which the 
guidance of Providence must be sought and chosen. Without Michael’s instruction 
(including the “gentle Dreams … / Portending good” given to Eve [12.595-96]), Adam and 
Eve would have been poorly equipped to make this vital choice. They would have possessed 
liberty but lacked the means to make it enduring. Milton presents such durable liberty not as 
their natural state, but as a state of harmony with the “proportion of faith” into which they 
must enter. Reading Paradise Lost with reference to this proportion of faith instead of the 
written Bible suggests that Milton’s poem, long recognized as an audaciously creative 
interpretation of scripture, might be something more audacious still: like De Doctrina 
                                                
29 John Milton, The Doctrine and Discipline of Divorce (London, 1643), 22. Thomason E.62[17]. 
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Christiana, Paradise Lost might be something of a personal Bible, which Milton produced 
through a sustained, creative, and above all, liberated engagement with the scripture written 
on his heart. That these two personal Bibles do not agree in every particular shows just how 
essential to Milton’s thinking about the sacred these values of liberty and charity really are.
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